Chinese Companies in Germany

中国企业在德国

Chances and Challenges

机会与挑战

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BertelsmannStiftung

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This study originated as part of the project „Corporate Cultures in Global Interaction – People, Strategies, and Success," which seeks to promote international and intercultural cooperation within and among companies. In addition to Sino-German cooperation, its focus areas include international value creation, cooperation competence, cultural diversity within companies, mergers and acquisitions and corporate culture, as well as virtual teams. An overview of the project's publications can be found at the end of the brochure.

The bilingual publication "Chinese Companies in Germany – Chances and Challenges" is availible in German/Chinese (print and digital) and English/Chinese (digital only).

The digital versions can be downloaded at:
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本课题是贝塔斯曼基金会“在全球互动中的企业文化——人、战略和成果”项目的一部分，此项目旨在推进企业内和企业间的跨国与跨文化合作。除强化德中合作外，课题也致力于国际价值创造、协作能力、企业内文化多样性、企业并购、企业文化及网络虚拟合作。在本手册后面附有一个此项目出版物的总览。

《中国企业在德国——机会与挑战》用德中双语（印刷版和电子版）和英中双语（电子版）发表。

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Preface

China and Germany:
Mutual Understanding and Respect as a Basis for Intercultural Competence

前言

中国与德国：理解与尊重作为跨文化整合能力的基础

In the recent past China, after having modernized its economic system, has developed in a way for which there are few precedents. This has happened because the state decided to accord top priority to economic progress and opened its doors to the rest of the world. In the meantime the fastest growing economy has already been integrated to a significant extent into the global system, and it is now difficult to imagine a world without China, be it as a manufacturing location, as an export and import market, and increasingly as an investor. As a rising economic power it is spawning companies which are active on a global scale and, in the course of their internationalization, are increasingly beginning to invest in Germany. On the German market they are customers, suppliers, partners, and also employers. These recent developments indicate that there are new opportunities for Sino-German cooperation from which, under certain circumstances, both sides can benefit.

Change is initially rather unsettling, which is naturally human, and is sometimes coupled with anxiety. This is especially true of the profound and fast-moving innovations which are a concomitant of economic and social globalization. Our customary ways of thinking and acting no longer help us to deal with the novelty of the situation, and we feel that it constitutes a threat. In order to perceive the opportunities inherent in new developments such as the internationalization of Chinese companies, we must be prepared to interact with our new partners and learn to appreciate them for what they are. This is of course true of both sides, Germany as the host country, and Chinese companies in their capacity as investors.

近年来，伴随着经济体制的现代化，中国取得了无以伦比的发展。她以经济发展为中心，向世界敞开了国门。无论是作为生产基地、供货及销售市场，还是作为日益强盛的投资者，这个增长最为迅速的国民经济体，已经成为世界经济中起着决定性作用的不可或缺的一员。中国日渐强大的经济实力造就了许多跨国集团，其国际化的进程也给德国带来了越来越多的投资。在德国市场上，他们既是客户、供应商、合作伙伴，也是雇主。这种尚处于起步阶段的发展，为中德合作提供了新的机会，并使双方在基于一定的前提下从中获益。

变更之初常伴随着不安，有时甚至是恐惧，这是人之常情。尤其是那些深入的、促进经济和社会全球化的剧变，更是如此。人们习以为常的思维和行为方式，不再能够适应和应对新的形势，从而感觉受到威胁。因此，要想抓住诸如中国企业国际化发展带来的机会，德国作为东道国，中国企业作为投资商，双方都必须接纳对方，欢迎对方的参与并学会正确地评价对方。

It is perfectly possible to express economic relations between countries in terms of investment totals and export levels. Yet behind these numbers there are human beings who cooperate. This is moulded by social and religious traditions, by cultural and historical roots, and by political and legal developments in the various societies. In other words, by their values! Even if in our globalized world the relations between countries are becoming closer by the minute, we must not assume that an alignment of the economic systems will lead to an alignment of the different cultures.

A monochrome global culture will not and indeed should not materialize. The specific peculiarities and cultural identities are simply too valuable, and we cannot afford to lose them. Thus we must create an understanding for and appreciation of the culture of others, and keep reviewing our own attitudes. Investing in foreign markets calls first and foremost for an appreciation of the local culture and respect for people. Without these things it will be difficult to achieve sustainable entrepreneurial success. With this kind of approach we can create an intercultural competence that enables us to combine cultural elements in such a way that for the people concerned living and working together enriches their lives on a societal and personal level, and also in companies and the business world.

虽然投资额度和出口数量可以说明国家间的经济交往，但每一个数字的背后其实是人与人的合作。这种合作受到各自的社会宗教、文化历史、政治法律，简言之，也就是各自的价值观的深刻影响。在我们这个全球化的世界，即使国家间的联系越来越紧密，我们也不能理所当然的认为，经济体系的趋同一定会伴随着同等程度的文化趋同。

一个统一的全球文化不会也不应该产生，因为每一种文化的特点和个性都是无价之宝，不允许割舍。重要的是我们要设法理解和尊重异国文化，并把这种理解和尊重不断地体现在自己的行为中。境外投资首先要求尊重和认同各自的人文。没有这一点，企业的成功难以持续保证。有了这一点，我们就有能力，让多元文化的组合，为参与方的合作和生活——在社会和个人方面，同时也在企业内部带来收益。

Mutual understanding which transcends the borders between cultures and states is crucial also for international corporations as they strive for economic success. They need to create a framework for their employees in which the latter can contribute and develop their skills in an intercultural environment. The corporate culture should absorb the social, emotional and historical values of the employees and use this diversity to contribute to the ongoing development of individuals and organizations.

An ability to learn, a willingness to embrace change, and partnership are important preconditions if as a global economic community we wish to ensure common wellbeing and survival. Yet mutual respect and esteem form the essential basis for companies as they go about their business of making and distributing goods, and shoulder their societal responsibility to achieve innovation, growth, employment and thus prosperity.

The following case studies and statements outline the kind of preconditions for fruitful Sino-German cooperation which does justice to the intercultural challenges. Thus it would be gratifying if within the global value chains there could be enhanced cooperation and thus greater achievement. For this reason I am especially grateful to the companies, specialists and employees who have taken part in this project.

成功地跨越文化和国界的沟通，对跨国企业的经济成就至关重要。跨国企业必须为其员工创造基本条件，让每位员工能够在国际文化的工作环境下充分施展和开发其聪明才智。企业文化必须融员工的社会、情感和历史的价值于一体，通过它的多样化，促进企业和个人的不断发展。

学习能力、思变能力及合作能力是我们这个全球经济统一体能够保证人们生活安康的重要前提。尊重和认同首先奠定了一个基础，使得企业不仅要履行其生产和供给合同，而且要对技术革新、经济增长、保证就业和社会繁荣承担责任。

本书的案例分析和结论给出了能够胜任国际文化挑战的中德成功合作的前提。我们希望，在全球价值创造链条中，能借此推动所有参与方的密切合作以帮助其成功。在此，请允许我对所有参与企业、专家和工作人员的协力表示衷心感谢！

Liz Mohn

Vice-Chair of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
Executive Board,
Gütersloh

莉兹・摩恩
贝塔斯曼基金会执行董事会副主席
居特斯洛

Chinese Investments in Germany

中国企业在德国的投资

Chinese companies are steadily expanding their presence in international markets, and in this respect Germany is no exception. Whilst it is true that this confronts companies, their employees and Germany as a business location with certain challenges, it also offers new opportunities of a societal and intercultural kind, in the areas of business administration, and for both countries' economies. The market entry of foreign companies has always been accompanied by changes in the local economy. They become apparent both in competition for customers and employees, and also in the opportunities for cooperation which transcend value chain sequences and sectors. The development of a particular location, and sometimes even of a whole region, is occasionally shaped to some extent by foreign investment, and there are closer economic and social links between the two countries concerned. Germany has experienced this on a number of occasions, first with investment by American and European corporations, and then by their Japanese and Korean counterparts. When a country first begins to pour in growing amounts of direct investment there is often uncertainty about the investors' intentions.

Investment by Western companies in Asia is now a completely normal occurrence, and many Asian companies such as, for example, Sony, Toyota, Canon, Samsung, Hyundai and LG have become household names on the global market. Until recently foreign investment in Germany and China was still a rather one-sided affair. For many years a significant number of German companies have been doing business in China. Chinese companies are now following their example and invest in Germany.

The Development of International Direct Investment

International foreign direct investment (FDI) has reached gigantic dimensions. According to OECD statistics, the OECD countries invested 1,818 billion US dollars abroad in 2007, and received investments totalling 1,370 billion US dollars. Direct

中国企业越来越多地在国际市场上亮相，包括德国市场。这不仅给企业及其员工以及经济场所德国带来了挑战，同时也在企业管理、国民经济、社会政治和文化方面为它们提供了新的机遇。外国公司进入市场总会使当地的经济发生一些变化。这些变化不仅体现在对客户和雇员的竞争方面，还表现在价值创造等级和行业之间协作的可能性上。投资地的发展，有时甚至是整个地区的发展，也会随之受到海外投资的影响，两国间经济和社会方面的联系将日益紧密。德国在这方面已积累了丰富的经验，从美国和欧洲企业集团的投资，到日本韩国的投资。当一个新的投资国刚开始加大直接投资力度时，由于投资者缺乏经验，投资往往存在不确定性。

人们对西方企业到亚洲投资早就习以为常，现在很多亚洲公司，诸如索尼、丰田、佳能、三星、现代和LG在世界市场上的地位也已深入人心。直到不久前，德国和中国之间的海外投资还是单方面的：多年来，德国企业以重大的规模对中国进行了投资，现在中国企业也紧随其后，来到了德国。

外商直接投资的发展

外商直接投资（Foreign Direct Investment，简称FDI）总体上已经形成了极大规模：根据经济合作与发展组织OECD统计，OECD国家2007年在海外共投资18.18亿美

investment still primarily occurs between industrialized countries, though in recent years there has been a noticeable increase in FDI both between the emerging economies themselves and by companies from these states in industrialized countries (OECD 2008). This pattern is also in evidence in the PR China, where at the beginning of the 1990s foreign investment had already reached about 70 per cent of the level recorded in developed countries. Around the time of the millennium this declined to about 36 per cent as a result of greater investment in developing countries, and in the period up to 2004 even sank to 22 per cent of the total investment volume. Western Europe is an exception, where investment rose between 2001 and 2004 from just about 2 per cent to 4.5 per cent.

In keeping with these developments, China's foreign investment in Germany rose strongly after 2002.

元，同时吸收海外投资13.7亿美元。直接投资仍然主要在工业国家之间进行，但在过去的几年中，不仅新兴国家间的FDI显著增长，这些国家的企业对工业国家的投资也大幅提高（OECD 2008）。这一发展趋势在中国也有所体现，90年代初中国将近70%的海外投资流入了发达国家。在世纪之交，由于对发展中国家投资力度的加大，这一比例降至约36%，到2004年甚至降至总投资额的22%。但西欧是一个例外，2001至2004年间中国对西欧的投资从不到2%升至4.5%。

与此相应，自2002年起，中国对德国的投资也迅速增加。

Indirect and direct Chinese FDI in Germany
中国对德国的直接及间接性直接投资

Absolute end-of-year totals, without Hong Kong.

As of 30 November 2008.

完全年末状态，不计香港。

日期：2008年11月30日

Source: German Bundesbank 2008 a.
来源：德国联邦银行 2008 a。

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Whereas Chinese direct investment in Germany rose more than tenfold between 1989 and 2006, from 27 million euros to almost 300 million euros, the extent of German investment was still on a much higher level. Thus the volume of German investment in China in the same period increased from 88 million euros to almost 13 billion euros, that is, latterly it was almost 150 times greater.

中国对德国的直接投资在1989年至2006年间从2700万欧元上升至将近3亿欧元，涨幅超过10倍，与此同时，德国对华投资规模的增长速度远远超过这一水平。同一时期，德国企业对华投资额从8800万欧元上升至130亿欧元，增长将近150倍。

中德两国间直接投资的动机

德国企业近十年来对投资中国寄予了热切的期望——“中国神话”四处流传：地缘广阔的巨大市场，数目庞大的潜在消费者及其无可限量的消费追补需求吸引了众多德国企业来华投资。其中许多企业在初期遇到了困难，而后也一再面临倒退的危险。但他们从中学到了很多跨文化管理方面的知识，也能够取得一些成功，比如汽车、化工和机械制造行业中的许多企业。

Indirect and direct German FDI in China
德国对中国的直接及间接性直接投资

Source: German Bundesbank 2008 b.
来源：德国联邦银行 2008 b。

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Motivation for Direct Investment in China and in Germany

German companies have been placing inordinate hopes in their forays into China for decades. It was a contagious China hype. The giant market with its mammoth geographical dimensions and the huge number of potential customers with their supposedly infinite catch-up demand tempted numerous German companies to try their luck in China. Many of them had teething problems and kept coming up against setbacks. However, they were on a learning curve with regard to intercultural management and by now can also look back at successful ventures in, for example, the automotive, the chemical and the machine tool industries.

International corporations have tapped into China as a manufacturing location and as an import and export market, and this process has also been of benefit to the Chinese economy and to Chinese companies. Economic regions have been able to develop, and through their new customers or partners local companies have forged links with other countries and have made good use of them in the course of the internationalization process, especially since China became a member of the WTO in 2001, in order to tap into new markets for themselves.

In addition to the business interests of individual companies, the interests of the Chinese government have acted as a spur to internationalization and investment in foreign markets. China is supposed to be catching up with the leading industrialized nations, and to stop being their admittedly increasingly successful workshop. The basic idea is to create a kind of balance. In China Chinese companies are increasingly being challenged by foreign competitors (for example, in the household appliances sector, where a number of German manufacturers are very active and are making life hard for domestic companies), and are thus looking for new markets to make up for the lost ground.

So why do Chinese companies want to invest in Germany? There are certainly numerous reasons for going to other regions, and this is in fact what Chinese companies are doing. Cultural and geographical proximity lead them to do business in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The sheer size of the market is the reason why they are motivated to enter the U.S. market. A need to secure supplies of raw materials is the motivation for going to countries which possess the requisite natural resources. And Germany is attractive on account of its high technological level, its legal security, the quality of the workforce, its market clout, and its central location in the EU and Europe. The largely positive and indeed respectful image of Germany plays a part in decisions to choose Germany as a location.

当外国企业将中国作为生产基地、销售和供货市场加以开发的同时，中国经济和中国企业也从这一发展中获益：经济地区得到了发展，当地企业通过新客户或新联络伙伴与国外取得了联系。自2001年中国加入世贸组织以来，在企业的国际化进程中，这些对外关系发挥了重要作用，有助于企业开发新的市场。

除了企业的经济利益之外，中国政府的利益也推动着企业加快国际化脚步，到海外投资。中国应该致力于晋升为先进的工业国家，而不能长期停留在仅仅作为延长工作台的阶段，即使中国将这一角色扮演得很成功。与此同时，中国也努力追求平衡：外国竞争者在中国的出现（例如在家电行业，一些德国生产商在中国表现活跃，对本地企业构成了竞争），使中国企业面临更大的挑战，为了应对这种环境变化，它们需要寻找新的市场。

为什么中国投资者恰恰选中德国？毋庸置疑，中国企业有很多去其他地方投资的理由，事实上他们也确实在如此实践：文化和地理上的接近导致中国企业奔赴东亚和东南亚；市场规模促使中国企业进军美国市场；原材料保障的必要性驱使中国企业到相应的国家进行投资。投资德国通常是因为看中德国较高的技术水平、法律保障、劳动力质量、强大的市场购买力和位于欧盟乃至欧洲的中心位置。此外，德国一向积极、受人尊重的形象也对投资者选择德国产生了正面影响。

而中国投资者在德国的形象却往往相反。有时在讨论利润导向的海外投资者时，不同媒体会一致得出相当负面的印象，这种印象使人们的不满日益高涨，并煽动恐惧情绪——例如，“明镜”杂志2006年刊登了一篇题为“来自远东的侵略”的文章。也许这

On the other hand, the image of Chinese investors in Germany is often quite different. One-sided reports when there are debates about profit-oriented investors from abroad sometimes paint a fairly negative picture which whips up emotions and raises anxieties. For example, in 2006 “Der Spiegel” carried a title page with the words “Assault from the Far East.” Perhaps this image is the reason why many Chinese investors act in such an inconspicuous manner. Examples are the 40 per cent stake in the profitable drugstore chain Rossmann, the majority stake in the successful fashion company Esprit, and the acquisition of traditional German brands such as Goldpfeil and Junghans.

This negative picture is in stark contrast to the interest German industry continues to display in Chinese direct investment. For example, in 2004 Heinrich von Pierer lent support to the idea as the German government’s representative for “Invest in Germany,” and compiled a list of “Ten Points for Germany” which were designed to explain his views on the subject. Two years later BASF chief executive Jürgen Hambrecht, who had just been elected to the post of chairman of the Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business, made this point. “We also need them [the Asians] as investors in Europe, for in a networked global economy there cannot be and there should not be one-way streets.” For this reason Hambrecht, like many other business leaders, welcomes Chinese direct investment in Germany and attempts to play down the anxieties. “In this area the [only] people who have got something to worry about are those who are not good enough.” However, such people would also lose out to Western competitors.

Challenges to Intercultural Management

Not only for German businesses does the entry of Chinese companies in the German market pose certain challenges relating to transcultural cooperation. The skills of the Chinese managers are also put to the test and, as in the case of German companies in China, they learn as they go along. First there is the problem of choosing a suitable legal form for company and of selecting a location, and then decisions have to be made about the degree of localization (adaptation to the German and possibly the European markets) and globalization (the standardization everywhere in the world of processes and products): To what extent should the company adapt to local cultural standards and modify its products so that they correspond to what people like to touch and taste, and how unmistakable will the international image of a brand remain in the process? How local or global should human resources management be in a “German company with Chinese roots?” At the heart of these questions is the problem of organizing intercultural interfaces: They will have to be structured within the company (in a Sino-German workforce

种负面印象是许多中国投资者宁愿低调行事的一个原因，就像他们在利润较高的清洁用品连锁店Rossmann参股40%，在蒸蒸日上的时装企业集团Esprit占有多数股权，以及收购Goldpfeil或Junghans等传统德国品牌时做的那样。

与这种负面印象同时存在的，是德国经济对来自中国的直接投资的巨大兴趣。海因里希·冯·皮埃尔2004年曾作为“德国政府投资促进署”的联邦委托人为德国经济做广告，并列举出“投资德国的十点理由”来支持这一选择。两年后，巴斯夫总裁于尔根·哈姆布莱希特竞选亚太理事会（APA）主席时强调：“我们也需要他们（亚洲人）作为欧洲的投资者，在紧密交织的世界经济网中不能够也不允许只有单行线。”因此哈姆布莱希特向其他许多经济界领袖一样欢迎中国直接投资者来到德国，并试图消除人们的恐惧心理：“在这里[只有]那些做得不够好的企业才需要担心。”而这些企业也同样会被西方竞争对手淘汰出局。

跨文化管理方面的挑战

中国企业进入德国市场不仅给德国经济参与者带来了跨文化合作方面的挑战，也同样考验着中国管理者的能力，这些中国管理者——象德国企业在中国的管理者一样，会逐渐积累起经验。他们首先面临的问题是选择企业形式和投资地点，以及本土化（按照德国，甚至欧洲市场进行自身调整）和全球化（维持全球统一流程及产品）程度：企业在多大程度上根据本地文化标准调整其产品的品位和外观，在多大程度上保留品牌的国际同一性？人事管理者应如何在一个“根植于中国的德国企业”中把握地区和全球性的关系？这个问题的核心在于对跨文化交织点的管理和组织：他们必须对企业内——从德国投资地到中国母公司的中德职工中；

Find out more about value creation structures in "Managing the International Value Chain"

from the German location to the Chinese parent company) or emanate from the company (to reach local customers, suppliers and the general public). The case studies of Chinese companies in Germany contained in this publication describe this state of affairs.

They describe the different ways in which companies from various industries came to Germany, depict the challenges of intercultural cooperation, and present action options with which they can be surmounted. Dürkopp Adler and Waldrich Coburg are examples of medium-sized German technology companies which, after having been taken over by the SGSB Group and Beijing No. 1 Machine Tools respectively, were confronted with the task of facilitating Sino-German cooperation. The story of today's Lenovo Germany is that of a corporation with three sets of cultural roots – it is a former division of the U.S. corporation IBM at a German location and has a Chinese owner – which has survived in the global computer market. The case of the household appliances manufacturer Haier illustrates how a Chinese company that was successful in the domestic market is also pursuing its internationalization through organic growth in Germany. Baosteel Europe and Minmetals are examples of how the roles of companies which are state-owned enterprises have changed in the German market (from suppliers for the domestic market to international sellers) and what specific requirements had to be mastered in the process.

On the basis of the insights garnered from the case studies, the final section presents some of the best practices with which companies were able to succeed in expanding their activities in the German market.

The case studies are based on interviews with Chinese and German employees and executives of the companies concerned, analyses of company documents and external sources. Interviews with specialists concerning legal and management issues provide background information which can help both sides to develop mutual understanding and to structure cooperation. Thus this publication will be of interest to everyone who in the broadest sense of the word is involved in the internationalization of Chinese companies, no matter what their nationality is or from what culture they come from. ■

您可以参阅《国际性新创价值管理》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于新创价值的建构的内容。

以及企业外——面向当地客户、供货商和公众的方方面面有一个构想。本书描述了中国企业在德国发展的案例研究。

这些案例向人们展示了来自各行各业的企业赴德投资的不同经历，阐述了跨文化合作带来的挑战，并介绍了企业应对这些挑战的操作方法。杜克普爱华和瓦德里希科堡是德国中型技术企业的代表，在它们分别被上工申贝和北京第一机床厂收购后，它们与新东家一道构划了企业内中德员工的合作。今日的联想德国分公司的故事告诉大家，一家拥有三个（不同）文化根基的企业——前美国IBM公司的一个部门现在作为中国企业在德国的分公司，是如何保持在全球计算机市场上的地位的。家电企业海尔的案例说明，一个在本土市场上获得成功的中国企业是如何通过有机增长的方式推动企业国际化进程的。宝钢欧洲和德国五矿的案例展示了国有企业集团是如何在德国市场上实现角色转变的——从供给本国市场需求到国际化的销售者，以及在此过程中必须达到哪些特殊要求。

基于从案例研究中获得的知识，本书在结尾部分还介绍了不同的最佳方案，企业正是借助这些实践成功地在德国市场上拓展业务的。

案例研究的基础是对这些企业内中德员工及领导层的采访，以及企业文件和外部信息来源。专家访谈围绕法律及管理方面的问题进行，介绍了有助于双方建立理解和合作的背景知识。本书适合所有在广义上参与中国企业国际化的人阅读，无论他们来自哪个民族，何种文化。■

Dürkopp Adler and ShangGong Holding

Fit for the Future Together

杜克普爱华携手上工申贝

共创美好未来

From the Beginnings to the 21st Century

The medium-sized East Westphalian company Dürkopp Adler AG is a traditional enterprise with reliable modern technology and well-qualified and motivated employees.

However, the phrase “traditional enterprise” should not blind us to the fact that in the history of the company there have been ups and downs, and that it was forced to adapt to new technologies and new markets. The history of the enterprise begins in 1860, when locksmiths Heinrich Koch and Carl Baer founded the sewing machine factory Koch & Co. in Bielefeld. In 1865 they persuaded the mechanics Nikolaus Dürkopp and Carl Schmidt to join them. Dürkopp, who had constructed his first sewing machine as early as 1861, and Schmidt left Koch & Co. in 1867 and founded their own company, Dürkopp & Schmidt. When, after some years of success, the sales of sewing machines began to decline, they diversified their product range and began to make bicycles. Between 1897 and 1927 the company also produced cars, motorcycles and trucks. Koch & Co. for a time copied this model, but later focussed on its original competences in the area of industrial sewing and clothing technology, and in the years which followed became internationally renowned as “Kochs Adler Nähmaschinenwerke AG.” After the Second World War the company once again attempted to diversify its range of products, this time round with writing and packaging machines, but later gave this up and in the end concentrated on the manufacture of industrial sewing machines. The company, which had changed its name to Dürkoppwerke AG in 1913, had already been forced to yield to market pressures at an earlier date. At the end of the 1920s it stopped producing cars and, in addition to making industrial sewing machines, shifted its activities to conveyor belts and systems for textile companies, an area in which it is still active today. In 1962 FAG Kugelfischer AG acquired Dürkoppwerke AG, and in 1987 Kochs Adler Nähmaschinenwerke AG. In 1990 the two companies were merged to form Dürkopp Adler AG.

创建初期至21世纪

位于德国北威州东部的中型企业，杜克普爱华股份有限公司，是一家拥有可靠现代化技术的传统企业，旗下员工不仅具备高素质还拥有高度的积极性。但传统企业也意味着，杜克普爱华在公司历史上经历了高潮与低谷，以及存在着适应新技术和新市场的必要性。

公司的历史始于1860年，当时两位钳工海因里希·科赫先生同卡尔·巴尔先生一起，在比勒费尔德建立了缝纫机工厂科赫有限两合公司。1865年，他们邀请机械师尼古拉斯·杜克普先生同卡尔·施密特先生一起加入公司。杜克普先生早在1861年就制造出了他的第一台缝纫机，但在1867年，他同施密特一起离开了科赫有限两合公司，并共同创建了自己的企业：杜克普-施密特公司。该公司在经历了几年成功后，开始面临缝纫机行业的销售危机，这使得公司不得不实现产品的多样化，甚至开始生产自行车。1897年至1927年期间，公司还生产过汽车，摩托车及大型货车。科赫有限两合公司也一度追寻这一生产模式，但之后仍将生产重点放回到了他们的传统强项——工业制衣技术，随后以“科赫-爱华缝纫设备股份有限公司”的名称在国际上获得了很高的知名度。第二次世界大战后，该公司开始尝试制造打字机和包装机，但随后又再次放弃，并最终回归到只生产工业用缝纫机。而之前的杜克普-施密特公司，则于1913年改名为杜克普制造股份公司，该公司在市场压力下不得不在二十世纪20

In the years after German reunification many companies sought and found new markets and set up factories in Eastern Europe. Dürkopp Adler AG acquired companies such as the sewing machine manufacturer Minerva Boskovice, a.s. in the Czech Republic and Beisler GmbH in Hösbach. Since 1998 it has also owned Dürkopp Adler Romania, a parts production factory in Romania. In the following period the company succeeded in establishing a global service network with more than 200 partners, and in doing more than 80 per cent of its business abroad. However, as a result of the deterioration of the global economy and the strong euro both turnover and profits kept declining. At this time the parent company FAG Kugelfischer AG had just been taken over by INA Holding Schaeffler KG from Herzogenaurach, and FAG Kugelfischer attempted with the help of restructuring, cost-cutting programmes and the reduction of overcapacities to counter the economic slump at Dürkopp. The new owners INA Holding embarked on preparations to sell the company.

The fundamental role of China as one of the most important markets for sewing machines is noted in the annual report as early as 2003. “Today more than a third of the world’s clothing is being produced in China.” As the board emphasized, “The potential is enormous.” The insight was there, though at the beginning those with responsibility in the company found it difficult to make use of all this potential as a result of weak sales channels and high import tariffs. It is true that the company could look back on twenty years of experience with Chinese sales companies. However, in January 2002, just as further measures such as the foundation of a trading company, Dürkopp Adler International Trading Co., Ltd., in Shanghai and cooperation with Chinese partners were just getting off the ground, Dürkopp Adler AG was finally put up for sale. Negotiations on the sale of the company had been held as early as 1998, though they had not produced any results. The INA Holding Schaeffler KG simply wished to terminate its involvement in this market.

年代终止生产汽车，转而从事工业用缝纫机以及纺织企业输送传送设备的生产，而该系列设备的生产作为企业的一个业务领域直至今日仍然十分活跃。1962年FAG Kugelfischer股份公司收购了杜克普制造股份公司，并于1987年又收购了科赫-爱华缝纫机制造股份公司。1990年两家子公司合并为杜克普爱华股份公司。

在1989年这一转折点后，许多公司都在随后的几年内经历了腾飞和繁荣，开拓了新市场，在东欧建立起生产点。而杜克普爱华公司也收购了一些相关企业，比如捷克的缝纫机生产厂家波斯科维奇，以及之后赫斯巴赫的拜斯勒有限公司。此外自1998年起，杜克普爱华罗马尼亚分部在当地组建了零配件制造厂。之后公司取得了很大的成功，拥有了世界范围内的服务网络，合作伙伴超过200家，80%以上的业务都在国外进行。但随着全球经济的衰退和欧元的坚挺，公司的销售和盈利逐渐开始走下坡路。与此同时其母公司FAG Kugelfischer集团却被总部位于赫尔茨欧根奥拉赫（德国巴伐利亚州爱尔兰根市附近）的依纳-控股舍弗勒两合公司收购。面对杜克普爱华公司出现的经济危机，FAG Kugelfischer公司力图通过公司重组，降低成本及削减超容量生产来力挽狂澜。在新东家依纳集团那里，杜克普爱华公司仍有可能被再次出售。

在一份2003年的商业报告中，中国作为缝纫机最主要销售市场之一，其突出作用被重点提了出来：“全世界超过三分之一的成衣都在中国制造”，当时杜克普爱华公司的董事会特别强调：“中国的市场潜力是不可限量的。”虽然已经认识到了这点，但由于当时面向中国的销售渠道十分薄弱，加上高昂的关税，对于中国市场的利用，公司在最初的实施中举步艰难。虽然公司有二十多年跟中国的销售企业打交道的经验，但当杜克普爱华跨出了在中国经营之路的第一步，在上海组建了杜克普爱华国际贸易公司，并与中国的合作伙伴们一起

The Partner's Development in the Middle Kingdom

The history of SGSB Group Co., Ltd. from Shanghai, the later shareholder of Dürkopp Adler AG, is shorter, but also very eventful. The SGSB Group had its origins in the Shanghai Industrial Sewing Machine Company. The name was later changed to ShangDong Holding Co., Ltd. Since September 1993 the sewing machine manufacturer has been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange as the first company of its kind. After merging with SMPIC, the company was transformed into the SGSB Group Co., Ltd. The city government of Shanghai owns 25.4 per cent of the holding through its civic administration company, is the largest shareholder of the Group, and exercises direct control over it. The ShangGong Holding acquired its present name in the course of the internationalization strategy. It is a typical example of a state enterprise which is attempting to prepare itself for the future by means of internal restructuring and globalization. It is in this context that we must see the acquisition of a majority share in Dürkopp Adler AG in July 2005. ShangGong (Europe) Holding Corporation GmbH was specially founded for this purpose. The takeover was preceded by years of negotiations, and the actual purchase price of the shares was only 1 million euros, though the German ShangDong (Europe) Holding also granted Dürkopp Adler AG a loan. The total sum was provided by the SGSB Group in Shanghai, although it is true that the Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB) also advanced a loan. Not only the pronouncements by the players involved, but the very circumstances of the acquisition of Dürkopp Adler by the SGSB Group show that this was not a hostile takeover. It was a deal that all the players wanted.

From the sale of its troubled subsidiary Dürkopp Adler AG the INA Holding Schaeffler GmbH hoped to obtain an appropriate price and a chance to concentrate on its core business. However, the motives of the Chinese buyers were rather more complex. They were prompted not only by the official "Zou Chu Qu" (swarming out) ideology, but by pragmatic economic constraints. It so happened that the SGSB Group was also in considerable economic difficulties. In 2005 it chalked up losses of ca 26 million euros with a turnover of 141 million euros. As one of the market leaders in sewing machine manufacturing the SGSB Group had come increasingly under pressure from private Chinese and also foreign competitors. These included, for example, Juki from Japan, which, with a turnover of almost 800 million euros, is the largest sewing machine manufacturer in the world. On account of these developments the SGSB Group hoped that by acquiring Dürkopp Adler AG it would be possible with the help of its expertise and technology to regain its lost position on the Chinese market and at the same time to open up new international markets with the help of its global sales network.

开始步入轨道之际，它却面临着被出售的命运：2002年1月，伊纳集团在经历了自1998年就已经开始准备，却一直未能成功的出售计划之后，决定结束集团在这一市场的努力。

中国合作伙伴的发展之路

作为杜克普爱华股份有限公司后来的控股人，来自上海的上工申贝集团历史虽不长，却也同样经历了各种变动。上工申贝集团的前身是上海工业缝纫机股份有限公司（后更名为上工股份有限公司），该公司于1993年9月在上海证交所挂牌上市，成为中国缝纫机行业第一家上市公司。该公司后与上海申贝办公机械有限公司合并组建了上工申贝（集团）股份有限公司。上海市政府通过其城市管理公司持有该集团25.4%的股份，从而成为最大的控股方，并直接实施监督。而如今的上工申贝（集团）股份有限公司这一名称也正是该公司国际化战略的一部分。该公司作为典型的"国有企业"，想通过内部改制这一模式适应未来的全球化战略。这一全球化的过程包括2005年7月购买杜克普爱华股份有限公司的多数股份，为实现这一目标，上工申贝集团在德国建立了上工（欧洲）控股有限公司。这一收购行动经历了长达数年的谈判，虽然收购价格仅为1百万欧元，但德国的上工（欧洲）控股公司还保证另外提供给杜克普爱华公司一笔借款。这笔资金全部由上海的上工申贝集团来筹措。此外西德意志州银行通过一笔贷款也参与到了这一收购中来。无论是收购活动中所有参与者的公告，还是上工申贝集团收购杜克普爱华公司的实际情况，都显示出这并不是一次恶意收购，而是各方都乐观其成的一项举措。

出售前就已经困境重重的杜克普爱华公司一直期望其所有者依纳-舍弗勒集团能够开出一个合理的价格，使公司能够专注于其核心业务。而作为收购者的中方，其目的事实上是多

"With this good German brand we are being treated with more respect in this highly competitive sector."

This is how Min Zhang, chief executive officer of the SGSB Group and chairman of the supervisory board of Dürkopp Adler AG, sums up the Chinese aims. Because the activities which the East Westphalian company was in the process of setting up in China at that time fitted perfectly into the concept of the SGSB Group, this acquisition, on account of the complementary targets involved, can in retrospect be described as having been advantageous for both sides.

Executive Structure and Human Resources Management in the Wake of the Takeover

However, the sale of a company always causes a stir among the workforce, even though it may already have accustomed itself to the idea on account of the persistent rumours which preceded it. The FAG Kugelfischer AG had been engaged in a massive reduction in the workforce for decades, and had reduced the number of staff at the Bielefeld plant from about 2,500 to ca 450 employees. Many employees were thus looking for a different job, and some left the company after it was announced that it was being bought by a Chinese company. Yet the fact that after the takeover no one was made redundant, that the collective labour agreements continued to apply, that codetermination through two workforce representatives on the board remained unchanged, that the Chinese presence was built up very cautiously, and, perhaps most important of all, that not a single machine was dismantled in the production halls, did a lot to appease the mood of the workforce. Finally, on 30 November 2005, there was a works meeting at which the president of the SGSB Group, Min Zhang, presented his concept, which had been carefully worked out in the preceding months. He explained the proposed restructuring, and also the planned expansion of activities in Europe and China with the long-term goal of gaining significant market share on the world market. In all this the Dürkopp Adler brand was to retain its independence.

At the time the management of the SGSB Group did not have a great deal of international experience, with the exception of earlier cooperation projects with the sewing machine manufacturers Juki from Japan and Singer from the U.S., though these had not turned out to be serious partners in the context of global cooperation. For this reason the Chinese proceeded slowly and with great care with regard to the organizational remodelling of Dürkopp Adler AG.

重的：他们来到德国不仅仅是为响应政府“走出去”的号召，更进一步的原因是其本身也面临着现实的经济压力。上工申贝集团自身当时处于一个巨大的经济困境中：2005年销售额近1亿4千1百万欧元，而亏损却高达2千6百万欧元左右。这家中国缝纫机行业曾经的巨头由于受到中国私营企业和外国同行的竞争，市场压力越来越大。而这些外国竞争者中有来自日本的JUKI重机，其销售额一度达到8亿欧元而成为世界缝纫机行业的领头羊。面对这样的发展上工申贝集团举步维艰，因此他们也期望可以通过收购杜克普爱华公司，获得新的经验技术，从而将在中国市场上失去的份额重新夺回来，同时也通过该公司原有的全球销售网开拓出新的国际市场。作为上工申贝集团总裁和杜克普爱华公司的监理会主席，张敏先生这样总结中方的目标：

“拥有了一个好的德国品牌，我们就可以在充满竞争的缝纫机行业内享有更多的尊重。”

由于当时北威州东部正在实施的扩建行动正好与中国上工申贝的收购计划相符，使得这一收购行动顺利完成，中德双方企业在互补长短的基础上取得了一个双赢的结果。

收购后的管理层结构和人事管理

公司的出售总会引起员工的不安，尽管杜克普爱华公司要被出售的消息已经流传了很久，职工们对此也习以为常了。之前FAG Kugelfischer公司十几年来一直在实施裁员，比勒费尔德总部的员工从2500人缩减到了450人左右。许多员工早早就开始着手寻找新的岗位，还有一些员工在得知公司将被中国企业收购后离开了公司。但事实是，公司在被收购后并没有出现企业范围内的员工遣散，之前的劳资合同继续有效，两名职工代表在监事会中参与意见的规定也没有

Their concept was based on the idea of defining corporate strategy jointly with the senior management level, whilst to a large extent leaving the operational activities in the hands of experienced local floor managers in the various different countries.

For this purpose the company devised a dual "2-in-the-box" system: The strategic planning is carried out by Chinese president Min Zhang in his dual function as CEO of the SGSB Group and chairman of the supervisory board of Dürkopp Adler at regular meetings in China and Germany with Alfred Wadle, the German chairman of the board of Dürkopp Adler AG. With regard to the operational side of the business, Alfred Wadle, who has responsibility for the areas of production, development and sales, coordinates his activities with his Chinese colleague and board member Ying Zheng, who is in charge of the areas of finance, human resources management and IT. But this division of responsibilities reflects in only a superficial way the functions of the Dürkopp Adler management. One of the reasons why Alfred Wadle was appointed to the post of speaker of the board is because, in addition to his qualifications, he acquired a comprehensive set of intercultural skills as manager of the Dürkopp Adler subsidiary Minerva Boskovice, a.s. in the Czech Republic, and learned to manage a multinational company. Together with her German employees, his colleague Ying Zheng integrates human resources management on the European level and is responsible for reporting company data to China. Furthermore, when agreements are required with regard to operational activities, she coordinates the communication between the head offices of the SGSB Group in Shanghai and Dürkopp Adler AG in Bielefeld. This can reach a point, whenever there are important decisions to be made, where she maintains telephone contact with China during the meetings. In this way it has proved possible to create a functioning triangle of very flat hierarchies which makes it possible to manage Dürkopp Adler in a very effective manner.

改变，而中方对公司的参与十分低调，最重要的是在生产车间内没有机器被拆除，这一切很大程度上安抚了职工的情绪。2005年11月30日终于举行了企业大会，在这次大会上，上工申贝集团总裁张敏先生介绍了他在过去几个月内深思熟虑后制定的计划：为了赢得显著的全球市场份额这一长期目标，做出新的结构调整并扩大在欧洲和中国的业务。而且杜克普爱华将作为一个独立品牌保持下去。

上工申贝集团的领导层在国际市场上的有限经验，来自于之前和日本JUKI及美国SINGER的合作，但这种合作却并非真正全球战略意义上的合作。因而中国人这次和杜克普爱华公司在组织方面的合作改造，也就相应谨慎仔细很多。

他们的理念是：顶层管理者共同制定企业战略规划，而具体经营则放手由经验丰富的各部门领导在各自国家进一步实施开展。

为此产生了一个"二合一"体系：战略规划将由中方张敏先生和德方阿尔弗莱德·瓦德勒先生，通过在中国和德国的定期会晤共同制定，前者同时身兼上工申贝集团的总裁和杜克普爱华股份有限公司监理会主席，后者则为杜克普爱华股份有限公司董事会发言人。具体营运实施由瓦德勒先生来负责，包括生产，开发和销售，而他的中方同事郑莹女士主管财务，人事和IT部门。这一安排当然只体现了杜克普爱华公司管理层最表面的功能分配。瓦德勒先生之所以被提名为公司董事局发言人，因为他在作为杜克普爱华的捷克子公司主管期间学习积累了大量跨文化合作和管理经验，知道如何才能管理好一个国际性企业。郑莹女士和德国同事一起担任欧洲区的人事管理工作，并负责将企业数据汇报给中国，同时在日常业务中出现必要协商时，协调位于上海的上工申贝集团和位于比勒费尔德的杜克普爱华公司之间

Sparrenburg Castle in Bielefeld – 位于比勒费尔德的斯帕伦堡

Strategic preparations for Global Competition

The restructuring challenges concentrated on two main areas, the reorganizationof the manufacturing processes and sale of sewing machines in Europe, and the recovery of the former market position of the parent company in China.

Find our more about value creation structures in "Managing the International Value Chain"

The first task was addressed with the help of a clear division of labour and a high degree of specialization in the different factories. The plant in Romania produces wage-intensive parts for subsequent processing in Europe and China, whereas for the time being the Czech Minerva Boskovice, a.s. continues to manufacture the main product lines. However, in future more and more hi-tech products are to be manufactured here, in particular new designs which are on a high quality level, but still affordable. The premium products will continue to be assembled at the Bielefeld plant, where the research and development department of the company is located. Here in a spacious showroom customers can watch how special sewing machines, sewing automats and sewing equipment – all electronically controlled – perform high-precision tasks at breakneck speeds. In future less expensive sewing machines made in China will also be on view.

Sales are organized at the Bielefeld plant and the customer is guaranteed high-quality, speedy and technically competent service. The target groups of the sew-

的交流沟通。这也意味着，在公司会议出现重大决议时她可以直接电话联系中国方面。这样就成功建立起了一个功能健全的、反应迅速的三角型管理模式，从而可以使杜克普爱华股份有限公司在各个层面都有效的运作起来。

为全球化竞争而做出的战略转换

企业结构转换所带来的挑战主要集中在两个方面：新的生产和欧洲市场缝纫机销售的组织结构；帮助母公司在中国重新夺回原有的市场地位。

您可以参阅《国际性新创价值管理》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于新创价值的建构的内容。

第一个任务将通过欧洲各分部的明细分工和高度专业化来实现，比如罗马尼亚的生产厂主要生产劳动密集型零配件，然后在欧洲和中国进行再加工，而大型整机生产暂且仍由捷克的生产厂负责，以后那里会生产越来越多高科技含量产品，特别是新开发的质优价廉产品。在比勒费尔德的总部则主要是公司的研发部门，继续负责装配高端产品。同时那里也给客户提供了一个大型的样品展厅，展示着各种特殊性能的缝纫机，自动缝纫机以及各种相关缝纫设备，这些机器全部都为电子控制并且可在几秒钟之内高度精确地完成任务。以后那里还会展出中国出产的价廉物美的缝纫机。

ing technology area – manufacturers of clothing, shoes, car seats and upholstery and processors of technical textiles – not only expect durable and mature quality products, but also service, supplies of spare parts, and training of employees. Furthermore, advising customers with regard to application and process optimization is becoming increasingly important. These tasks can only be dealt with by highly qualified employees who have the appropriate linguistic skills.

In China the challenges lie elsewhere. Alfred Wadle has described the initial situation as follows: “In Europe we were in a very good position, but in Asia our machines were simply too expensive.” This now began to change as a result of the new local partner, the SGSB Group. The latter contributed its sales channels, its capital and its contacts to the city government in Shanghai, which proved to be rather invaluable. Slightly more problematical were other assets such as the production plants and the human resources. The manufacturing equipment was not state-of-the-art, and employees did not always have the qualifications needed for a leading company. For this reason two joint ventures were founded in 2006 to underpin the repositioning strategy on the Chinese market, one for sales, and one for manufacturing. Here Bielefeld’s Dürkopp Adler AG was not only supposed to contribute its high technical and commercial skills, but above all its quality management.

The production joint venture Dürkopp Adler Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., in which Dürkopp Adler AG has a 30 per cent share, and to which the SGSB Group contributed production equipment, among other things, concentrates on the development and manufacturing of simple products specially designed for the Chinese market. In 2007 ca 20,000 sewing machines were produced. The management of the joint venture is primarily in German hands, and many engineers from Bielefeld have been seconded to the Chinese plants of the SGSB Group in order to optimize the technical and operational processes and to instruct local employees. Naturally there are intercultural problems, especially because the people involved – both German and Chinese employees – have very little or no experience with such situations. Whilst it is true that there is a great deal of good will on both sides, different work attitudes, different concepts of time and dissimilar hierarchical levels and communication channels complicate coordination considerably, not to mention the different corporate cultures. In Shanghai the employees of Bielefeld’s Dürkopp Adler AG appear to be lecturing people in a company which in point of fact owns them. Here a great deal of understanding and tact is required on both sides, but also an awareness of what needs to be done.

位于比勒费尔德的总部会组织分销，确保为客户提供高质量、迅捷的专业服务。因为目前缝纫技术市场的目标客户：制衣业，制鞋业，汽车纺织品、家纺业以及技术纺织品加工商都已经不再只是单纯看重产品的质量和耐用性，还需要完善的服务、备用件补给和员工培训，此外在应用和生产优化方面为客户提供咨询也越来越受到重视。所有这些服务都只有高素质、并且还掌握一定外语知识的员工才能胜任。

在中国面临的挑战则出现在其他的领域。瓦德勒先生这样形容道：“在欧洲我们有着良好的起点，而在亚洲我们的产品只有一个字：贵。”这一情况需要通过当地新的合作者，即上工申贝集团来改善，比如运用他们原有的销售渠道，他们的资本，还有他们特别重视的与上海市政府的关系，这一系列的优势来扭转劣势。但在生产车间和员工素质等方面中方也存在着一定问题：生产设备不能和当前的技术相匹配，员工不具备在高端企业应具有的素质。鉴于这些情况2006年在中国成立了专门针对中国市场的两家合资公司，一家专门负责销售，一家专门负责生产。在这两家公司中比勒费尔德的杜克普爱华股份公司不仅提供相关的高技术和商业能力，最重要的还有完善的高质量经营管理体系。

这家负责生产的合资工厂杜克普爱华工业制造（上海）有限公司由德国的杜克普公司参股30%，上工申贝方面则提供生产设备。该合资厂主要提供专门针对中国市场的简单机器生产和开发。2007年一年就生产了近两万台缝纫机。这家合资厂主要由德方来管理，许多工程师都是从德国比勒费尔德总部派来的，还有一部分来自中国的上工申贝集团，这样两方面的结合便于技术的交流和生产过程的优化，同时也能提供给当地员工相应的培训。当然，在这一过程中必然出现很多文化交流上的障碍和问题，特别是在德方和中方的员工都还没有过类

In addition to this production joint venture, in 2006 Dürkopp Adler AG and the SGSB Group founded a sales joint venture in China, the Dürkopp Adler Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. The Bielefeld team initially contributed 25 per cent of the capital, and after a rights issue now own 34 per cent of the shares and are in charge of the management. In 2007 ca 3,000 sewing machines were sold globally in the framework of this joint venture. There are plans to keep expanding the business, above all by using common sales outlets and by enhancing the international qualifications of Chinese managers.

This new organizational structure has clearly had a positive effect on the situation of the SGSB Group, which has been profitable since 2006.

> Success is due largely to consistent quality management, which under German supervision has now been implemented in the Chinese plants.

This central feature was simply not up for discussion, as the innovation manager of Dürkopp Adler AG declared with some conviction: “People like to improvise ... and then the quality goes way down ... As far as our Chinese colleagues are concerned, things are often not fast enough. But our machines call for the highest kind of precision.” Naturally the Chinese side also has cogent arguments: Such consistent quality management was said to cost a lot of money, and make the products more expensive. However, many Chinese customers did not even want machines which were very durable, because they worked for foreign customers with short-term supply contracts. They were said to think in shorter time spans and fought shy of expensive long-term investments, since they served very volatile markets. Yet in China the trend is quite clearly leading to durable and high-quality products. But on the way to attaining that goal it is necessary to keep coming up with a healthy mixture of price and quality, and this calls for a great deal of coordination. In order to promote this reciprocal adaptation process, engineers from Bielefeld visit the plant in Shanghai every two months, and telephone almost daily with their Chinese counterparts.

Dealing with Cultural Differences

Both in the joint ventures and in the newly conjoined company, especially in the initial phase of Chinese and German intercultural cooperation, there were numerous examples of modes of conduct which caused astonishment and dismay. For example, Germans are not familiar with the Chinese custom of allowing people to show that they are not interested in what is being said when topics are

似经验的情况下。虽然双方都表现出了很大的诚意，但不同的工作理念、时间观念、等级制度和交流方式，都为公司的协调统一难上加难，至于不同的企业文化就更不用提了。来自比勒费尔德的德方员工是以培训师身份来到上海的合资厂，而后者事实上却是他们的所有者。这就意味着中德双方员工都需要相互理解和体谅，当然还有对待事情的分析判断力。

除了这一合资工厂外，杜克普爱华公司还于2006年与上工申贝集团一起在中国成立了一家合资销售公司，即杜克普爱华贸易（上海）有限公司。这一公司比勒费尔德总部参股25%（增资后现已参股34%），同时也拥有其管理权。2007年间该公司在世界范围内销售了三千台缝纫机。这一业绩还将在未来不断扩大，首先当然是通过中德双方原有的销售方式，此外还会通过一批具有国际水平的中国专业经理人来实现。

这一新的组织结构给上工申贝带来了明显的良好影响，其财务状况从2006年起终于没有再出现赤字。

> 这一成果很大程度上得益于德方在中国的高质量管理。

这一原则是不能被动摇的，但杜克普爱华股份有限公司创新部经理沃斯先生也提到：“当然也会出现临时的变动，然后质量就下降，中国同事们总是觉得速度还不够快。但如此一来我们机器的高度精准性就成问题了。”当然中国方面也有他们的见解：这一高质量的管理模式花费实在太大，使得产品成本直线上升。事实上许多中国的客户根本不关心你的机器有多么耐用，因为他们手上的外国订单都是短期的。他们只看眼前的情况，而昂贵的长线投资是他们所畏惧的，因为对他们来说市场实在变化莫测。当然在中国高质量的耐用性产品也开始逐渐变为主流。但找到一个有效平衡价

Oriental Pearl Tower, TV tower in Shanghai – 上海东方明珠电视塔

discussed which do not concern them. Conversely, the Chinese find the rigorous manner with which Germans express their opinions to be very arrogant and miss the politeness which in their opinion is called for even if one happens to be right. Such differences become clearly apparent in the case of the quality management alluded to above: On the one hand, the Chinese have a great deal of respect for the quality management skills of German employees. On the other hand, they will complain about German slowness and fussiness. Conversely, the Germans often construe Chinese flexibility and innovative skill as an inability to implement in a consistent way a plan of action previously agreed on, and tend to interpret their speed as rashness.

Thus the yawning gap between the ways in which German and Chinese managers behave is still rather large, in particular with regard to Chinese adaptability and German sustainability. In the case of Dürkopp Adler this led to a growing feeling that managers in an international corporation increasingly need intercultural skills. A holistic human resources policy which takes into account intercultural skills when appointments are being made or in human resources development could help to overcome intercultural conflicts, enhance communication in the company, streamline the treatment of employees, coordinate the activities of senior management, and in this way combine the two corporate cultures in order to pave

格和质量的方法才是目前最重要的，这也是大家都期盼的。为了中德双方能够更好地互相适应，沃斯先生以及其他来自比勒费尔德的同事每两个月就会去上海的工厂一次，甚至差不多每天都会和中国的同事电话联系。

对文化差异的处理

在跨文化合作初期，不但是合资企业，而且在新的集团中，中德同事经常表现出不同的行为方式。这些行为的不同，为双方带来诧异和误解。比如德国人不知道中国人有这样的习惯：在会议或商谈过程中，谈到和自己无关的话题时就漠不关心。反过来中国人又觉得德国人在谈论自己的观点时过于严肃，显得高傲，一旦自己有理了，就失去了对中国人来说非常必要的谦虚礼貌。这些不同点在高质量管理过程中就特别明显的表现出来了：一方面中国人尊重德国同事在高质量管理上的能力，但另一方面他们却抱怨德国人的慢性子和过分细致。而德国人则把中国人的灵活变通和创新力更多的理解为无能力，过于随便，把中国人对速度的要求评论为过于仓促草率，欲速则不达。

中德双方管理行为中出现的分歧还是比较大的，特别是在中国人要求的适应力和德国人要求的持久性这两方面的冲突上。通过种种磨合杜克普爱华公司的认识也在不断成熟起来：跨国企业内的经理人必须不断提高其处理跨文化问题的能力。一个统一的，能够在人员挑选和发展中考虑到其跨文化协调能力的人事政策，将会有助于减少跨国企业中因文化不同而造成的矛盾，也能促进企业内部的多层面交流，统一同事之间的行为，协调企业的领导管理。按照这样的思路行进，双方企业才能求同存异取得未来道路上成功。这一人事政策上的统一计划，从在欧洲各分部引入企业人事手册开始，该手册是在郑莹女士的领导下，主要由其德国的部门领导乌里希·寇索克先生起草的，可望于2008年底投入使用。

the way for a successful future. Such streamlining is planned with the envisaged introduction at the end of 2008 of a human resources handbook, initially only for the European plants, which, under the direction of Ying Zheng, was to all intents and purposes devised by her German head of department..

The communication among the senior management already works smoothly and openly. In order to be able in future to optimize communication on the lower levels, a Chinese employee who speaks German fluently has been appointed to the post of sales manager in Bielefeld. His task is to become acquainted with German work processes on the spot and to report back to the Chinese head office in Shanghai about any unusual features. Furthermore, when there are misunderstandings he is supposed to intervene in his capacity as an interpreter, and attempt to resolve them. In this go-between function the employee is being trained to perform executive functions in sales, which are also due to be streamlined on a global basis.

Sino-German Win-win Constellation

For the majority of German employees at the Bielefeld plant not much has changed since the takeover by the SGSB Group: They continue to communicate with German colleagues and superiors. The change has become visible, if at all, on account of the Chinese flag in front of the gate, or the Chinese name at the entrance. Thus two years after the takeover the workforce is rather relaxed about the whole situation. The head of central marketing of Dürkopp Adler AG describes this as follows:

> "Fears that the Chinese would export German know-how and eradicate jobs in Germany were quickly dispelled. What our employees had to get used to is the fact that we often have Chinese delegations visiting the Bielefeld plant. Our successful cooperation seems to have set a good example."

Such assessments have become common knowledge: Some of the employees who left Dürkopp Adler AG before the takeover have come back. Families and friends of employees who at the time were quite understandably anxious about job security are now tending to ask about the opportunities which lie ahead. The unions report that the Chinese have fulfilled all their promises. This picture is also reflected in the media, which has commented quite favourably on the takeover.

Three years into the post-takeover period it is possible to take stock of what has been achieved. In economic terms both sides have been able to reach their

在高级管理者间的交流目前已经基本没有什么问题，需要改善的是普通工作人员间的合作。为了将来这一层面的交流能够朝良性方向发展，一名具备良好德语能力的销售经理被派到了比勒费尔德。他会在那里了解整个工作流程，然后将其特殊性和优势直接汇报到上海的总部。此外在双方出现误解的时候他要充当翻译，并试着解释。为了能在中德同事间起到桥梁的作用，这名担任销售领导工作的员工还将接受培训。销售未来也是要全球统一的。

中德双方的双赢局面

对于绝大多数比勒费尔德总部的德国员工来说，公司在被上工申贝集团接收后至今几乎没有什么变化。他们一如既往的和德国同事及上司沟通交流。最明显的变化就是公司的大门口出现了中国国旗，公司的中文名出现在了门牌上。公司被收购两年，员工也对公司的状况松了口气。杜克普爱华公司中央市场部主任这样形容道：

> "那些凭空多出的担忧，比如中国人会偷走德国的技术，会减少在德国的工作岗位等，很快就不攻自破了。我们的员工现在能感受到的就是经常会有中国代表团来到比勒费尔德访问。一个成功的合作已经成了样板。"

不仅公司内部，事实上外界也看到了类似的情况，因此几个在收购前离开公司的员工又重新回到了公司。而员工的家属及友人也不再担心家人的失业，反而更多的关心将来的发展前途。工会报告说：中国人没有食言。此外媒体在针对公司被收购的报道中也一致做出了积极的评价。

收购已经过去三年，第一阶段的总结也出炉了。从经济角度看中德双方都达到了他们

targets: The SGSB Group has increased its turnover considerably; in 2007 it amounted to ca 240 million euros. The company had already turned a profit in 2006, and this increased in 2007 to about 2.6 million euros. It proved possible to arrest the decline in China, and the turnaround became a fact. The developments at Dürkopp Adler in Bielefeld have also been positive. Turnover increased from 128.6 million euros in 2005 to 151.3 million euros in 2007, and in the same period profits increased noticeably from 1.4 million euros to 2.6 million euros. By ploughing profits back into the business it was possible to increase the capital ratio to 22.7 per cent, which was especially gratifying. Furthermore, the number of employees, after many years of layoffs, has not only remained stable, but has actually increased slightly. On 31 December 2008 it amounted to 1,817 employees globally, and of these 555 worked at the Bielefeld plant (previous year: 531).

Some of the success can be traced back to the reorganization carried out in previous years and the economic improvement in the customer segments which are so important for Dürkopp Adler AG. It was no doubt significant that ownership by the SGSB Group restored continuity to the development of the company, which under the aegis of FAG Kugelfischer AG, when there were ten changes in the management, was so sorely lacking. The board has commented on the positive post-takeover development of Dürkopp Adler AG as follows: “The fact that continuity has returned motivates the workforce.” In addition, the takeover prepared the way for Dürkopp Adler AG to become a success in China and to thrive as a result of new product lines. This can basically be traced back to the fact that the Chinese parent gives the German executives quite a lot of leeway when it comes to executing as cautiously as possible the much-needed reorganization of the corporate structure and culture. The German executives are motivated by cooperative communication on an eye-to-eye basis and by the Chinese feedback culture prevalent in the SGSB Group, where objections are not only permitted, but actually deemed praiseworthy.

> Middle managers have observed this cooperation very precisely, have seen that it works, and have become confident that the company will continue to thrive.

The chairman of the board, Min Zhang, was able to dispel the fears of employees that working conditions would deteriorate in the wake of the takeover in the course of his speech to the works meeting when he stated that the Bielefeld plant would be kept going, and that in fact new product lines would be introduced. He kept his promise.

预期的目标。上工申贝的销售额出现显著上升，2007年达到了近2亿4千万欧元。2006年开始扭亏为盈，2007年更是盈利近260万欧元。企业经济效益下滑终于得到了有效的制止，出现了上升的转折点。而比勒费尔德的杜克普爱华方面同样效果显著，销售额从2005年的1亿2千8百60万欧元，上升到了2007年的1亿5千1百30万欧元，同期年净收益也从140万欧元，显著上升到了260万欧元。特别可喜的是通过盈利积累杜克普公司的自有资产份额在2007年上升到了22.7%。曾在前几年持续下降的员工人数不仅稳定了下来，甚至出现了小幅增长，截止到2007年12月31日，全球员工共1817人，其中555人就职于比勒费尔德总部（2006年时为531人）。

成功的取得一部分要归功于前几年企业重组措施的实施和全球经济的改善，很多重要的客户又都回来购买杜克普产品。但决定性的原因还是在于：与上工申贝集团一起保持了企业发展的连续性，而在此之前曾在FAG Kugelfischer的领导下，历经了十次董事会的人事更替，根本无法持续发展。杜克普爱华股份公司的董事会这样形容公司在被收购后取得的良性发展：“再次看到公司的可持续发展，大大激励了员工的积极性。”此外，随着对杜克普爱华公司的收购，不仅企业在中国的参与逐渐走上了正轨，同时新的生产线也带来了可喜的经济成果。这些成果的取得，主要还归结于中国的母公司给了德方很大的自由空间，以及公司结构和公司文化的必要转化，也实施得十分周到细致。平等的协作式交流和中方对不同意见的反馈，包括接受和奖励，都很大程度的激发了德方管理者的积极性。

Common Goals and Common Challenges

However, this is merely the beginning, and more progress will have to be made in the years ahead. The medium-term goal of the SGSB Group, which is to become one of the three largest and most important companies in the sewing machine industry within the next three to five years by exploiting economies of scale and determined profit orientation is admittedly very ambitious. For the Asian and in particular the Chinese markets are a big challenge for Dürkopp Adler AG. Thus the 2006 and 2007 annual reports both refer to “robust competition from Asian manufacturers,” and in the area of sewing technology the beginning of 2008, on account of a decline in spending, especially in Asia, was not as rosy as had been expected. Furthermore, there are signs that in the medium and long term more changes will have to be made at the SGSB Group and at Dürkopp Adler AG, especially with regard to the resurgent importance of the European market. The next few years will be marked by shifts in the various major markets, and these challenges will have to be confronted.

The two partners Dürkopp Adler AG and the SGSB group will have to develop joint strategies in order to secure this successful Sino-German cooperation in the long term. It is not so much a matter of harmonizing the various values and goals, but of respecting them, and for this reason mutual knowledge and understanding need to be enhanced on an ongoing basis. The goal is a situation in which the managers of Dürkopp Adler AG will think within the same referential framework as the managers of the SGSB group and vice versa. This would be a corporate culture capable of facing up to the global challenges of the future. ■

中层管理者仔细观察了双方的合作并发现，合作非常有成效，而在合作中产生的相互信任，更成为了企业成功的奠基石。

所有员工对于收购后工作条件变差的担忧，也被监理会主席张敏先生在企业大会上的发言打消了，张先生保证比勒费尔德总部不仅全部保留下来，而且还会引进新的生产线并生产新的产品。这一承诺也得到了证实。

共同的目标和挑战

这些只是开始，在接下来的几年里还必须扩大业务。上工申贝集团的中期目标是：在接下来的三至五年内，充分利用规模经济以及利益导向，使企业跻身于全球缝纫机行业最大和最具知名度的三家企业之列。这一目标确实雄心勃勃。无论怎样，亚洲市场特别是中国市场，对于杜克普爱华公司来说，始终都是一个很大的挑战。2006年和2007年的公司年报中均提到了“亚洲生产商的激烈竞争”，以及2008年开始，由于亚洲市场上缝纫机行业的萎缩，前景并不如预期的那么美好。针对这一问题的一系列数据表明，上工申贝和杜克普爱华都必须做出中长期的应对策略。特别是欧洲市场的复兴，在接下来的几年内，洲际间的市场转移，将成为一个明显的特征和不可回避的挑战。

合作的双方杜克普爱华和上工申贝，需要制定出共同的战略发展规划，以确保中德双方合作的长期性和稳定性。中德双方的互相尊重，比起对各自价值观和目标的协调更为重要，有了互相尊重这一前提，才能实现长期的相互认识和理解。杜克普爱华公司的经理人应该和上工申贝的经理人们在相同的体系里进行思考，反之亦然，这是双方的目标。这样才能够成功树立起，能够因应未来全球挑战的企业文化。■

Speaking with Patrick von Wrede

China representative at Invest in Germany, Beijing

丰威德先生访谈录

德国政府投资促进署驻北京代表

"Chinese investors keep telling us that they consider the quality of German products to be of the utmost importance. In international terms "Made in Germany," the country of origin label, is synonymous with the highest quality and achievement."

"中国投资商一再对我们说，德国产品的质量对他们来说何等重要。原产地标签'德国制造'标志着国际一流水平和质量，这也是他们为何决择'登陆'德国的一个重要因素。"

Mr von Wrede, in recent years in particular Chinese companies have begun to invest more and more in Germany. How did this all begin, and how high is the volume of Chinese investments in Germany?

There have been Chinese companies in Germany ever since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Germany in 1972. Thus the logistics company COSCO and the iron and steel corporation Baosteel located their operations in Hamburg, and the steel trader Minmetals opened a branch in Düsseldorf; all of them were state enterprises. In recent years more and more private companies have come to Germany, such as the telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE, or the household appliances manufacturer Haier. In the meantime between 600 and 800 Chinese companies from various sectors – not including Chinese restaurants or travel operators – have located in Germany. In 2006 the total direct investments of Chinese companies in Germany reached ca 295 million euros. Of course, this is not yet on a par with American or Japanese investments in Germany, which in 2006 amounted to 48 billion euros and 11 billion euros

丰威德先生，近年来，投资德国的中国企业愈来愈多，请问，中国企业的对德投资活动是如何起步的？中国在德国的投资金额大概有多高？

早在1972年，中国与德国恢复外交关系之后，就有中国企业到德国来投资经商。譬如有落户汉堡的中远物流集团和宝钢集团，以及把杜塞尔多夫作为贸易活动基地的中国五矿集团——全部都是国营企业。然而，在过去几年中，到德国投资的中国队伍里民营企业所占的比例愈来愈高，譬如华为电讯公司、中兴通讯、以及家电产品制造商海尔集团等等。迄今为止，大约有600-800家中国企业——不包括餐馆和旅行社，在德国安营扎寨。2006年，中国企业在德国的直接投资金

respectively. Furthermore, Chinese investments are very small when compared to German investments in China. In 2006 the total direct investments of German companies in China amounted to ca 12.7 billion euros.

Is it possible to discern a trend here? How do you think these investments will develop in the future?

We are certainly only at the start of a development, though the tendency clearly points upwards. The Chinese economic policy programme "Go Global" is motivating more and more Chinese entrepreneurs to invest abroad. Thus the Chinese trade ministry MPFCOM believes that in the next three to five years Chinese investments in other countries will increase on average by 22 per cent annually. By the year 2010 the volume will probably rise to 60 billion US dollars. For the next ten years the management consultancy PriceWaterhouseCoopers is reckoning with Chinese investments in Germany of up to 2 billion euros.

In which sectors of the economy do Chinese companies invest most in Germany, and why do investors choose them?

Currently the investments of Chinese companies in Germany are still focussed on the machine tools sector. An example of a very successful investment is Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant (BYJC), formerly the medium-sized machine tools manufacturer Waldrich Coburg. Slowly but surely the well-known Chinese private companies from the telecommunications or chemical sectors are beginning to make some headway in Germany. For example, the telecommunications company ZTE has opened a branch in Düsseldorf. The telecom equipment company Huawei has had several branches in Germany for some time, and has about 500 employees on the payroll. The hi-tech company Beijing Rose Biotech Co., Ltd. has invested in the Hoechst Industrial Park in Frankfurt. The decision to invest in sectors such as this can also be traced back to the competence of German companies. Chinese companies invest in Germany in those sectors or projects in which they can usefully combine the strengths of German companies with their own. Since in China environmental protection and high technology have begun to play an increasingly important role in recent years, Chinese entrepreneurs have become more interested in investing in new technologies–and Germany is leading the way in the fields of renewable energy and biotechnology.

额大约在2亿9千5百万欧元左右。当然，这个数目远远不能跟美国和日本在德国的投资数额相提并论。2006年，美国在德国的投资金额为480亿欧元，日本为110亿欧元。即使与德国在中国的投资额相比，也小巫大巫，不能同日而语。2006年，德国企业在中国的直接投资金额为127亿欧元。

您如何评价和估测中国对德投资的发展趋势？

不瞒您说，中国的对德投资活动尚处于初始阶段，但其前景呈明显上升趋势。中国政府"走出去"的经济战略部署，激励着愈来愈多的中国企业走出国门，向海外寻求发展。据中华人民共和国商务部估测，在未来三到五年间，中国的对外投资幅度将平均每年增长22%。截止2010年，中国对外的投资金额预计增至600亿美元。据普华永道咨询公司估测，未来十年，中资企业在德国的投资总额有望达到20亿欧元的高度。

中国对德国的投资热门都是那些部门和行业？他们为何做出这样的选择？

目前中国企业的投资重点仍然聚集在机器制造行业，北京第一机床厂对德国原中等重型机床制造商科堡公司的成功并购，就是一个典型的范例。一些电讯领域和化工领域的民营企业也逐渐步入德国的投资队伍。譬如著名的中兴通讯在杜塞尔多夫开设了分支机构。再如在德国拥有数个子公司的华为电讯，大约有500名左右的雇员在该公司供职。在高科技领域，则有投资于法兰克福赫司特工业园的北京诺诗康瀛生物技术有限公司。类似此种对高科技领域的投资，自然与德国的科研水平和企业实力不无相关。综合两国之长，实现优势互补，是中国企业选择投资行业或投资项目的考量。近些年来，随着中国对环境保护和高科技领域的关注日益渐

In addition to the hi-tech competence of German industry, are there other reasons why Germany is an attractive location for Chinese investors?

Chinese investors keep telling us that they consider the quality of German products to be of the utmost importance. In international terms "Made in Germany," the country of origin label, is synonymous with the highest quality and achievement. Chinese entrepreneurs have often said that this factor was of crucial importance when they decided to locate in Germany.

A survey by Invest in Germany has shown that, in addition to the excellent infrastructure, the central position of Germany and its integration into the European transport networks play an important role in the choice of a specific location. By obtaining access to the German market, companies are also opening the door to the single European market, which is the largest of its kind in the world. That is another reason why certain large Chinese companies have decided to locate their European headquarters in Germany.

In March 2007 consultants Ernst & Young polled the managements of 800 foreign companies which have invested in Germany. The survey showed that Germany is maintaining its position as the leading location in Europe. It is esteemed on account of its highly developed infrastructure, the outstanding quality of research and development, and also on account of its social stability and well-trained workforce. German workers are considered to be productive, efficient, disciplined and loyal. The majority of investors interviewed actually believe that German employees are the best in Europe.

Is there any particular region in Germany which Chinese investors prefer and where there are a large number of Chinese companies?

The choice of location also depends on the sector in which one is investing. Various different industrial clusters have emerged in the German federal states. Naturally they also attract Chinese investors in these sectors. Generally speaking Chinese investors like Germany on account of the excellent infrastructure and outstanding communication possibilities. A number of large cities already have an excellent range of services for the Chinese community. Criteria such as these give Chinese investors a great deal of room for manoeuvre when it comes to selecting the right location.

增，中国企业对高科技领域的投资兴趣也愈来愈浓。而德国在可再生能源领域和生物技术领域处于国际领先地位。

除了实力雄厚的高尖端科技，还有其它吸引中国企业到德国投资的原因吗？

中国投资商一再对我们说，德国产品的质量对他们来说何等重要。原产地标签"德国制造"标志着国际一流水平和质量，这也是他们为何决择"登陆"德国的一个重要因素。

德国政府投资促进署一个问卷调查还告诉我们，除了优越先进的基础建设环境之外，得天独厚的地理位置，方便发达、通往欧洲各国的交通运输网等等，也是德国之所以被各路投资商们所青睐的几个原因。对投资企业来说，开发德国市场的同时，也就意味着直接打开了进入欧洲市场——全球最大内陆市场的大门。这也是为何几个较大的中国公司直接把它们的欧洲总部安设在德国的一个原因。

2007年3月，安永咨询顾问公司对800家驻德外资企业进行了问卷调查，其结果表明：因其高度发达的基础设施，领先世界的科研水平，稳定的社会环境，训练有素的产业工人等等，使德国仍然处于欧洲首选投资国的地位。德国的劳动力享有创造性强、工作效率高、守纪律，有诚信的良好声誉。大多数受访投资商认为德国雇员是欧洲职业素质最好的员工。

德国的哪些地区为中国投资商所偏爱？抑或在德国的哪些地区集聚着中资企业？

投资地区的选择取决于投资行业的取向。在德国，每个联邦州都有各具特点的工业集群，对中国投资商自然也很具有吸引

Confucius Statue at Berlin's Chinese Garden – 柏林中国花园的孔子像

The inflow of foreign capital as a production factor is becoming important for the economic strength of the country, especially against the background of increasing investments in other countries by German companies. What is the role of Chinese companies in the creation of jobs in Germany?

Investment naturally also creates jobs. Chinese companies in Germany are usually successful if they pursue a strong localization policy and adapt well to the German market. This also means that in relation to the total size of their workforce they employ a large number of German employees in order to integrate into the German market. According to NRW Invest, in North Rhine-Westphalia alone as many as 2,500 people already work for Chinese companies. The Huawei corporation with its eight subsidiaries in Germany has a culturally mixed workforce of over 500 employees. Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant has created 150 new jobs within the space of two years and has filled the vacancies exclusively with local staff.

力。总而言之，良好完善的基础设施和先进发达的通讯环境，是吸引中国投资商面向德国的主要原因。甚至有那么几个大城市在其“招商引资”供应中，为中国投资商提供中国社区的良好服务。类似的附加供应无疑使中国投资商在地域的抉择方面拥有了更大的空间。

随着德国企业外移倾向日益加剧，外资的引进和流入对德国的经济发展可谓是事关重大。中资企业在德国的投资对德国的就业市场有何影响?

投资自然也创造就业机会。中国企业若想在联邦德国卓有成效，必须实行本土化，适应德国市场。换句话，也就是说，为了融入德国市场，他们必须大量“收留”和聘用

What do Chinese investors have to do if they want to do business in Germany and what kind of support can they hope to receive from German and Chinese organizations?

Most companies already have business contacts in Germany before they locate. And more and more Chinese companies are making use of professional support in their international ventures. For example, they use the services offered by Invest in Germany, by foreign chambers of commerce or by consultants.

Chinese entrepreneurs who wish to invest in Germany can get in touch with the local offices of Invest in Germany in Beijing or Shanghai. Having ascertained the needs of the companies concerned and the sector in which they wish to invest, we get in touch with the industrial department at our headquarters in Berlin. They conduct an analysis and assessment of various possible locations in Germany for the potential investors. In other words, we help Chinese investors to find a suitable location and to communicate with the regional and local institutions. We look into the possibility of obtaining financial support, help with applications for subsidies and provide various services in the areas of financing and project planning. Data are of course treated as confidential. For investors who create jobs in Germany our services are free of charge.

At the beginning of the year 2000 several Chinese ministries initiated a new policy based on the "Go Global" programme. This provides political and financial support for Chinese companies which are willing to invest in other countries. Apart from this the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) holds an annual "Chinese Enterprise Outbound Investment Conference," which is designed to provide support for potential Chinese investors and information about investment possibilities in other countries.

德籍雇员。据德国北威州投资促进署讯息，仅在北莱茵-威斯特法伦州就有2500名德籍雇员受聘于中国公司。在华为电讯公司及其下属的八个子公司里，就有一个由500多人组成，来自不同文化背景的职工群体。北京第一机床厂仅在两年之内，就创造了150个就业机会，这些雇员统统都是本土人士。

到德国来投资经商须要经过那些途径？中国投资商可从德国和中国两方得到怎样的支持？

大多数中国公司"登陆"德国之前，与德国方面已有业务来往。愈来愈多的中国企业登门造访德国政府投资促进署、外国商会、抑或其它咨询公司，寻求参与国际性商务活动的专业咨询和指导。

有兴趣来德国投资的中国企业，可以事先与德国政府投资促进署在北京或上海的办事处取得联系。然后，我们再根据他们的具体需求，投资方向，委托我们在柏林总部负责分管工业的团队，对各个入选的投资目标及其环境进行分析和评估。也就是说，我们将协助中国投资商们，选择理想的投资地点，与当地有关部门和负责机构沟通接洽，为他们寻找获取经济资助的门路，协助他们去申请拨款，提供其它可能的融资项目。客户的数据不言而喻对外严格保密，对那些为德国创造就业机会的投资商，我们提供免费咨询服务。

2000年开始，中国方面多个部委联合推出"走出去"的新的经济战略部署，这个计划不仅从政策方面，也从财经方面支持和资助中国企业到海外投资。除此之外，中国国际贸易促进委员会每年举办一次"中国企业对外投资研讨会"，为那些谋求海外发展的企业提供咨询和帮助。

What challenges do Chinese investors have to overcome as they gain access to the German market, and what advice would you give them?

The first companies from China to invest in Germany had some unfortunate experiences. They had very little information about the German market, were not systematic enough at the planning stage, and made many decisions on the spur of the moment and on an ad hoc basis. Apart from this their knowledge of cross-cultural management methods was insufficient. Many of the Chinese companies which invest in Germany today have learned a lesson from this. They proceed very cautiously and do a lot of research before they put their money on the table. After the investment has been made, many of them hire local executives and adapt the management to the local situation. In this way there are fewer disagreements caused by cultural differences.

I advise Chinese companies which wish to invest in Germany to pursue a simple investment strategy, to avail themselves of advice with regard to domestic legal questions and the German taxation system, and to practice international communication, and to learn how to promote mutual understanding. ■

中国投资商开发德国市场时，经常遭遇哪些挑战和难题？您将给予他们哪些建议？

第一批到德国投资的中国企业遭遇了许多不快的经历。他们一对德国市场缺乏经验，二又事先没有做好系统性的规划和准备，许多决策都很冲动多跳，随心所欲，三则缺少跨文化的国际企业管理经验。如今到德国投资的中国企业则不同，他们借前车之鉴，行动审慎。投资之前，充分调查研究，投资之后，继续留用本土的原管理人员，力求管理风格入乡随俗。如此，由于文化差异所导致的摩擦和分歧也就随之减少。

对谋求投资德国的中国企业家们，我建议，致力于一个清晰明确的投资战略；在德国遇到法律和税务问题的时候，征询专业顾问的意见；融通国际惯用的沟通和理解方式。■

Invest in Germany

Invest in Germany is the location marketing company of the Federal Republic of Germany. It informs foreign investors about investment possibilities in Germany and the general conditions at this location. Since August 2007 Invest in Germany has had a representative office in Beijing.

德国政府投资促进署

“德国政府投资促进署”是德意志联邦共和国官方投资促进机构。该机构为外国投资商咨询在德投资的可能性以及建立公司所需的条件。从2007年8月起“德国政府投资促进署”在北京设立了自己的代表处。

Speaking with Dr. Ulrike Reisach

Expert on Chinese economic policy,
University of Applied Sciences Neu-Ulm

冉珊鹤博士访谈录

新乌尔姆高校中国经济政策专家

"Chinese companies are at one and the same time partners and competitors. They should be taken seriously as customers and suppliers, and of course as investors and competitors."

"说到中国企业，我们必须既要把它们当成投资者和竞争者，又要当成客户和供应商而认真对待。"

Mrs Reisach, the internationalization of Chinese companies is being encouraged by the Chinese government in the framework of the "Zou Chu Qu" programme. What are the reasons for this economic and industrial policy initiative?

China joined the World Trade Organization WTO in 2001 not only in order to open its markets for foreign companies and products, but also in order to promote its own products and companies on the world markets. This was the reason why the "Zou Chu Qu" (swarming out) strategy was proclaimed to coincide with accession to the WTO. Currently twenty Chinese corporations are among the 500 in the world with the largest turnover, and the idea is that there should be fifty by the year 2010. The goal is a sustainable improvement in Chinese economic growth which, according to the 11th five-year programme, is supposed to increase annually by 8.8 per cent between 2006 and 2011. Only growth of this magnitude can help China to master the enormous challenges with which it is confronted as a result of growing social, regional and demographic inequalities. However, the

冉珊鹤女士，中国政府用"走出去"的策略来推动中国企业国际化进程。而这一经济和工业政策的动因究竟是什么呢？

中国于2001年加入世界贸易组织WTO，不仅仅是为了对外国公司和产品打开自己的市场，同时也为了让中国产品和企业在国际市场上立足。所以加入世界贸易组织和"走出去"策略的启动几乎是同步进行的。今天有20家中国企业名列世界500强，而到2010年，将有50家中国企业跻身于世界500强。中国的目标是保持经济持续增长，按照"十一五"规划的要求，2006至2011年间的年增长率要达到8,8%。而只有当经济达到这样的增长率时中国才能够应付由于社会、地区和人口失衡发展而日益加剧的严重挑战。然而仅靠本

Middle Kingdom can no longer sustain high growth of this kind on the basis of its own natural resources and domestic demand. Thus an important precondition is to ensure that it can acquire sufficient raw materials.

At the same time, as in other states, the aim is to create well-paid and qualified jobs for the millions of workers crowding into the cities each year and to raise the standard of living. In such a situation profits and foreign reserves deriving from sales on the markets of high-income industrialized countries are of course more than welcome.

The economic development of China and its integration into the world market are not only of central importance for the political and social stability of the giant multi-ethnic state. They are also a symbol of national pride, as is demonstrated by the opening to date of 100 Confucius institutes throughout the world, or by the ambitious Olympic Games in Beijing 2008 and the world exhibition EXPO 2010 in Shanghai.

What does state support for businesses mean in practice?

First of all it needs to be said that in China it is often not very easy to distinguish between state-owned and private enterprises. There are companies in which shares are owned by the Chinese state itself, or by individual provinces, towns and communes, other state enterprises, semi-governmental institutions and communal enterprises. One is usually dealing with mixed ownership structures. Some of the capital has been provided by governmental or semi-governmental institutions, and some by private companies, i.e. Chinese, foreign, or Chinese and foreign companies (joint ventures). The People's Liberation Army, Chinese tertiary education institutions or party members are occasionally involved. Private owners come from among the new and often extremely wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and managers. Like politically influential personalities, they belong to the upper class. Against the background of mixed and, seen from without, not particularly transparent ownership structures, it becomes clear that there are numerous ways of obtaining direct and indirect state subsidies. They range from the low-cost provision of industrial land by local authorities and access to state research facilities to the assignment of scarce resources such as raw materials and energy. The provision of loans by state and quasi-governmental banks is another avenue, as is the provision of foreign exchange for investments and partnerships in other countries. As a result of what is still a restricted capital market, purely private companies and investors in China often find it extremely difficult to obtain financial backing, and some have come to grief for this very reason.

国资源和拉动内需中国已经无法来消化如此高速的发展。保证原材料的供应则是首要的前提。

同时，中国也和其他国家一样每年要为1亿涌入城市的劳务人员提供高收入和高质量标准的工作岗位并且不断提高福利标准。产品通过销往高收入工业国市场而带来利润和外汇收入则是理所当然的目标。

中国经济发展和融入国际市场不仅仅是维护这个多民族国家政治稳定和社会安定的头等大事，同时也是民族自豪感的体现。例如在世界各地设立100多家孔子学院以及主办2008年北京奥运会和2010年上海世博会所带来的荣誉感。

国家促进经济发展在实践中是如何体现出来的呢？

首先需要说明的是，在中国区分国有企业和私人企业常常并不是一件容易的事情。有些中国企业是百分之百的国有企业或者是各省、市、乡镇、其他国有企业、半国有企业和乡镇企业所属的企业。而大多数企业的所有权则是混合式的：国有或半国有机构拥有一部分股权，而另外一部分股权为私营企业即中国企业、外国企业或者中外合资企业所拥有。人民解放军、中国高等院校或者党员也拥有一些企业的股权。私营企业家是一个新兴的利益集团，他们常常是超富的中国企业家和经理人。他们和政治影响很大的名人相似，是上层社会的一部分。了解了这种从外表看起来往往不那么透明的所有权混合形式的背景，你就清楚了：国家有很多种直接的和间接的途径来促进经济发展。形式则多种多样：以优惠价格提供厂房，开放国家科研机构和配备紧缺的资源如原材料和能源。国有和准国有银行在发放贷款方面也是一条途径，还有提供海外投资和购买股权所

Newspapers sometimes carry reports that foreign companies in China are discriminated against in favour of domestic ones. What is one to make of such claims?

It is a fact that hitherto smaller Chinese companies have had a series of indirect competitive advantages over companies from other countries. Compliance with regulations, be it with regard to labour and taxation laws, product certification or environmental protection, is very strictly controlled in China in the case of foreign companies. But on the other hand, many companies, for image reasons if for nothing else, are very much in favour of such controls. In a domestic economy which comprises many hundreds of thousands of small companies in every region of the country, it is not always possible to secure sufficient compliance with current regulations. Reports on improvable working conditions, health and environmental damage, and product piracy show this quite clearly. For the Chinese government such cases are a powerful incentive to redouble its efforts to ensure compliance with current legislation. This is the reason why environmental issues and improved protection of intellectual property are at the centre of its 11th five-year programme. At the same time it hopes to dismantle social and regional inequalities by means of balanced development and improvements in the healthcare and social systems. The goals of the Chinese government, which wishes to promote morality, public security and product safety, also point to the fact that it has recognized the nature of the problem. However, there are still areas where equal opportunities do not exist. For example, as in the past only Chinese companies can submit tenders for large government contracts in China. To date China has not signed the WTO agreement which stipulates that large public contracts must be open to tenders from the international community. .

What role does the Chinese sovereign wealth fund play in the internationalization of the economy?

The state investment company China Investment Co., Ltd. (CIC) has a budget of more than 200 billion US dollars. This is only a small portion of the gigantic Chinese foreign exchange reserves of more than 1.8 trillion US dollars – the sum reached by the end of June 2008 – and is designed to diversify Chinese investments. Hitherto China's foreign currency reserves have for the most part been invested in U.S. Treasury bonds. For this reason the fund is looking for safe and lucrative investments in companies throughout the world. The investment in Blackstone, the U.S. private equity fund, caused quite a stir; since 2007 China has owned just on 10 per cent of the capital. Blackstone is now advising China on the takeover of the Australian mining company Rio Tinto, for which at the end of

有时侯在报纸上读到消息称，在中国的外国企业跟本国企业相比受了歧视。如何评价这种说法?

迄今为止，中国的小型企业与外资企业相比确实具有一系列间接的竞争优势：在遵守法规方面，无论是劳动法还是税法，在产品认证方面或者说环境保护方面，一般来说中国对外资企业的审查都很严格。另一方面许多企业出于形象上的考虑也对这些审查有很强烈的兴趣。而国内经济囊括各个地区的数以万计的小企业，要求它们严格遵守法规，确实难以做到完全彻底的监督。关于劳动条件差、健康受到威胁、环境遭到破坏以及冒牌生产的报道清楚地显示了这一点。这些事件成为中国政府要求严格遵守法规的强烈理由。所以政府将加强环保和维护知识产权定为“十一五”规划的中心任务。同时它还要求平衡发展，改善健康和社会保障体系以期达到减少社会和地区不协调发展的目标。中国政府旨在促进道德水准的提高、公共安全和产品安全的改善，这也都说明它已经看到了存在的问题。尽管如此，仍然存在机会不均的问题：例如国家的一些大型项目一如既往只允许中国企业竞标。中国至今还没有签署WTO关于大型项目必须公开进行国际招标的协定。

2007年建立的中国国家投资基金在经济国际化当中扮演什么角色?

中国国家基金投资公司拥有2000亿美元资金，而这只是中国庞大的1万8千亿美元外汇储备（截止到2008年6月底）的很少一部分。据说成立该公司的目的是为了投资多样

January the Chinese aluminium producer Chinalco and the U.S. steel corporation Alcoa offered 12 billion US dollars, the largest sum China has ever been willing to invest in a foreign company. This enables us to see the main thrust of Chinese foreign investments, which is all about obtaining natural resources in order to satisfy the craving for energy in the burgeoning Middle Kingdom.

At the same time China is attracted by hi-tech industries and banks. In the early part of the summer it displayed an interest in ailing U.S. banks such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns. There were rumours that Dresdner Bank in Germany might be the target of a takeover bid. And via the Hong Kong branch of its state foreign exchange authority China has acquired a share in Australian banks without causing much of a stir in the press.

However, the artificially exaggerated fear of Chinese investors whipped up by the German press is wholly misplaced. Why should China not buy a share, as is standard international practice, in certain companies just as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Singapore have done in the past, and as Russia and India are doing at the moment? As long as its share remains within reasonable limits, China should be as welcome as any other investor. That Germany is a good place for equity investment and to raise capital is illustrated by the attempts of Deutsche Börse to persuade Chinese companies to be listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. However, China is also afraid of foreign “crocodiles” (the equivalents of what Germans call “locusts”), which buy up Chinese companies in order to “devour” them. For this reason it protects its strategic sectors against unduly high foreign participation. To a certain extent Western market economies should certainly be permitted to scrutinize Chinese participation policy.

化。迄今为止，中国外汇储备的大部分都用于购买美国政府债券。将来则用于投资并购安全系数和收益较高的外国企业。2007年中国购买了美国从事私人融资业务的黑石集团将近10%的股份，从而引起恐慌。得到黑石集团的咨询，中国国有铝制品生产商中国铝业和美国钢铁康采恩美国铝业于2008年1月底共同斥资120亿美元竞购澳大利亚力拓矿业公司的股份，这是迄今中国对海外公司最大的单项投资意向。在这里，中国海外投资的主要流向也十分清晰：为中国日益增长的能源原材料需求提供安全保障。

与此同时还有投资并购高科技企业和银行的部分股权。今年初夏，中国对投资参股几家经营不善的美国银行如花旗、美林、摩根士丹利和贝尔斯登表示了兴趣。而且有消息称中国有意购入德国的德累斯顿银行部分股权。中国还通过在香港注册的外管局投资公司购入澳大利亚几家银行的部分股权，而且几乎没有引起媒体的关注。

不过，我们这里的媒体刻意夸大对中国投资者的恐惧感却是不合适的。既然沙特阿拉伯、科威特和新加坡可以购买外国企业的股权，俄罗斯和印度现在也在购买外国企业的股权，那么为什么中国就不能按照国际惯例同样做呢？只要中国所持有的股权是在一定的范围之内，就应当和任何一位出资者一样受到欢迎。德国对外来资金的参股和接纳都是开放的，具体体现就是德国股市鼓励中国企业在法兰克福挂牌上市。不过中国同样也担心外国“大鳄”（行话所谓的那种“飞蝗”）购入而且可能吞并中国公司。所以它的策略是防止外资购入过多的股权。西方经济也应当允许对中国购股政策进行一定程度上的观察。

View into the Forbidden City in Beijing – 北京紫禁城一景

How competitive are Chinese companies on international markets and how is their competitiveness influenced by Chinese economic policy?

Chinese companies have continually improved their international competitiveness since the start of the reforms at the end of the 1970s and of economic liberalization, and are currently in the process of becoming global market leaders in numerous hi-tech sectors. For this reason we will have to get used to names of large resources corporations such as Sinopec, Sinochem, Petrochina and Baosteel, of technology companies such as Lenovo, Haier, Huawei and TCL, and of car makers such as FAW, SAIC, Geely and Chery, just as we once got used to Toyota, Honda, Sony, Toshiba, Fujitsu and Nintendo from Japan, or Samsung, Hyundai, LG and Daewoo from Korea.

Chinese companies often appear on the global market with cheap and imitation goods for a few years and then, to the great astonishment of Western competitors, suddenly come up with efficient and at the same time inexpensive designs of their own. And Chinese companies are in a continual state of flux. Where hitherto there were only small local suppliers which, if they were competitors, were totally disregarded by Western companies, new and hard-hitting entities have appeared within a very short space of time as a result of government industrial policy. This happened, for example, in the telecommunications and energy sectors, and is currently happening in the automotive and aerospace sectors. I once described this as a "mushroom strategy." For a long time the links between such companies are invisible, and then suddenly a large new company seems to have been created out of nowhere. This comparison seems to put its finger on what is happening, for it has been quoted rather frequently. Market economy explanations are insufficient if one wants to understand the Chinese economy. The Chinese government

中国企业在国际市场上的竞争力如何？中国的经济政策又是怎样对它们的竞争力施加影响的？

改革开放以来中国企业在国际市场上的竞争能力不断得到提高，而在很多高科技领域它们正在崛起成为世界市场的领导者。我们将不得不习惯下列名字：比如说大型的原材料企业中国石化、中国化工、中国石油和宝钢，高科技集团公司联想、海尔、华为、TCL，汽车生产商中国一汽集团、上海汽车工业集团、吉利汽车、奇瑞汽车股份，就象当年我们不得不习惯日本的大公司丰田、本田、索尼、东芝、富士通、任天堂或者韩国大企业三星、现代、LG和大宇一样。

中国公司在仿造或者廉价生产短短的几年之后，就带着自主开发的，性能优良而且价格便宜的产品迅速打入国际市场，这往往令西方的竞争对手大吃一惊。中国企业界一直处于变化之中。本来只有一些西方公司所忽略的小型地方企业，而通过国家工业政策的扶持在极短的时间里就会诞生一批实力强劲的企业。这在电信和能源行业已有先例，而在汽车和飞机制造业正在大面积展开。我有一次曾经将其称为"蘑菇战略"：这类企业盘根错节，很长时间默默无闻，有的大型

is behind many company changes and mergers, both horizontally and on the vertical level of the initiators. This is demonstrated by the reordering of the large Chinese mobile phone providers in the summer of 2008.

Chinese economic policy strives to strike a balance between promoting the integration of China into the world market on the one hand, and the growing domestic economic challenges on the other. Thus in 2008 Chinese investors are for the first time experiencing a dramatic decline in share and property prices. In the hope of rising share and property prices many Chinese small investors have invested borrowed money, and are now experiencing a situation in which their supposed wealth is melting away. If this downward trend continues, the Chinese government might deem it necessary, as has happened in the U.S., to provide massive economic support for small investors and banks. Generally speaking state intervention in economic activity is not taboo in China. It is done quite pragmatically to stabilize the Chinese economy, and this is in the interests of China's trading partners throughout the world.

Is there an internationalization strategy that receives special support from the Chinese government?

The strategies differ. There are individual investors and small family-oriented companies, and there are giant Chinese conglomerates which are moving into international markets with the backing of the government. Here are some examples. The carmakers Geely and Chery are selling their cars in South America and Africa, and in this way are gaining experience of foreign markets. With its household appliances, and especially microwave ovens, the Galanz company has established itself virtually unnoticed in practically all Western countries. The household appliances manufacturer Haier, which began with licences from the German refrigerator manufacturer Liebherr, developed from a producer of niche products – mini refrigerators for mobile homes and student apartments – to the second-largest maker of washing machines in the U.S. Haier is now the largest manufacturer of household appliances in the world and employs more than 50,000 people. In 1993 the container manufacturer China International Marine Containers (CIMC) acquired about a dozen smaller container makers on the Chinese coast. Then, from 1995 onwards, it used a joint venture with the German company Graaff to develop the technology for special containers and overtook the previous market leaders Japan and South Korea. The Tsingtao brewery, which was founded in 1903 with recipes provided by Bavarian brewers, has long since become a part of the global beverages industry via its parent company, Anheuser Busch.

新企业真好象是突然间横空出世。这个比喻常常被引用，看来是比较准确的。完全用市场经济的模式来解释中国经济是远远不够的。在很多企业的改制或重组的后面都有中国政府的影子，无论从平行角度还是垂直角度上讲动机都是来自于政府，例如2008年夏中国移动通信网络商重组所显示的那样。

中国经济政策在中国融入世界市场和迅速增长的国内经济挑战之间追求平衡。所以中国投资者在2008年第一次经历了大面积戏剧性的股市和房地产萧条。为数众多的中国小额投资者希望股市升值，物价上涨而贷款进入股市，现在却不得不接受财富缩水的事实。而如果这一贬值趋势延续下去的话，中国政府将不得不象在美国发生的那样被迫在经济政策层面采取断然措施，扶持那些小额投资者和银行。在中国，总的来讲政府对经济进行干预不仅不是禁区，为了经济局势稳定以完全实用主义的方式来处理，而稳定局势又是为各界贸易伙伴所共同感兴趣的。

有没有哪一种国际化策略得到中国政府的特别支持?

各种策略之间存在着很大的差异：国际市场上蜂拥而来的，既有个体投资者和小型的家族式企业，又有以政府为靠山的大集团。这里仅举几个例子：汽车制造商吉利和奇瑞在南美和非洲销售汽车，积累海外市场上的经验。格兰仕公司通过家电产品尤其是微波炉几乎是声色不动就在所有西方国家站稳了脚跟。家电生产商海尔是靠贴牌生产德国电冰箱生产商利勃海尔的产品起家的，从一个生产休闲房车和学生公寓专用小冰箱的专类产品生产商，成长为美国第二大洗衣机供应商。今天的海尔是世界上最大的家电生产商，有50000名员工。集装箱生产商中国国际海运集装箱有限公司，1993年兼并了中国沿海地区十多个集装箱生产厂家，自1995

The computer manufacturer Lenovo did things the other way round. In 2005 it acquired for ca 1.25 US dollars billion the whole of the PC business of the traditional market leader IBM, including expertise, brand name and global sales channels, and opted for a listing on the New York Stock Exchange. The Chinese internet company Alibaba provides small and medium-sized Chinese companies with a platform where they can establish a global presence as suppliers. In 2007 it had the most successful Chinese IPO of all times on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising just about 1.5 billion US dollars. Chinese banks were also in search of international capital and expertise. Despite fears of hidden risks, they were overwhelmed by foreign investors at their IPOs in 2007. A clear trend emerges. Buying shares – mergers and acquisitions (M&A) – has become the way in which the Chinese prefer to pursue internationalization. In 2007 it made up almost 90 per cent of the Chinese foreign investments amounting to a total of about 30.1 billion US dollars. The advantages of the M&A strategy are obvious. It is possible to get into markets faster and more easily, for one is buying internationally familiar brand names, well-tried sales structures and technical and management expertise. As investors Chinese companies are far more successful than they used to be.

Not all Chinese investments in Germany seem to have been well planned in strategic terms and some quickly came to grief as a result. Where are Chinese companies in Germany today, and what may we expect from the Chinese government and Chinese companies in future?

In the beginning Chinese investors also had to learn the hard way, as is shown by the disastrous involvement of Chinese electronics company TCL in TV manufacturer Schneider Electronics in 2002, and the failure of TCL's partnership with Alcatel in the area of mobile phones in 2005. In Germany people still remember the Chinese conglomerate DeLong, which was planning to take over the traditional aircraft manufacturer Fairchild Dornier in Munich-Pfaffenhofen. However, there have also been some striking successes. The machine tools company Beijing No. 1 has forged an efficient manufacturing entity with German machine tools producer Waldrich Coburg and has secured jobs in both countries. Beijing No. 1 would like to continue to expand in Germany and is on the lookout for suitable partners. In the machine tools sector there are a number of other successful examples such as the participation of Shenyang Machine Tool Co., Ltd. in Schieß AG, Düsseldorf; of Dalian Machine Tool Group Co., Ltd. in Zimmermann GmbH, Denkendorf; or of Harbin Measuring and Cutting Tool Group Co., Ltd. Kelch GmbH & Co., Schondorf. Large Chinese companies such as telecom equipment supplier Huawei and Haier, the manufacturer of household appliances, have long

起，通过与德国Graaff公司成立的合资企业，从事专用集装箱技术二次开发，超越了处于领先地位的日本和南韩。按照1903年巴伐利亚啤酒配方生产啤酒的青岛啤酒厂通过它的母公司Anheuser Busch早已是世界饮料业的不可或缺的一部分。

计算机生产商联想走的是一条相反的道路：它2005年斥资12,5亿美元兼并了传统的行业领导者IBM的整个计算机业务、专有技术、品牌和全球销售渠道，在纽约股票市场上市。中国互联网公司阿里巴巴为中国的中小企业提供面向全世界的供货平台，2007年在香港股市吸纳了将近15亿美元的资金，而成为历史上中国上市企业最成功的范例。中国的银行也在寻找国际资本和专有技术提供者，虽然一开始对上市的潜在风险有些顾虑，2007年似乎难以抵制外国投资商的攻势。这里所显示的趋向很清清晰：购买股权—并购已经成为中国国际化优先选择的途径。2007年，中国在海外投资总额有近90%用于并购，高达301亿美元。并购战略的优势显而易见：进入市场更快更安全，因为购入的是国际知名品牌、经过考验的销售结构和技术及管理方面的专有知识。正是因为这个原因，中国企业作为投资者比以前更加成功。

好象中国在德国的投资也不完全都是深思熟虑的，所以有的投资很快就失败了。另外一些则很成功。那么今天中国公司在德国处于何种地位呢？未来我们对中国政府和中国企业又有什么样的期待？

正象中国电子集团公司TCL2002年兼并电视机生产商Schneider Electronics的失败和2005年TCL与Alcatel在移动通信领域合作的失败所显示的那样，中国投资者在刚开始的阶段也必须交学费。在德国人们还会想起中国德隆集团意欲兼并慕尼黑郊区普法分霍分

since established a presence in the U.S. and in Germany and are advertising a growing number of job vacancies in the daily papers. They are looking especially for experienced German specialists and executives in order to profit from their expertise with regard to technology, marketing and sales.

Chinese companies are as varied, flexible, and creative as the country itself and in future will probably be omnipresent on the international markets. They are cooperating with Western partners, but at the same time pursuing their own interests – just as any Western company would – and, if it is a company supported by the Chinese government, the interests of the PR China, perhaps in slightly more explicit terms.

Chinese companies are therefore at one and the same time partners and competitors. At any rate, they should be taken seriously as customers and suppliers, and of course as investors and competitors. ■

历史悠久的飞机制造商Fairchild Dornier。不过我们也看到了成功的例子：机械制造商北京第一机床厂收购德国机械设备制造商瓦德里希科堡就是高效率的生产组合，在两个国家都保住了工作岗位。北京第一机床厂还将寻找合作伙伴继续在德国扩张。在机械制造业还有大量成功的范例，如沈阳机床厂收购杜塞尔多夫Schieß AG，大连机床厂收购丹肯多夫Zimmermann GmbH，哈尔滨工具集团收购硕恩多夫Kelch GmbH & Co. KG。中国大型企业如电信设备商华为和家电制造商海尔早就在美国和德国站稳脚跟，在报纸上刊登的招聘广告越来越多。它们在德国网罗经验丰富的专业和技术人才，利用其技术、市场和营销方面的专门知识为公司获利。

中国企业多种多样，应变能力强，富于创造性，将来也和它们的国家一样在国际上处处出现。它们与西方伙伴合作，和每一家西方企业一样同时追逐它们自己的利益，而如果是一家得到国家支持的企业，或许追逐中国国家利益就更为鲜明。因此中国公司既是伙伴又是竞争对手，至少应该既要把它们当成投资者和竞争者，又要当成客户和供应商而认真对待。■

Ulrike Reisach

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冉珊鹤

冉珊鹤教授自2008年秋在新乌尔姆高校执教企业管理和国际企业通讯。22年来她对中德之间的经济合作进行了研究，并发表过诸多文章。她是德国标准读物《中国——位于企愿和现实之间的经济伙伴》这一力作的作者。此外她还是位于布鲁塞尔的"欧洲中国学术网络"(ECAN)的成员。作为西门子股份公司企业通讯和政府事务中央部门的主管，她从1991年开始参与管理多个德中经济项目。

Waldrich Coburg and Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant

Change and Perseverance

WALDRICH COBURG

瓦德里希科堡公司和北京第一机床厂

在稳定中变化

History of a Franconian Company

The machine tools company Adolf Waldrich Coburg GmbH & Co. KG was founded by Adolf Waldrich in Coburg in 1920, when it was called Globuswerke. As time went on the company expanded its range of products and in this way adapted to the changing conditions, even during the difficult years of the Great Depression and the Second World War. It initially devoted itself to tools used in the treatment of glass and stone, and later to long planning machines used in metalworking. Since the 1960s the company has been producing large high-precision machine tools. Shortly before the millennium Waldrich Coburg once again adjusted its range of products. It tried to meet changing customer demands in the machine tools industry by switching to multipurpose machines, modular construction, and customer-specific configurations and units with special features. The company advanced to become the technological market leader and restricted itself to the high-price segment.

The manufacturing systems were often adapted to cope with new challenges. The structure and the culture also changed. Until 1986 the company was a typically Franconian medium-sized family-owned business, and had the corporate culture one might have expected. This changed when it was taken over by Ingersoll International, the American large cutter manufacturer from Rockford, IL. The new parent corporation, which had a similar range of products, gave Waldrich Coburg little room for manoeuvre in adapting the business to the peculiarities of the regional markets and placed strict limits on the evolution of the company. In 2003, when Ingersoll International was forced to file for bankruptcy, this system collapsed completely. Through no fault of its own Waldrich Coburg found itself in a parlous situation. After a year in the possession of Herkules, a machine tools factory in Siegen, the company was sold to the new Chinese owner, Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant.

一个弗兰肯企业的故事

阿道夫·瓦德里希科堡机床厂有限两合公司是由阿道夫·瓦德里希于1920年在科堡创建的，当时的厂名叫格卢布斯工厂。公司不仅遭受了20世纪世界经济危机和第二次世界大战那样的变动，而且还不得不多次对其产品进行全面改产。起初工厂以生产玻璃加工和石料加工机械为主，后来生产用于金属加工的龙门刨。从60年代起，公司开始生产用于加工船用螺旋桨的高达8米的高精度重型铣床。在千禧年即将到来的前夕，瓦德里希科堡公司以新的理念面向未来，推出了多功能机床系列，机床的模块化生产可按照客户的要求专门为客户提供特殊配置。公司一举成为行业中技术领先的龙头企业，并将产品生产定位在高价位机床领域。

不仅公司的产品体系要随时适应新的挑战，企业结构和企业文化也经历了多次变更。1986年之前，该公司一直是一个典型的带有家族企业文化的弗兰肯中型家族企业。美国罗克福德市的重型铣床生产厂家英格索尔国际公司的收购完全改变了这一切。因为新的母公司也生产同类机床产品，所以为了维护自身利益，新的母公司多次改变瓦德里希科堡的公司结构，控制了其产品的开发，并划分了弗兰肯产品和洛克福德产品的销售市场。2003年英格索尔国际公司不得不申请破产时，这一系统彻底崩溃：瓦德里希科堡公司虽然自身并无债务，但也随之陷入了紧张的境地。济根市的海库勒斯机床厂收购该企业一年后，瓦德里希科

History of a Chinese Enterprise

Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant was founded in 1949 and is currently owned by Beijing Jingcheng Mechanical & Electrical Holding Co., Ltd., which in turn is owned by the Beijing city government. Beijing No. 1, which had an annual turnover of 100 million euros in 2007, may be a relatively small enterprise, but among Chinese manufacturers of machine tools it takes pride of place with regard to profits and comes in third with regard to turnover. Its origins as a typically state-owned enterprise should not deceive us. Whereas it is true that it has burdens from the past, the Chinese management has been trying for some time to make it capable of facing up to free competition. In this area it has made use of its special political connections in order to obtain favourable financing. These modernization efforts were marked by partnerships with foreign manufacturers and the foundation of international joint ventures in China. Within the framework of such cooperation agreements there was an increasingly close relationship with Waldrich Coburg after 1984.

Find out more about the merger of corporate cultures in "Post-Merger Integration and Corporate Culture"

Moving Closer Together Step by Step

Find out more about successful partnerships with the Toolbox "Cooperation Competence"

Contacts between Beijing No. 1 and Waldrich Coburg were initially restricted to fairly loose cooperation. In fact the Chinese company started out by being a customer. As a result the two companies became acquainted and learned to appreciate each other's reliability. For a long time the Chinese were primarily interested in technology transfer, and later in cooperation in the area of employee training and exchange of experiences in international management. Behind all this was the strategy of moving ahead with increasingly high-value products, at first on the Chinese and then on the international market.

> For their part the Franconians did not see this partnership only as part of their normal business. They seized the opportunity to make some (successful and profitable) headway on the Chinese market, and at the same to acquire intercultural experience in working together with Chinese entrepreneurs.

Subsequently this would turn out to be of inestimable value.

堡公司被卖给了对它有兴趣的中国北京第一机床厂。

一个中国企业的故事

北京第一机床厂建于1949年，目前隶属于北京京城机电控股有限责任公司，而该公司又隶属于北京市政府。北京第一机床厂的年销售收入为1亿欧元，虽然它相对而言是个小企业，其利润在中国机床生产厂家中却居首位，营业额居第三位。切不可只看到他典型国有企业的出身：虽然他还背负着一些遗留问题，但长期以来，中国公司的领导班子一直在为适应自由竞争而努力。特别是他们为了获得优惠贷款，与政界建立了特殊的关系。他们为实现现代化做出的努力，突出体现在与国外厂家合作和在中国建立合资公司上。在合资合作的框架下，北京第一机床厂从1984年起就和瓦德里希科堡公司建立了合作关系，并且关系日益紧密。

您可以参阅《企业后台管理与企业文化》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于企业文化的内容。

逐步靠近

您可以参阅《合作能力》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于利用工具箱成功实现合作的内容。

北京第一机床厂和瓦德里希科堡公司之间的联系起初仅限于松散的合作。中国公司开始只是以客户的身份出现，通过合作如签订长期供货和维修合同，两个企业间加深了互相了解，双方都很重视相互间的信任：就像“兄弟”一样合作。长久以来中国人一直对技术转让特别感兴趣，后来还对职工培训以及在国际企业管理经验交流方面的合作感兴趣。而此后真正的战略意图是，要用高质量的产品首先占领中国市场，然后再有重点的发展国际市场。

The strategies of the two companies gradually began to converge on account of their positive experiences and the external circumstances, especially globalization and the economic rise of China. At this time Beijing No. 1 decided that it would try to achieve technological leadership and access to the global market with the help of a decisive step such as the acquisition of a subsidiary. As early as 2002 the imminent bankruptcy of Ingersoll prompted the management of Beijing No. 1 to toy with the idea of acquisition. A year later it submitted an offer. However, because no one believed that the Chinese could pull off a deal of this magnitude, they were at first rebuffed. The situation changed suddenly when the new owners, the machine manufacturing company Herkules in Siegen, decided that it was no longer interested in Waldrich Coburg. The sale to Beijing No. 1 was concluded on 24 October 2005.

The Acquisition

The acquisition of a company by a foreign corporation will always be a dramatic moment in the corporate culture. In this case it was compounded by the fact that a medium-sized Franconian company was joining a Chinese state enterprise. Yet Waldrich Coburg had gone through a "vale of tears" and had not been "pampered" by the developments in the recent past, as Norbert Kastner, the mayor of Coburg put it. On account of the negative experiences of the workforce with the former parent company, Herkules, which had wanted to introduce less favourable working conditions after acquiring Waldrich Coburg, the expectations of the workforce were very low indeed. This provided an opportunity to change the mood among the employees by introducing a number of sensible measures.

A step in the right direction, which proved to be a decisive one, was taken by Zhicheng Cui, the managing director of Beijing No. 1. In a speech to the workforce he explained the strategy of his company and guaranteed the continued existence of the Coburg plant with the words "You cannot transplant a German oak".

The employees responded in a positive way to the transparent explanation of the reasons for the acquisition and the clear description of what was going to happen in the future. However, promises only begin to sound credible if they are followed up by deeds. A first sign of this was that the new Chinese parent company decided to finance the acquisition using its own financial resources and to plough the profits generated by Waldrich Coburg back into the company in order to increase the equity capital. The new business and budget plans also proved convincing to the banks, which thereupon offered the company very favourable

同样，弗兰肯人也没有把这种合作当作普通业务来看，而是充分利用对他们有利的机会，成功的开辟中国市场，获取更多利润，并且在与中国合作的同时获得国际文化交流的经验。

这些后来被证实的确是受益匪浅。

由于积极的经验交流以及外部的客观情况，尤其是中国经济的崛起和经济全球化使得双方的战略以这种方式日益接近。在此期间，北京第一机床厂作出了决策，进而迈出了决定性的一步，通过收购一家技术领先的子公司以达到打入世界市场的目的。2002年英格索尔国际公司签署破产时，北京第一机床厂的管理层就已经开始着手对收购进行审核。一年后提出了报价。然而因为当时无人相信中国人有这个收购能力，收购未能实现。但风云突变，当济根市海库勒斯机床厂，这个新的母公司对瓦德里希科堡公司不再有兴趣的时候，2005年10月24日北京第一机床厂终于收购成功。

收购接手

一个公司被一家外国公司收购，在企业文化方面都会有一段刻骨铭心的经历，这种情况下一个弗兰肯中型企业和一个中国国有集团的合并使这段经历更加难忘。然而，正如科堡市长诺伯特·卡斯特纳所说：瓦德里希科堡公司过去经历了"苦难的历程"，在过去几年的发展中没有得到过什么"宠爱"。但这种背景的结果却是矛盾的：由于前几年糟糕的经历，职工们的期望值已经很低，这样公司只要采取合理的措施，就可以调动职工的积极性。

北京第一机床厂的厂长崔志成采取的第一个决定性的步骤，就是他在一次讲话中对全体职工谈到企业战略时说的那句话："德国的橡树是不能

terms for the facilitation of its customer transactions. The decisive factor was the profitability of the factory in Franconia. The banks were unable to assess the real creditworthiness of the Chinese parent company, but Zhicheng Cui's candour in the negotiations and the ongoing transparency of the financial model created the trust that was necessary for sustainable financing.

Another important aspect at the time of the takeover was the trust the employees placed in their own abilities. They knew that the difficulties their company had encountered were not home-made, but the result of mismanagement on the part of the previous owners. Furthermore, it was obvious that the real value of the company was not the sum of the equipment and the patents, but the excellent technical and organizational skills of its highly qualified employees.

Any interference by a new owner would destroy the company's real capital, that is, customers who trusted an "industry brand name" and long-term business relationships which in this segment had been in existence for decades

Customers clearly buy with a long-term perspective in mind. They expect comprehensive and speedy service, staff training, long-term quality assurance, and state-of-the-art technological progress in subsequent purchases. An investor who thought he could play down the importance of these fundamentals would simply be doing himself a great disservice. Within a short space of time the German employees began to display a willingness to give the new owner the benefit of the doubt on the basis of the promises he had made and to fulfil his high expectations of them.

Integration and Repositioning of the Company

The management of the Chinese parent company was fully aware of the risks involved when it took over Waldrich Coburg. It had little international experience, and this was compounded by the fact that it had never before mastered such a challenge and possessed neither the organizational structure nor the appropriate human resources for a task of this magnitude. For this reason it commissioned an international management consultancy to accompany the post-merger process.

Another important and successful factor was the creation of a new executive structure.

移栽的。”这样保证了科堡公司的所在地保留不动。

对收购理由的透明解释和对公司未来发展的明确说明让职工们都心悦诚服。作出的承诺需要有实际行动的支持才能让人信服。第一个证明是新的中国母公司集团全部是用自己的资金完成的收购，接着又把每一笔科堡公司经营获得的盈余利润再投资到科堡公司。新的商业计划和资产负债表说服了贷款条件优惠的科堡HVB银行，也令其它商业银行对该企业刮目相看。起决定性作用的是弗兰肯工厂的经营实力。尽管银行无法可靠地核实中国母公司的偿付能力，而崔志成先生在谈判时坦诚的交谈，对融资模式一直都透明的介绍，赢得了必要的信任，使得未来的融资成为可能。

在收购接手时另外一个重要的方面是职工们对自己的能力非常自信。他们知道公司的困境不是自己造成的，而是由前一个公司所有者管理不善导致的。企业本身的价值不在于有多少设备和专利，而在于那些具有杰出技术和管理经验的职工。

每一个新业主的介入都有可能将企业原有的资本毁灭：即客户对“行业品牌”的信任以及几十年建立起来的长期的业务关系。

此外，客户也是以高瞻远瞩的眼光来购买产品的，他们期待得到全面快捷的售后服务，为他们培训操作员并提供长期的质量保证以及技术升级服务。任何一个投资者如果让别人对这种业务基础产生了一丝的怀疑，都将会给自己带来损失。德国的职工们在很短的时间内就做好了准备，要给已经做出承诺的新的中国股东一个机会，而且也要不辜负他的厚望。

With the selection of three managing directors, Hubert Becker (chairman), Horst Rothhaupt (marketing), and Uwe Herold (financials), Beijing No. 1 placed its bets on “home-grown” Waldrich Coburg executives who enjoyed the complete confidence of the employees (Hubert Becker had started his career as an apprentice in the company), and at the same time had for many years cultivated an excellent relationship with the top Chinese executives. There were no redundancies, and later on the workforce actually once again increased in size. As a result of this the company has witnessed an extremely low fluctuation rate. It guarantees very high quality standards among the employees, and at the same time prevents skills from drifting off elsewhere.

Another important aspect comprises the intentions of the Chinese management. Whereas Waldrich Coburg did not have a say in the actual takeover, the management of the company was co-opted by the new owners to participate in the development of a common strategy. The company continued to apply itself to the international markets, and also increasingly to the Chinese market, where Waldrich Coburg together with Beijing No. 1 is now considered to be a national manufacturer. After having regained some freedom on the operational side of the business, the Franconians were subsequently able to concentrate on two crucial points, the market situation and technology.

The product strategies of the companies complemented each other. Waldrich Coburg, a premium manufacturer, and Beijing No. 1, a manufacturer on the lower cost level, now serve the market in two price segments. In Beijing No. 1’s marketing strategy on the Chinese market, the Franconian company now contributes its reputation as a quality manufacturer, so that advertisements can henceforth point to the existence of high technological standards in both price segments. The parent company in Beijing has won the respect of Chinese competitors and customers on account of its successful acquisition in Germany. It first strengthened its strategic position on the domestic market, and subsequently in international terms. The various interests have now been combined, and if one part were to weaken, it would also affect the other parts.

实现一体化与企业整合

中国母公司的管理层对伴随收购瓦德里希科堡所要面临的风险十分清楚。他们之前不仅没有什么国际企业管理的经验，而且也没有承担过如此的重任，因此他们既没有组织机构也没有合适的人员。所以他们委托一家国际企业咨询公司伴随兼并后的营运过程。

另一个成功的重要因素是建立一个新的领导班子。

北京第一机床厂任用的管理团队首席总经理胡伯特·贝克、财务总经理乌韦·海罗德和主管市场销售的总经理霍斯特·鲁特豪特都是瓦德里希科堡的“土生土长的自己人”，他们在职工中享有很高的威望（胡伯特·贝克是从学徒工开始就进入公司的），并且多年来他们也和中方的企业领导保持着很好的关系。公司非但没有裁减雇员，反而后来还增加了员工人数。结果是：迄今为止只有微小的人员流动，极大程度地保证了职工的素质水平同时也阻止了技术外流。

中国股东管理层的意图也是一个重要的方面。公司以前被收购的时候瓦德里希科堡是没有发言权的，但新的股东收购之后却让科堡的领导班子积极参与到共同的发展战略中来。战略的目标首先是拓展新的业务市场，特别是中国市场的大门现在完全敞开了，德国公司现在也可以通过他的中国母公司以国内供应商的身份出现。凭着经营业务上重新获得的自由，使弗兰肯人可以将他们的主要精力都集中到关键点上：市场和技术。

企业的生产策略不断得以完善：瓦德里希科堡公司提供一流的高端产品，北京第一机床厂提供低端的产品。在北京第一机床厂的市场战略中瓦德里希科堡还有进一步的作用：每一个价位上的产品都要以高标准的技术取胜。北

Creation of a Common Corporate Culture

The development of a common corporate culture is always a long-term process, and in this respect Waldrich Coburg was no exception. After the takeover by Beijing No. 1 had been explained to the workforce in positive terms, there was a lengthier period during which a greater degree of trust emerged. Visible signs of confidence-building measures were things such as the modernization and enlargement of the company's buildings. One milestone was the construction of an assembly-line hall in May 2008, which cost 1.75 million euros. Furthermore, Waldrich Coburg kept adding to its workforce, and employees noticed on a daily basis when they came to work the full use of the manufacturing facilities and the burgeoning order book.

There was also a positive response among the employees to the fact that their traditional conditions of work such as compensation structure, working hours, further education possibilities, career opportunities, etc. were left largely unchanged. They did not feel that the Chinese were putting pressure on them, and certainly not that they were being dominated and pushed around. As a result of Chinese reticence with regard to operational and strategic management, which was welcomed, especially by the German executives, only a very small number of Chinese employees at the Coburg plant hinted at the new state of affairs. As one of the managing directors of Waldrich Coburg, Xiangjun Qu is on the ground for company coordination purposes and in order to exchange information with corporate headquarters in China. He manages to demonstrate rather credibly that he does not one-sidedly represent Chinese interests, preferring to see himself as a reporter who transmits concerns, problems and facts directly from Coburg to the parent company in Beijing and vice versa. This ongoing transparency forms an important basis for the joint meetings of executives from Coburg and Beijing which take place on a regular basis in order to evaluate business successes and to define the goals of the company.

There is also a great deal of coming and going in the field of technology. German technicians fly to China on a regular basis in order to set up machines, to do routine maintenance, and to train their Chinese colleagues to deal with the service side of the business. Conversely, small groups consisting mainly of young Chinese technicians and managers are sent to Coburg for training. It also gives them an opportunity to experience at first hand the highly sophisticated manufacturing organization and to acquire a feeling for the goals the parent company in Beijing is hoping to attain. In the context of this partnership they also become acquainted with German and Chinese employees, which may well turn out to be

京的母公司通过成功的购买德国公司赢得了其他中国竞争对手和客户的瞩目，从而确立了国内市场的战略地位并加强了在国际市场上的地位。现在双方的利益更加紧密地联系在一起，任何一方的弱点都会影响到另一方。

共同的企业文化的产生

共同企业文化的发展总是一个长期的过程，瓦德里希科堡的情况也是如此。在使所有职工欣然接受了北京第一机床厂的收购之后，还需要有一个较长的过程来赢得职工们的信任。显而易见的增进信任的措施有：整修公司的办公楼，扩建现代化研发实验室和技校培训中心。一个新的里程碑就是在2008年5月耗资175万欧元新建的装配车间。生产设备的充分利用和不断增长的订单合同，这一切当然是瞒不住职工们的，所有的迹象在每天的工作岗位上都能看得到。

在职工中产生的积极的反响还有，他们已习惯的工作条件如工资结构、工作时间、进修机会、提升的机会等等基本上都保持不变。他们在中方面前不觉得窘迫，更没有觉得中方在主导一切。中国人在营运和管理策略方面的矜持态度，首先得到德国的管理人员的积极好评，新的关系表面上只能从在科堡工作的少数几个中国员工看出来。作为瓦德里希科堡公司总经理成员之一的曲向军先生负责企业间协调和与中国总部之间的交流。他做到了使人们相信他不只是单方面的代表中国一方的利益，而是作一名把科堡所发生的事情、问题和实事直接报告给北京总部，又把来自北京的信息反馈回来的通讯员。这种连续性的具有透明度的联系是科堡和北京的管理层共同开会时的重要基础，这种会议定期召开，是为了对企业经营的成绩进行评估并为企业定出下一个奋斗目标。

在技术方面也有定期的交流。为了发展共同的生产体系，为卖到中国市场的机床提供维

a valuable experience with implications for the future. At any rate, it constitutes a significant step towards the emergence of a corporate culture. Such measures are backed up by leisure activities for German and Chinese employees which are designed to promote intercultural progress and mutual understanding.

The management in Coburg also communicates the development of the new corporate culture in a company newspaper which is published in German and in English. In addition to reports about technological innovation and successful business deals it also communicates progress in the area of integration and Sino-German cooperation. Thus Hubert Becker is not only able to tell his employees that "we are investing in our plant as never before in the history of the company." He can also tell them why this is happening.

"In Asia, Beijing No. 1 and Waldrich Coburg can secure orders by working together which would not have been possible without joint efforts."

修服务以及对中国售后服务技术人员进行技术培训，德国技术人员定期飞往中国。而主要由年轻的中国技术员和管理人员组成的小组也到科堡来接受培训。他们在当地可以亲身体验高精度产品的生产组织情况。让他们找到感觉，明白北京的集团总部努力追求的目标是什么。在合作的同时，德国和中国的职工可以互相增进了解——或许将来他们会成为很有价值的人力资源。无论如何这是未来企业文化的重要步骤。另外还有德国和中国职工业余时间的休闲聚会，以促进多元文化的融合和相互间的了解。

科堡公司的管理层还通过厂报和大家沟通最新的企业文化发展情况，厂报有德文版本和英文版本。除了关于技术方面的新动向和经济上的业绩的报道，还有一体化的进展以及德中合作项目的消息和职工们进行透明性地交流。所以，胡伯特·贝克不仅可以对他的职工报告："除此之外，历史上我们还从未在我们企业的厂区做过这么多的投资"，而且还告诉大家原因:

"这样北京第一机床厂就能和瓦德里希科堡在亚洲市场上共同得到订单，单靠任何一方都是办不到的。"

对外交流与合作

首先厂报作为在公司所在地科堡及其子公司、还有新的母公司总部之间的内部交流工具得以证明是很有价值的，特别是在一些经常被低估的方面：与外部一些利益相关的企业的联络，营造良好的商业和政治环境。厂报还有其它的作用，首先在像科堡这样一个中小城市中，企业的职工们就是重要的传播媒介。他们在他们的家庭，朋友和熟人之间交流亲身体验也制造了"气氛"。再加上当地报纸的报道，还有跨地区的电视台对这个特殊的德中合作项目也做了报道。领导班子公开坦诚的交流，配

External Communication and Cooperation

The company newspaper, initially introduced in order to facilitate internal communication at the Coburg plant, and between the subsidiary and the new headquarters, turned out to be of use for Waldrich Coburg in an area that is frequently underestimated, that is, external corporate communication with stakeholders and the social and political environment. The company newspaper is widely influential, especially since the company employees in a medium-sized town such as Coburg are important multipliers. Their personal statements to family members, friends and acquaintances "create the right atmosphere." On top of this there have been articles in the local papers, and the special nature of Sino-German cooperation has also been the subject of national reports on television. The openness of the management's communication policy and the positive comments of the employees led to a very favourable media response to the acquisition by Beijing No. 1. This does not happen very often in this context, even though it is so important for the development of a partnership that is equipped for the future.

The political environment also contributed to the success of the merger of the two companies. The Coburg town council has welcomed the acquisition and has provided support in the shape of municipal subsidies. It has also displayed an interest in more investment from China. It was this attitude which encouraged the Chinese to embark on the risk of acquiring Waldrich Coburg, and it led to a positive response in the Chinese media, which depicted Germany as a suitable place for business. Norbert Kastner's visit to Beijing No. 1 during his trip to China was also commented upon favourably by Chinese politicians. This was emphasized in his meeting with a deputy minister and the visit by Wanjin Zhu, the head of the Economic Affairs department of the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, to the town hall in Coburg. Other prominent guests followed. And Chinese students have also been greeted receptions given at the town hall. The success of the venture was demonstrated by a Sino-German Business Day in Coburg, which elicited a very positive response. Policymakers are no doubt guided by rational considerations and have in mind such things as higher local business tax revenues, secure jobs and votes at the next elections, yet a remark by Huber Becker aptly sums up the basic mood.

> "The Franconian and Chinese mentalities go together well." Both sides are interested in long-term success and not in short-term economic results dictated by the rhythm of quarterly reports.

合职工们肯定满意的反响，为北京第一机床厂的收购带来了舆论界积极的回音。这种情况实属稀有，这一点对将来长远的发展十分重要。

政治大环境也有助于两个企业的成功合并。市长诺伯特·卡斯特纳专程去了中国，为了向北京第一机床厂的企业领导们和其国有股东发出重要的信号：科堡市政府对这一企业合并表示祝贺，并将通过科堡市经济促进局提供支持，也欢迎有更多的中国投资到科堡来。这一举措鼓舞了中国人承担风险收购瓦德里希科堡公司的勇气。这一访问也带来了中国舆论界积极的反响，他们认为德国是一个适合投资发展经济的地方。市长诺伯特·卡斯特纳到中国访问也受到了政界要人的接待。他受到中国的一位副部长的接见，还有中国驻柏林大使馆经济部负责人朱万金到科堡市政府的访问都说明了这一点。随后来访的还有其他一些高官要人，一些中国学生也受到了市政府的接待。成功的合作促成了后来科堡市政府成功举办的德中经济日的活动，这个活动受到了各方的好评。当然，政策的制定取决于合理的思考，企业好就能缴纳更多工商税、众多工作岗位能得到保障并且这也会影响到选票，这些都要考虑到。胡伯特·贝克对总体感受的描述非常恰当：

> "弗兰肯人和中国人的个性配合得很好。"双方都着眼于长期的成功合作，而不是对季度报表那种节奏的短期经济效益感兴趣。

像瓦德里希科堡这类技术型企业需要和科研及培训紧密配合。因此，与科堡专科技术大学的合作是未来人事政策和商业战略的重要组成部分，以便把毕业生中的高材生作为职工招募到企业中来，使企业可持续发展。为了适应这种特殊的情况，上海科技大学和科堡专科技术大学建立了高校之间的合作关系，还专门开设了德语–中文学科。

Technology companies such as Waldrich Coburg need to maintain close contacts with research and educational institutions. For this reason cooperation with Coburg University of Applied Sciences is an integral part of the human resources and forward-looking economic strategy which will make it possible to recruit highly qualified graduates and to keep generating one success after another. The opportunities inherent in the unique situation have led to academic cooperation between Coburg University of Applied Sciences and the University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, which has developed a special Sino-German course. The fact that the companies are pursuing a joint educational policy in addition to integration cannot be valued too highly in the framework of the kind of globalization that is being structured in a meaningful way. Thus they are creating both high-value jobs and qualified, motivated and interculturally trained employees.

The Chinese-Franconian Success Story

Since the takeover in 2005 Waldrich Coburg has developed in a very positive manner. As early as 2006 turnover increased from 63 million euros in the preceding year to 75 million euros, and in 2007 to 85 million euros. Furthermore, there are orders on the books amounting to 400 million euros, and the biggest headache of management is how to reduce the long delivery times. This of course has had an effect on the employment situation. Whereas in 2005 there were about 500 employees, the number had risen to 700 in 2007. The acquisition by Beijing No. 1 can be construed not only as a success for the company itself, but for the whole of the Coburg region.

Thus it is hardly surprising that the executive leadership of Beijing No. 1 is very happy about this acquisition. The managing director of the company, Zhicheng Cui, emphasized that he was particularly proud of the fact that Waldrich Coburg had been made profitable and that new jobs had been created. The risk of purchasing a valuable German company as a strategic investment at a high price had been worth it. As reasons for the success of the venture he adduced (1) careful due diligence, (2) good communication, (3) adherence to international practices as well as (4) a competent executive leadership team, and added

> "I can only advise other companies in a similar situation to give the German managers all the freedom they need and to cultivate a reticent leadership style."

Of course the successes notched up so far are not only due to the measures implemented by the management, however target-oriented they may have been.

总体上来说，在有效实现全球化方面，对这个企业和高校携手推动联合培养机制的实例，无论给予多高的评价都不过分。这一举措既创造了高品质的工作岗位，同时又造就了高素质、有积极性、受过国际交叉文化教育的职工。

中国-弗兰肯的成功故事

自从2005年被收购以来，瓦德里希科堡公司的发展是相当积极向上的。2006年的销售收入已从6千3百万增加到7千5百万欧元。2007年的销售收入再一次提高到8千5百万欧元。此外，目前的订货合同总值已超过了4亿欧元。管理方面最大的担忧是如何缩短供货周期。这样自然会对产能和职工人数产生影响：2005年公司大约有500名职工，而2007年职工人数已达到700左右。由此可见，北京第一机床厂的收购不仅是企业的成功，同时对整个科堡地区也是有价值的。

毫不惊奇，北京第一机床厂管理层的核心人物对收购这家公司也很非常满意。北京第一机床厂的厂长崔志成说：我们感到特别自豪，把瓦德里希科堡带进了盈利时代，并且还创造了新的就业机会。用高价收购一家有价值的德国企业，这个风险冒得值得。他列举的成功因素如下：（1）认真做好尽职调查，（2）良好的沟通，（3）遵守国际惯例（4）有能力的领导班子。他还补充说：

> "我可以给和我们情况相同的企业一个建议，在管理方面给德国管理层充分的自由，要保持矜持的领导风格。"

当然，迄今所取得的成就不仅归功于管理层经理们所采取的有效措施，归根结底是靠不达目的誓不罢休的意志。大好的经济发展趋势尤其是繁荣的机械制造业市场对于头三年的成

The economic upturn and in particular the booming market in the machine tools sector have no doubt helped to ensure that the first three years were a triumph. The fact that the profits were ploughed back into the business led to an equity capital quota of about 40 per cent, an excellent figure for a company of this kind. At the same time the parent company continues to adhere to the idea that the Franconian plant is and will continue to be a "key point of strategy." This ensures the future in economic terms, increases the motivation of the employees, and enhances their confidence in the leadership and the extent to which they identify with the company.

There will no doubt be more difficult periods, and provision must be made for them. The give and take between the headquarters in China and the subsidiary in Coburg will be the subject of an ongoing debate about who is profiting or contributing most. And new market situations will call for new strategies, though conflicts of interest compromises and the generation of synergy effects will not always be as easy as they are now.

Thus it is all the more important to have intercultural interfaces, that is, people or committees who or which can mediate credibly when there is conflict.

If such mediation is a success on the executive level and reaches the employees in China and Germany, there is a good chance that a home-grown local company with international connections will come out on top. And managing director Zhicheng Cui may be able to keep the promise he gave on 24 October 2005. "Waldrich Coburg will continue to be Waldrich Coburg!" ■

功营运做出了贡献。公司把盈利再投资的举措使公司的所有者权益比例达到了约40%，对同水平的企业而言，这是非常出色的数值。正如母公司所说，弗兰肯厂址是"战略要地"，并将一直保持这个地位。这两点不仅保证了将来的经济发展，而且提高了职工的积极性，加强了他们对管理层的信任，也增强了他们与企业息息相关的主人翁意识。

无疑将来会有暴风骤雨的时候，对此要有所准备。在中国总部和科堡子公司之间的给予和获取将会成为主题。谁受益多少或者谁付出多少，对话各方的看法总会存在分歧。此外，新的市场形势将会要求新战略对策，在双方的利益平衡和协同效应方面不会总像现在这样简单。

但重要的是要建立一种多元文化的衔接点——个人或团队，当发生冲突时他们能够在双方都可以信赖的基础上进行协调。

当这种协调不仅只局限在管理层的层面实现，也落实到在中国和德国的职工们身上时，这样一个具有国际背景的本地企业就拥有了良好的成功契机。那么，崔志成厂长在2005年10月24日所说的承诺就能长久实现了："瓦德里希科堡仍然是瓦德里希科堡"。■

Speaking with Jade Wang

Executive director at Baron International Consulting Services, Hong Kong

王玮女士访谈录

香港建勤国际咨询服务有限公司执行董事

"The greatest challenges in takeovers of foreign companies are the successful integration of people with different cultural backgrounds and the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation."

"接管外国公司的最大挑战，是将不同文化背景的人们，成功地融合在一起，并且促进其相互的了解与合作。"

Ms Wang, Chinese companies have only recently started to invest abroad and acquire businesses beyond Chinese borders. How has this trend developed?

China's entry into WTO in 2001 signaled a major transformation in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Chinese enterprises. Overseas investment by Chinese enterprises has achieved a new peak. This phase is characterized by the continuous growth in the Chinese economy, and, as a result, the rapid increase in domestic savings, company funds, and China's foreign reserves. These conditions provided a favourable basis for the expansion of Chinese enterprises into foreign markets. In order to increase competitiveness in the global market, Chinese enterprises are increasingly searching for resources, technologies, and potential markets. They have realized that cross-border acquisition is an effective route to robust development of their businesses over the international platform.

王女士，最近以来很多中国企业到国外投资和收购境外公司，怎么会有这个趋势，它将如何发展下去？

中国企业近几年的海外收购活动。2001年中国加入WTO是中国企业对外直接投资发生根本性转变的里程碑，中国企业的跨国投资进入了一个高峰。这一阶段中国经济的持续增长，国内居民储蓄、企业资金以及中国的外汇储备的快速积累，为中国企业向海外市场扩张奠定了良好的资金实力。在经济全球化的趋势中，为提高在国际市场的竞争力，中国企业在全球寻求资源、技术、市场环境等方面的愿望不断高涨，成为中国企业跨国收购的源动力。从2004年起，中国企业跨国收购在全球经济体系中有愈走愈强之势，中

In recent years, the transaction value of each cross-border acquisition by Chinese enterprises has increased, and the speed of transaction has shown an increased rhythm. Most of the cross-border acquisitions – especially in manufacturing businesses – have been made by industrialized countries of the European and American market. For example, the acquisition of IBM's PC division by Lenovo, the several acquisition deals by TCL in the European markets, and the acquisitions by the Chinese machine tool industry in Germany.

According to the survey released in January of 2007 by Deutsche Bank, it was estimated that the yearly increase of China's FDI could exceed 20 per cent in the next five years. The value of China's FDI is estimated to reach 60 billion US dollars in 2011.

What types of experiences have Chinese companies had with cross-national acquisitions so far?

In comparison to the cross-border acquisition experiences Western countries have had during the last decades, China, with its first cross-border acquisition deal carried out in 1986, has a cross-border acquisition history of just 20 years, so the branch is still in its infancy. As Chinese enterprises lack experience in cross-border acquisitions, they have often underestimated the impact of East-West cultural differences and overestimated their abilities in managing multinational companies. In addition, most acquisition targets are problem-ridden companies which seem to be a good bargain at first sight but turn out to require much more involved managing than a company in good shape. Acquisition failures can be found among many of the first Chinese movers. For example, in 1997, Shanghai First Pencil Corporation acquired a German pencil-making factory. The factory was closed within half a year. TCL, after the acquisition of Thomson TV and DVD and Alcatel business, reported in the first quarter of 2005 a loss of 5.7 million US dollars. It reported heavy losses in the European market of up to 758 million Hong Kong dollars in 2006. Although the strategic decisions of Chinese pioneers are often highly ambitious, the cold hard reality after acquisitions has left many of them with painful memories and hard-learned lessons.

国的企业家们已经认识到跨国并购是以空间换时间、实现企业的跳跃式发展的有效途径。

近几年中国企业跨国收购呈现出单笔交易金额放大、交易节奏加快之势，而且中国企业的跨国并购，特别是在制造业方面，多发生在欧美经济发达的国家和地区，如联想收购IBM的PC业务、TCL在欧洲市场的系列收购以及中国机床行业在德国的系列收购等。

德意志银行2007年1月15日发布最新研究报告，预计在未来五年中国对外直接投资的年均增长率很可能超过20%，中国对外直接投资额将在2011年达到600亿美元。

中国企业在收购外国公司方面，积累了哪些经验?

与全球跨国并购130多年的发展历史相比，中国企业的跨国并购从1986年的第一单成交到现在不过短暂的20年，还处于发展的幼稚期。由于中国企业缺乏跨国收购的经验，轻视中西方文化差异，与此同时，他们在跨国公司的管理方面缺乏经验，而且收购目标多为问题企业，尽管乍一看已是一个合理的价格，但是中国总公司必须做比经营一个业务运营良好的公司多得多的工作，因此中国企业并购失败的案例更是比比皆是。例如，1997年上海第一铅笔厂收购德国一家铅笔厂，半年后工厂关门。收购汤姆逊公司电视、DVD影碟机业务以及阿尔卡特手机业务的TCL在2005年第一季度仅手机业务就净亏损达4570万美元，2006年的欧洲市场巨亏达7.58亿港元。决策时的志在高远与并购后的严酷现实，给中国跨国并购的先驱者们留下许多痛苦的回忆和惨痛的教训。

What are the challenges Chinese companies face in the process of cross-border acquisitions?

Cross-border acquisition and integration is a high-risk investment activity. It involves governmental, economical, legal, and cultural factors as well as factors relating to cross-cultural management styles. The challenges usually emerge during the post-acquisition integration, not during the actual transaction process. Once the acquisition is completed, the professional teams set up by investment bankers, auditors, and lawyers – as well as the project teams of the related enterprises – withdraw from the project, leaving the integration process in the hands of newly- expatriated management who has little understanding of the situation. This usually leads to misunderstandings and chaos at the beginning of the integration stage, which could be one of the most important causes of the failure of the acquisition project.

Since the Chinese enterprise is the company's new stockholder, how it presents itself to the acquired company is the focus of the acquired company's attention. The actions and measures adopted by the Chinese team will have a direct impact on future management. On the one side is the new team, which enters the company full of enthusiasm and belief that they can do a better job, yet not fully understanding the daily operations of the company. On the other side are the employees of the acquired company who are aware that what awaits them is a new management style, new organizational structure, and many other unknown changes. Too much uncertainty will lead to anxiety, frustration and even anger.

Hence, the most pressing problem Chinese companies face is finding the right management and internal control approaches to overcome problems during post-acquisition integration. Practice has shown that the use of an integration manager is an effective way of solving the related problems. Many multinational companies have utilized integration managers in their cross-border acquisition and integration processes, with good results.

中国公司在收购外国公司方面，面临哪些挑战？

跨国收购整合是风险性极高的投资活动，涉及到政治、经济、法律、文化、经营管理等各方面。其风险的高发期是在收购后的整合阶段，而不是在收购交易阶段，更不是人们想象中的交易价格的高低导致了收购项目的失败。在许多收购案中，收购交易一旦完成，投资银行、会计事务所和收购工作小组的人员就从项目中撤出，由重新组建的管理层接手被收购公司的整合与管理工作，而由于他们通常对于所接手的公司并不了解，对于跨文化管理也没有经验，所以接管团队经常不能对各种的复杂情况做出相应的判断和处理。这导致在融合阶段一开始，就常常处于误解和混乱的情况，这往往是收购项目失败的一个主要原因。

作为企业的新股东，中国企业以何种姿态展现在目标公司面前是对方关注的焦点，中方团队的所采取的行动和措施将直接影响未来的经营管理。这是目标公司最敏感的时期，一边是入驻的接管团队，踌躇满志，自信能将企业管理得更好但并不了解企业的日常经营；另一边是被收购企业的全体员工，每个人心里都很清楚等待他们的是新的管理方式、新的组织结构以及许多未知的新变化，太多的不确定性让人们感到焦虑、不安甚至愤怒。

所以中国企业跨国并购所面临的迫切挑战是找到适合的管理和管控模式，以解决并购后整合过程中的各种问题。实践表明，利用整合经理人是解决这一问题的有效途径。许多跨国公司在收购外国公司和收购后的整合过程中，都引入了整合经理人的角色，并收到了良好效果。

What role does an integration manager play in the acquisition process and how can he or she support the integration?

The integration manager's task is to prevent the cross-border acquisition from failing due to the cultural differences between the two parties. The manager is involved throughout the whole acquisition process in order to identify potential factors and problems that might affect the integration process. He or she has a key role in establishing and extending social relationships between the acquiring and the acquired company.

The integration manager has to take special note of the differences in management style, business cultures, and organizational structures between the two companies and prepare to set up proper reporting lines and communication strategies. In the preparation stage of integration, the integration manager acts as the insider and liaison for the entire process. His or her main task is to rapidly remove and reduce uncertainty in work plans. This can be achieved through either a mass employee meeting during which the new management team is announced, aor press conference as well as meetings with unions and workers' committees.

Other responsibilities would include discovering potential problems and informing the stockholders, assisting in solving these problems, making sure that the parties adhere to the agreed schedules or timelines, and guaranteeing that major milestones are reached. To this end, it is crucial that the integration manager maintains impartiality and is granted direct communication with senior management of the organization at all times. It is also vitally important to carry out this analysis early in the stage of due diligence between the two companies.

什么是收购过程和整合阶段的整合经理人？他如何协助公司的整合？

整合经理人的任务是防止合并的两家公司之间因文化差异造成整合的失败。他参与整个收购的过程，以洞察潜在的问题，化解影响整合进程的不利因素。因此，他肩负着协调母公司和子公司之间的社会关系的重任。

整合经理人确定两家公司的领导风格和企业文化的不同特点，引导重组的企业组织结构协调统一，并实施适当的外部及内部沟通的报告制度。在整合准备阶段，整合经理人作为对整个项目的知情者和协调者，其主要任务是迅速制定以消除不确定性为目的的工作计划并展开工作，如组织召开全体员工大会、宣布新一届管理团队、媒体见面会、会见工会组织代表等等。

整合经理人既游离于企业的权利架构之外，又直接参与到从尽职调查到企业整合的全过程之中。整合经理人的角色本质上是管理咨询，对于整合经理人的考核与其他的管理岗位截然不同，其考核指标主要包括及时发现问题，向股东告知问题，协助股东解决问题，督促各方遵守时间表，确保整合过程中重大事项的按期完成。尽管整合经理人没有决策权，但是可以加快整合进程。如果没有整合经理人的参与，许多有待解决的问题会无限期的拖延下去。同样至关重要的是，做为尽职调查的重要组成部分，整合经理人要分析和评价收购主体与收购目标之间的文化差异，并将其作为日后对目标公司进行整合的重要参考。

Can you elaborate on some of the cultural differences in managing styles and business cultures between a Chinese and a German company?

German management usually encourages innovation and values the demonstration of individual ability. Germans respect power equality and free speech. Hence, different voices and opinions are encouraged and respected during management meetings. Those who never offer opinions and who only agree with the group leaders or their superiors are regarded as low in capacity and unqualified. In contrast, employees in Chinese enterprises seldom openly challenge or doubt decisions and strategies made by higher management, due to the high power distance and respect for authority that exists in Chinese culture. Moreover, Chinese management takes for granted the passiveness of their employees in their work. For example, a foreign manager might feel that he or she is actively trying to solve organizational problems, while his or her Chinese counterpart might feel that he or she is seeking to undermine the power of the Chinese stockholders. In German companies, a transparent style of management is the norm, with the emphasis on the sharing of information. Conversely, in the Chinese enterprise,

您所提到的中国和德国公司在管理风格上的文化差异是什么呢?

大多数德国企业注重促进管理创新、个人能力的发展及员工优势的发挥，而且让员工也有平等的权利参与各个级别的决策。在管理层会议上，也有可以有争议地进行讨论。而员工如果没有自己的意见，只会赞同其上级或部门负责人的意见，常常被称为“追随者”，因为他们对公司不尽心，或者说不称职。与此相反，毫无疑问在中国的企业的决定和战略，只是在高级管理层的少数人做出的，这主要是清晰的权力关系和对权威的高度尊重在中国文化中的独特体现。此外，中国的经理们对员工的消极态度早就习以为常。这种差异可以举一个例子来说明：一个德国的经理积极寻求解决存在的问题的


CONFUCIAN ANALECTS.

BOOK I. HSIO R.

論語

學而第一

子曰、學而 一節

時習之、不亦

說乎。二節

遠方來、不亦

樂乎。二節

人不知

而不慍、不亦

君子乎。

CHAPTER I. 1. The Master said, 'Is it not pleasant to learn

perseverance and application?

delightful to have friends coming from distant

Abstract of “Lun Yu”, record of the words of Confucius –《论语》节选

any information regarding the acquisition and its processes is kept top secret. In the German acquisition target, however, employees could access information related to the acquisition progress through authentic channels.

German companies also make accurate, detailed plans, and schedules are followed with care. They tend to adhere to time arrangements very strictly, without the Chinese characteristic of flexibility. This flexible approach to time tends to give Germans, who rather stick to a planned and monochronic work pattern (i.e. one thing at a time) the impression that the Chinese are not punctual, tend to waste others' time, and are untrustworthy.

Also, the concept of "face" is very important to the Chinese. As such, they are not comfortable with disagreeing with others face-to-face. This, however, could lead to the Germans thinking the Chinese have no opinions of their own and exhibit low ability. Moreover, such differences between culture and management style make the acquisition and integration processes harder and are likely to lead to misunderstandings.

The job of the integration manager would be to identify these potential cultural issues and enact a plan to rectify them as quickly and smoothly as possible.

Merger and acquisition processes not only affect a company's internal structure and culture, but also its external business partners, organizations, and the broader public. What difficulties can derive from the companies' external environment and how can an integration manager assist in overcoming them?

The integration manager also analyzes the acquisition's impact on market and customers. This includes the reactions of the acquired company's customers, potential customers, and competitors, as well as the reactions of domestic and foreign markets. The analysis by the integration manager is integral in determining how the company should enact strategies during the integration phase. For example, Beijing First, in the process of acquiring Waldrich Coburg, found out through the integration manager's analysis that customers had concerns about the continuity of services. The company also discovered that competitors were using these concerns to motivate new customers to sign contracts with them in order to increase their market share. Another interesting finding of the integration manager was how stronger reaction to the acquisition came not from the American and European markets, but from the local Chinese markets. They were worried about the continual quality of products from Waldrich Coburg,

办法，而他的奉献精神，可能被其中国同行们看作是对中国投资者影响力的破坏。还有一个例子：在德国公司，信息的提供和透明度是企业领导的重要标准，而在中国公司，所有收购方面的信息都是是严格保密的，相反，被收购的德国公司的雇员，通过官方的信息渠道，就获得了当前收购的信息。

德国公司制订全面而准确的计划，并执行非常确切的时间表，而中国人在这方面则表现出更大的灵活性。这个灵活性使喜欢单一的工作流程——就是一件情解决之后才进入另一个问题的德国人，有一个印象：中国人是不守时和不可靠的，而这将浪费宝贵的时间。

在中国文化里还有一点也是极其重要的，就是"保存颜面"。这就是为什么中国人对不满意的事情不做比较公开的反对，这又反过来可能让德国人认为，中国人没有自己的见解，或不想做出称职的贡献。这种文化和领导风格的差异，阻碍了公司收购和之后的融合进程，制造了很多误解的可能性。

整合经理人的任务是，认识这种文化上的差异，了解所产生的问题，并确定适当的措施，帮助他们迅速和顺利地解决问题。

兼并和收购过程不仅影响到公司的内部结构，而且也影响到外部的合作伙伴、组织和公众。有哪些困难来自于公司的外部环境？整合经理人如何能帮助企业克服这些困难？

整合经理人还要分析企业收购对市场和消费者的影响。例如：客户的反应、被收购公司的潜在客户和竞争对手、以及国内和国际市场的情况。这个分析，必须在领导班子对融合阶段的战略执行时被参考。这个方面我们有一个例子：北京第一机床厂计划收购

and about whether they would end up paying German prices for products made in China.

Hence, the market impact analysis by the integration manager has high significance for strategic decisions made by the company: He or she assists the acquired company in developing a series of plans and strategies, such as establishing sales offices in important markets around the world, visiting important clients of the company, formulating strategies for dealing with local and foreign press, etc.

Of particular importance would be an analysis of the power, position, and sphere of influence of unions and workers' committees. The determination of the correct communication strategy is key to success in this area. For example, labour unions and workers' committees exist to ensure the protection of employees in Germany, so good interaction and the peaceful settlement of the labour-capital relationship after cross-border acquisition is an issue that requires serious and urgent attention.

What is the best approach, overall, for beginning the essential task of integration management, and how long does the integration period tend to last?

Cross-border acquisition and integration is similar to a transplant operation between transnational enterprises – severing ties with the old system and building up new ties with a new system. In the process, the rate of integration and its effectiveness are essential.

The biggest challenge faced in cross-border acquisition and integration is how to integrate people coming from different cultural backgrounds and promote understanding and cooperative work. Evidence has shown that a successful method utilized by integration managers is the implementation of small-scale cooperative projects, which allow employees from different cultural background to work together cooperatively. Such small-scale projects could be market sales or customer services activities, or some type of short-term cooperation between technicians and engineers. The accumulation of small changes must not be underestimated; they are essential in getting the process of integration moving. Once the integration process has moved from experimental small-scale projects on to the normal operations of the transnational company, the integration process has come to its successful end. The entire process usually takes two to three years. ■

德国瓦德里希科堡公司，经过整合经理人的分析，发现那个公司的客户们在为接管后的客户服务的连续性而担忧。此外，人们还清楚地看到，公司的竞争对手们，利用这种担忧，争取这些客户，以扩大他们的市场占有率。另一个有趣的发现是，在中国国内市场对企业的收购的反应，远远超过美国和欧洲市场。

瓦德里希科堡公司在中国的客户们担心，其产品是否能继续保持高质量，还是到最后变成：他们用“德国的价格”，买到“中国制造”的产品。出于这样的原因，整合经理人关于公司收购在西方市场的影响所作出的分析，对于企业的战略决策至关重要。他支持着公司的发展计划和战略决策，比如在世界各地的主要市场设立销售办事处，在新的领导带领下，与当地和国际媒体沟通，对客户进行初访。

特别重要的是他关于肩负工人和雇员的保护重任的德国工会组织的权力和影响力的分析，这是沟通与合作成功的关键。与雇员代表们良好的关系及在工资方面一致的协议，是中国企业在德国收购公司工作中必不可少的。

怎样评判一项成功的融合管理？融合阶段一般持续多长时间？

收购外国公司、使其融入现有的公司，有点类似器官移植手术：与旧系统的连接将被切断，与新系统的连接即将建立。在这个过程中，至关重要的是，紧密地统一和有效地向前推进。接管外国公司最大的挑战，是让不同文化背景的人成功地融合，并且促进其相互的了解与合作。实践经验表明，先从规模较小的项目上开始渐进地进行文化融合，而不是立即统一所有的制度和结构，是一个有效的办法。来自不同的文化背景的同

事们，有机会分享合作的经验，并学习他人的思想和行动方法。这种较小的项目，可以是合作中的中国和德国的同事们，在销售或客户服务方面的合作，也可以是来自这两个国家的技术员和工程师在开发部门的短期合作。

这些在日常工作中的许多微小的变化，使融合的进程稳步推进，因此不能低估它的作用。一旦逐步的融合已经发展到所有部门和所有的日常运作中，融合的过程就可以说是完成了。根据经验，这一阶段大约持续两至三年时间。■

Jade Wang

Jade Wang, executive director, Baron International Consulting Services Ltd. As a senior member of Baron Group, Ms Wang has over ten years experience in Mergers & Acquisitions and Post-Acquisition Integration. Baron Group is a well-established merchant bank headquartered in Hong Kong providing a full range of financial services including Investment Banking, International Consulting & Corporate Advisory, Asset Management as well as Equity Capital Market Services. Ms Wang is also a guest professor at Shandong University of Finance in China.

王玮

建勤国际咨询服务有限公司执行董事。作为建勤集团的高级主管，王玮女士有超过10年的企业跨国并购和并购后整合的经验。建勤是一个总部在香港的国际知名的投资银行及专业咨询机构，提供全方位的金融服务，包括国际并购、IPO、国际咨询和企业咨询，以及资产管理等服务业务。

Speaking with Zhenzhou Ma

Lawyer and expert for labour law,
Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, Düsseldorf

马震洲律师访谈录

杜塞尔多夫浩运律师事务所律师和劳动法专家

"For a management team which comes to Germany for the first time, co-determination by the works council is in most cases a culture shock."

"对首次到德国工作的中国企业管理人员来说，职工委员会的介入在大多数情况下无异于一种文化休克。"

Mr Ma, as a result of a higher level of Chinese investment in Germany, the number of German employees working for Chinese companies is on the increase. The way in which Chinese managers and a German workforce cooperate does not always please the two sides. What is the role played by the German co-determination system and the representation of workers' interests within the company?

The economic and cultural differences between the two countries – which range from the different societal traditions and the history of economic development to individual ideas of value – are reflected in the prevalent attitudes towards employment. The differences do not first become apparent on the level of the individual, in teamwork, or in the conduct of executives. They are already part and parcel of the higher structures created by the state and special interest groups. Chinese companies which are setting up a branch in Germany or buying another company should familiarize themselves with the German attitude to employment, not only on the level of interpersonal relationships between executives and the workforce, but also on the institutional level.

马先生，随着愈来愈多的中国企业来德国投资，中资企业里的德籍雇员人数也日益增长。然而，中国管理层与德国员工之间的合作却不能事事处处皆尽人意，不知德国的员工参与权和权益维护体制对此起到了哪些作用？

鉴于两国之间的文化和经济差异，不同的社会传统，不同的经济沿革，不同的个体价值取向——双方对劳资雇佣关系的不同理解也是可想而知、自然而然的。这种差异不仅表现在个体观念、团队合作、管理风格等层面，而且根深蒂固于自上而下的国家机制和利益集团结构。到德国开办公司或并购企业的中资企业必须全面了解德国的企业结构和劳资制度，不能仅仅停留于管理人员与德籍职工之间的人际关系层面。

Chinese entrepreneurs are not used to the German concept of co-determination and the representation of workers' interests. For example, in China there is no equivalent to the German Industrial Relations Act, and the rights and manner of functioning of the unions in China are essentially different to those in Germany. For this reason it is not surprising that Chinese investors and executives in Germany initially find it difficult to come to terms with these structures.

How would you explain to Chinese employers in Germany the beliefs on which a German contract of employment is based, and how this works out in practice?

First of all, I would explain the basic idea behind the Industrial Relations Act. Germany is a democracy, and in a democracy the idea is that the only good citizen is a mature citizen. For this reason the German model of the social market economy seeks to involve the workforce in important aspects of a company. If a decision is made after having consulted the workforce which may be affected by it, it may be assumed that it will receive support from both employers and employees. The most important thing is to preserve a harmonious atmosphere in the company and not, as might be supposed from the perspective of other countries, to place constraints on the freedom of entrepreneurial decision-making.

Thus the basic idea of the Industrial Relations Act is the notion of a partnership between the employer and the workforce. The two sides should try not see each other as opponents. Unions and employers' representatives should work together in an atmosphere of trust for the benefit of the employees and the company whilst respecting the law and any collective wage settlements. It is perfectly legal for the employer and the works council to take industrial action.

Over the last few decades the Industrial Relations Act has certainly proved its worth. The partnership style of cooperation which it guarantees is the main reason why Germany is one of the few countries in Europe where industrial disputes and the ensuing damage to the economy are not a daily occurrence. In this respect the Industrial Relations Act helps to make Germany an attractive location for foreign investors.

中国企业家对德国的雇员参与权和权益维护的企业管理思路颇为陌生。在中国，一来没有与德国《企业组织法》相适应的法律法规，二来中国的工会所拥有的权力和功能也不能与德国的同日而语。所以，毫不见怪，当初来乍到的中国投资商和管理人员常常为此感到手足无措，头痛不已。

您将如何向在德国的中国企业主讲解这里的劳资概念，雇佣关系及其功效？

首先我要告诉他们的是《企业组织法》的基本思路。德国是一个民主制国家，在民主制度下，一个有自决权的公民才能称之为一个名符其实的公民。这也是德国社会市场经济模式的宗旨：让雇员群体参与企业重大事宜的决策。当一个决策涉及企业雇员切身利益的时候，它不是越位于雇员，而是由企业主及其员工共同决定和承担。在此，保持企业内部机制稳定，实现劳资双方合作融洽是德国雇员参与权的根本动机，而非其它国家可能感觉的那样，限制了企业主决策的自由。

《企业组织法》的基本思路是在雇主和雇员之间建立一个平等合作、相互信任的伙伴关系。劳资双方不应成为敌人或对手，相反，工会和企业主代表应该从雇员和企业的切身利益出发，在尊重劳资协议的基础上，互予信赖，携手合作。雇主与职工委员会之间的劳资纠纷双方皆享有采取反对措施的权利。

在过去几十年中，《企业组织法》经受了实践的考验，收效甚良。伙伴性的合作，使德国成为欧洲为数不多，发生罢工少，从而造成全面经济损失也很小的国家之一。德国之所以成为一个让外国企业家青睐的投资国，从某种意义上，与《企业组织法》的贡献不无相关。

Lion statue in the Forbidden City in Beijing – 北京紫禁城铜狮

You have already mentioned a crucial element in the cooperation between employers and employees in German companies, the works council. What is the important thing about the works council and what parallels to it exist in Chinese employer-employee relationships?

The works council is based on the Industrial Relations Act, which forms the core of collective labour legislation in Germany and regulates the co-determination of the employees with regard to social, personal and economic matters. Apart from other things, it determines the rights and duties of the works council, and when and how these representatives of the employees' interests are elected.

Organizing the elections for a works council is exclusively in the hands of the employees, though the employer has to defray the expenses of the election. Any employee who has been working for the company for at least six months can be elected, and this naturally also applies to foreign employees.

The tasks of the works council in Germany include support for and protection of employment in the company, promoting work safety measures and company-specific environmental protection, the integration of foreign employees and

您方才提到德国企业中涉及劳资协作的一个重要元素：职工委员会。职工委员会是一个什么性质的组织？在中国也有相似的组织机构吗？

职工委员会的法律基础是《企业组织法》。《企业组织法》又为德国集体劳动法的核心，它规范着雇员在社会福利、人事变动以及经济事宜诸方面的共同决定权，且对职工委员会的权利和义务做有明确的规定，譬如什么时候，以怎样的方式选举和产生这个雇员权益的代表机构。

如何选举和组成企业职工委员会纯属企业雇员自身的事情，然而，组织选举职工委员会时所花销的经费却由企业主承担。所有工龄不低于六个月的企业雇员，皆享有选举与被选举的权利，外籍雇员自然也包括在内。

understanding between them and German employees, and promoting the employment of older workers and reconciling family life and work–to name but some. If there are no legal or collective bargaining regulations, the works council has participatory or co-determination rights in regard to economic matters, vocational training, human resources planning and individual human resources decisions. Thus it has to be consulted prior to every dismissal or termination of contract. The participatory rights range from a right to information to compulsory co-determination. Furthermore, the works council concludes bargaining agreements with the employer which are binding on all employees of the company.

In China there is neither an Industrial Relations Act nor an institutionalized equivalent of the works council. The institutionalized representation of employees' interests is at best still "in its infancy." Under the political system and the planned economy which preceded the reform and open door policies in China, the clashing interests of employers and employees in Chinese companies were simply ignored for ideological reasons. As capitalist practices spread and were enforced in the course of the economic reforms, social issues sank to the bottom of the comprehensive reform agenda. If they do not work for state enterprises, employees are dependent on the good will of their employer, or are at the mercy of his whims. In recent years the Chinese government has been trying to improve things here and there, but a collective bargaining system with independent organizations acting as equal partners or/and opponents is still impossible to reconcile with the nature of political reality in China.

In addition to the works council, which is a body within the company, the trade unions in Germany play an important role in shaping the nature of employment. How are the unions organized in China, and how do they work when compared to German unions?

The German trade unions represent the interests of their members in their negotiations with the employers' organizations. Their tasks include defending employees' interests by exercising an influence on the economy via the legal institutions with the help of the Industrial Relations Act, co-determination, and collective bargaining, and keeping in touch with the government and the employers' organizations. In Germany the unions are organized on a sectoral basis.

The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only legal and recognized trade union in China. The ACFTU has about 150 million members. It was re-founded in 1978 after the Cultural Revolution. In addition to the Women's Federation, the Youth Federation and the Students Federation it is one of the so-

职工委员会的主要任务是：促进和保障就业岗位，加强和改善劳动保护和劳动环境，促进外籍雇员的社会融入，以及他们与德籍雇员之间的相互理解与沟通，提高和保障老年雇员的就业机会，统一和协调家庭与职业之间关系。在劳工法和劳资协定规范之外的事宜，职工委员会亦有参与决策权，在诸如工资调整、职业培训、人事变动，某个职员被解雇等等重大决定之前，企业主必须事先征得职工委员会的同意。职工委员会所享受的职权范围很大，从获得信息权到强制参与权。此外，职工委员会还有权与企业主一起参与制定涉及全体职工利益的企业协议。

在中国，既不存在《企业组织法》，也不存在与德国职工委员会同等的组织机构。雇员权益维护的制度化、机构化尚处于初始阶段。改革开放之前，在计划经济体制下，企业内部雇员和雇主的利害冲突为意识形态所否定。随着经济改革的步步深入，资本主义经营方式的处处渗透，具有社会意义的成分被经济改革之大潮冲出了议事日程。非国营企业的雇员只能寄望于雇主的善心，抑或任其雇主随意摆布。尽管中国政府近年来采取了这样或那样的补救措施，然而，建立一个平起平坐、与企业主势均力敌的职工利益代表机构，与中国的政治现实至今依然是格不相入。

在德国，除了企业职工委员会，工会也是德国劳资机制中的一个举足轻重的代表雇员权益的组织。中国的工会是一种怎样形式的组织，它与德国的工会有那些不同？

德国工会是其工会成员权益的代表者和维护者，与其相对的是各类雇主联合会。德国工会的主要任务是，借助《企业组织法》所赋予的法律手段，以其经济上独立于企业的地位，维护劳动者权益、行使决策参与

called mass organizations in China. 16 national industrial trade unions operate under its umbrella, as do 31 regional organizations in the provinces, autonomous regions, and cities which are under the direct control of the central government.

In companies where the employees are members of the trade union, two per cent of their wages are deducted as a trade union levy. 60 per cent of the levy is retained by the trade union in the company, and 35 per cent goes to trade union organizations on the province, district or city levels. Only 5 per cent goes to the central organization in Beijing to enable it to perform its tasks. Apart from the employees of the state enterprises, information supplied by ACFTU suggests that the workforce in 59,000 companies with foreign capital participation and 57,000 private businesses is now organized on trade union lines. In addition to the many sports facilities, cultural institutions, sanatoriums, recuperation homes, schools and training facilities the trade unions run about 65,000 enterprises of their own throughout the country with a total of about a million employees. The trade union claims to have found new jobs for about a million employees of state enterprises who have been dismissed.

The Chinese trade union law does not give employees the right to strike. This was excised from the Chinese constitution in 1982 on the grounds that the political system had “removed problems between the proletariat and company owners.” The 1995 trade union law contains provisions on conflict resolution, including arbitration procedures and appeals to a labour court, but does not envisage industrial action. In order to resolve disagreements, it is possible to issue arbitration rulings that are binding for both parties.

权、进行劳资协议谈判并与政府和雇主联合会联系周旋。在联邦德国，工会组织按行业而分，每个行业皆有其自成一统的工会。

中华全国总工会是中国境内惟一的一家合法的、被政府认可的工会组织，共计会员人数约为150万。中华全国总工会在文化大革命结束之后的1978年恢复重建，共下设有16个国家级工业工会和31个省、自治区、直辖市级的工会组织。中华全国总工会与中华全国妇女联合会、中国共青团和中华全国学生联合会一起，被列属于中国所谓的群众性组织。

在设有工会组织的企业中，工会会员每月所缴纳的会员费占其基本工资的2%。其中60%的会员费留用于本企业工会使用，35%的会员费上缴省市级工会组织，剩下的5%则上缴驻地北京的工会总部。除了国营企业的职工，根据全国总工会所提供的讯息，迄今为止，已有59000家合资企业和57000家民营企业相继成立了工会组织。除了许多体育场、文化宫、疗养院、学校和培训中心以外，中国工会在全国范围内共拥有65000家下属企业，大约一百万左右的职工在此供职。据工会方面报道，他们使大约一百万国营企业的下岗工人，重新走上工作岗位。

现行的中国工会法中没有罢工权这一规定。1982年宪法取消了罢工权，其理由是社会主义条件下“无产者和资本家之间的矛盾已彻底消除”。在1995年所颁发的工会法中，虽然写入了可以通过仲裁程序，和向法院提出起诉的方式来解决劳资纠纷的规定，却否定了罢工的形式。仲裁法院允许以单方判决来终止职工与企业主双方的劳资争议。

What advice would you give to Chinese employers in Germany and German workers in Chinese companies so that both can get down as fast as possible to working together smoothly?

Chinese investors would be well advised to prepare themselves thoroughly and to look at labour law provisions not only from a purely cost point of view. German labour law does not only comprise personal labour law, which primarily regulates the employment of individual employees, but also collective labour law, the most important part of which is the Industrial Relations Act. A desire to treat every single employee well is a very good basis for a partnership style of cooperation. With the institution of the works council German labour law provides a well-tried set of instruments for such cooperation.

For a management team from China which comes to Germany for the first time, co-determination by the works council is in most cases a culture shock. The German workforce and its representatives in such enterprises would do well if they were to approach the new management at the earliest opportunity (and not only in their own interests) so that together they can pass an important "entrance exam" relating to trust and cooperation – namely, whether or not the chemistry works. In order to ensure that it will be in a position to exercise influence in the future, the works council should not from the start pursue a policy of confrontation, but seek to make a positive contribution by familiarizing the new – and insecure – management with the rules of a game which is new to it, and in this way to demonstrate that it is an indispensable partner. ■

您将给在德国的中国雇主及其在中资企业供职的德籍员工怎样的建议，使他们之间达到融洽合作？

中国的投资者必须事先对德国的劳动法及其基本框架结构作一个充分的了解，不能仅仅停留于对经营成本的考虑。德国劳动法不仅仅是一部个体法规，规范着个体雇员与雇主之间的雇佣关系。德国劳动法首先是一部集体法规，而《企业组织法》正是其中的一个重要组成部分。公正对待每一名雇员的意愿，是实现伙伴性合作的一个很好的基础。而劳动法中所设置的职工委员会，则又是实现劳资双方融洽合作的一个行之有效的途径。

对首次到德国工作的中国企业管理人员来说，职工委员会的介入在大多数情况下无异于一种文化休克。在此，我建议在中资企业供职的德国雇员及其他们的权益代表，尽早地去接近新的领导层，主动营造一个互为信赖，和谐融洽的工作氛围，携手共度最初的难关。为了确保今后有更多的参与空间，建议职工委员会不要一开始就站到新来乍到，经验不足的企业管理层的对立面，而是积极协助他们熟悉新的游戏规则，成为他们不可缺少的左膀右臂。■

Zhenzhou Ma

Zhenzhou Ma was born and grew up in Shanghai. He studied law in Germany, and since 2006 has worked for the law firm of Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, where he is the lawyer in charge of the Chinese desk.

马震洲

马震洲出生并成长于上海，在德国法律专业毕业。2006年初作为律师在浩运律师事务所工作，领导“中国服务部”。

Lenovo Germany

From Iconic IBM to Start-up Lenovo

联想德国

从IBM标志到联想集团的新起点

Modest Beginnings and Years of Growth

The Chinese IT corporation Lenovo was founded in 1984 by the research institute of the Academy of Sciences in Beijing. The foundation of the company was essentially pursued by a small group of eleven Academy scientists under project leader Chuanzhi Liu, who received for the ambitious project from the Academy the modest starting capital of about 200,000 yuan renminbi (RMB), that is, about 25,000 US dollars and a porter's lodge at the Academy. In the early years the company, which at the time operated under the name of NTD (New Technology Developer Inc.), dealt exclusively in PCs which were imported from well-known foreign manufacturers. However, the English-language operating surface of these PCs and the lack of English linguistic skills of large parts of the Chinese population made it necessary to develop a module with which a PC could be adapted for use with Chinese characters.

In 1985 NTD scored a breakthrough with the "Chinese Character Card," which made it possible to operate computers effortlessly in Chinese. With this path-breaking development NTD laid the groundwork for the successes of the company in the years which followed.

From Dealer to Manufacturer

The development and production of its own PCs began in 1990, when the company changed its name to Legend. Under Chuanzhi Liu's leadership Legend prospered and was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1994. By the year 1999 Legend had developed to become number one of the Top 100 electronics companies in China. In 1993 the executive leadership appointed Yuanqing Yang, who was only 29 years old at the time, to the post of manager of the newly restructured PC division of Legend. To this day Yang continues to make a decisive contribution to the development of the company as CEO and chairman of the supervisory board.

艰苦的创业年代

联想在1984年由中国科学院科研机构投资成立。当时由中科院的11名科技人员创办，中科院投入20万元人民币（相当于25,000美元）的启动经费，并提供了一间中科院计算机研究所的传达室。在创业初期称为“新技术发展公司”的联想在中国只代理从国外进口的名牌PC机。由于PC机的操作界面是英文，中国用户使用很不方便，因此有必要研制一种模块，使PC机可以进行中文处理。

1985年联想凭借“联想式汉卡”实现了技术上的突破，这款扩展卡使计算机可以毫不费力地进行中文处理。这一划时代的技术革新为企业后来的成功打下了坚实的基础。

从经销商到生产商

1990年，企业更名为联想，用“Legend”这一名称，并开始研制和生产自己的PC机。在柳传志的带领下，企业繁荣发展，并于1994年在香港上市。1999年，联想已发展成为全国电子企业百强之首。1993年，企业的最高领导任命当时只有29岁的杨元庆为新成立的联想电脑事业部总经理。杨元庆后来出任联想集团CEO及董事会主席，至今仍对企业的发展产生决定性的影响。

Today's corporate or rather brand name "Lenovo" was first introduced in 2003. The syllable "Le" remained from the name "Legend," whereas the Latin word "novo" signifies "new" and is supposed to reflect the company's innovative spirit. The Chinese equivalent of this name, "Liangxiang," means "to associate" (ideas). However, the most important reason for the change was the fact that Legend as a brand name had already enjoyed protection in certain countries. Nevertheless, this step marks the beginning of the phase of aggressive expansion into the overseas markets.

The company had been active abroad prior to this, though in a rather modest kind of way. For example, it was an exhibitor at the CeBit Computer Trade Fair in Hanover as early as 1989. Thereafter it sold mainly printed circuit boards to the Asian-Pacific region, the U.S. and Europe via the Hong Kong subsidiary Quantum Design Inc., and from 1994 onwards also via overseas sales subsidiaries. At the beginning of the 1990s the company founded a development centre in Silicon Valley. However, the decisive step followed in May 2005, when it acquired IBM's PC division.

A Milestone: The Acquisition of IBM's PC Division

IBM is generally considered to be the harbinger of the modern PC age on account of its development of the first personal computer in 1981. However, the IT giant's PC Division ran into difficulties, and the corporate leadership felt compelled to sell it. As early as 2000 there were exploratory talks between Lenovo – at the time still called Legend – and IBM, both of whom were already engaging in cooperation, but IBM first made a specific offer to the Chinese in 2003. Lenovo hesitated on account of the risks involved, and carefully analysed its own abilities and, under the leadership of Mary Ma, who was CFO at the time, the financial ramifications. For this reason Lenovo accepted the offer only after weighing up the pros and cons in great detail, and in December 2004 the two corporations announced the transaction, which surprised both the industry and the public at large. The purchase price was quite considerable by Chinese standards and up to that point without precedent. Lenovo paid about 1.25 billion US dollars, partly in cash and partly by purchasing shares, and also took over debt to the tune of 0.5 billion US dollars.

It is not surprising that many Lenovo managers initially viewed the acquisition with scepticism, not only on account of the high price that was being paid, but also because the company was for the first time pursuing an expansion strategy that, in contrast to its tradition up to that point, was not based on organic growth.

今天公司的英文名称，或者说是品牌名称“Lenovo”是2003年启用的。其中“Le”取自原标识“Legend”，是继承传奇的意思，“novo”是一个拉丁词根，代表创新之意。“Lenovo”寓意为“创新的联想”。2004年，联想公司正式从“Legend”更名为“Lenovo”。公司的中文名称“Lian Xiang”，意为“联想”（有思想的、有想象力的）。当时改名最重要的原因其实颇具戏剧性，Legend作为一个商标在一些国家已经被注册了。尽管改名在很大程度上是出于偶然，但这一举动仍标志着联想准备大举进攻海外市场。

虽然此前联想也一直在积极拓展海外业务，但规模比较有限。比如它在1989年已参展汉诺威的计算机专业博览会。从那时起，它通过位于香港的子公司科迪亚（自1994年开始也通过海外子公司）将大量计算机主板销往亚太地区、美国和欧洲。90年代初，企业在美国的“硅谷”成立了一个研发中心。然而，最终让联想在世界崭露头角的决定性一步，是2005年5月收购IBM全球PC业务。

里程碑：收购IBM全球PC业务

1981年，IBM正式发布了历史上第一台个人电脑，由此成为了PC时代的开路先锋。然而，正是由于这个IT巨人的个人电脑部陷入了困境，迫使公司的领导层做出决定，出售这部分业务。早在2000年，Lenovo（当时还叫Legend）就已经开始和IBM进行谈判了，两家公司当时就已展开合作，但直到2003年IBM才表示出售意向。联想推迟这一收购计划是出于对风险的考量，同时企业也认真审视了自己的能力，并在当时的财务董事马雪征领导下对财务风险进行了分析。在全面评估这项交易之后，联想才接受出价。2004年12月，两家企业对外公布了这项交易。消息传出，在业内和社会各界引起一片哗然。收购

In the course of the protracted negotiations preceding the takeover there emerged two decisive reasons for the takeover and against organic growth in the shape of more wholly-owned sales subsidiaries abroad, for example. These were the lack of international experience and the lack of a global brand.

As a result of the takeover and within a very short space of time Lenovo had acquired not only the know-how and the familiar global brand name

(the rights to IBM for five years, and to "Think" for an unlimited period), but was also able to make use of the established sales channels and the service organization of IBM, which had an excellent reputation. Lenovo concluded a strategic alliance with it after the takeover.

In structural terms Lenovo had thus developed into an international corporation. Only 42.1 per cent of the shares are still held by Legend Holding, 5.6 per cent are owned by IBM, and 6.6 per cent are held by a group of institutional investors and a private equity company, Texas Pacific Group. Merely 0.6 per cent are owned by the management, and 45.1 per cent are already held by private investors. The fact that about 12 per cent of Lenovo is owned by U.S. investors is of great importance for the American market, particularly when it is a question of securing government contracts. In the takeover and integration process the institutional investors of Texas Pacific Group, according to the former CFO Mary Ma, played an extremely important role, since in addition to contributing capital they brought with them their strategic skills and international management competences.

Thus for the first time ever a Chinese company acquired a core element of Western capitalism, which, to be sure, had at this point run into difficulties. Not only external observers doubted whether the venture would turn out to be a success. The move attracted a great deal of attention both in the U.S. and everywhere where IBM had larger subsidiaries, for example in the European central office in Paris or in the delivery warehouse in Scotland.

Three years after the takeover the corporation has a global market share of 7.4 per cent (Gartner Research). In the meantime Lenovo also produces and sells monitors, beamers and notebooks in addition to PCs. In 2007 it attained a turnover of just about 14.6 billion US dollars, and in 2008 this will probably be more than 16.4 billion US dollars. Lenovo's earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (Ebitda) in 2008 doubled, when compared to the previous year (375 million US dollars), to reach 798 million US dollars. It has 23,000 employees

在当时是史无前例的，联想付出了12.5亿美元，一部分是以现金形式，一部分通过购买股票，此外还承担了5亿美元的债务。

毫不奇怪，很多负责收购工作的联想经理人在初始阶段受到了怀疑，这不仅是因为高额的收购价格，还因为这是企业第一次执行扩张战略，与以往的传统不同，这次不是机构的增设。在收购前漫长的谈判过程中，企业决定支持收购，而反对借助诸如继续在海外设立子公司的方式实现机构增长，并总结出了两个决定性的原因：缺乏国际经验和全球市场。

通过收购，联想在最短时间内不仅获得了技术经验和世界驰名的品牌

（可在5年之内使用IBM品牌，完全拥有"Think"品牌），而且还可以使用IBM已经建立的销售渠道和享有良好声誉的客服机构，这些优惠条件是基于联想跟IBM在收购之外另行约定的战略同盟。

在结构上联想也已晋身为一家国际企业，母公司联想控股有限公司只保留了企业42.1%的股权，另外5.6%由IBM拥有，6.6%由得克萨斯太平洋集团等机构投资者持有。管理层手中仅有0.6%，散户持有45.1%。美国公司或机构持有联想约12%的股权，这对联想在美国市场的拓展具有重大意义，尤其是当涉及国家订单的时候。据前首席财务官马雪征说，在并购和整合过程中，机构投资者得克萨斯太平洋集团发挥了非常重要的作用，他们除了投入资本之外还带来了战略经验和国际管理方面的雄厚实力。

这是中国企业第一次获得了西方国家的核心企业，但不只旁观者对项目的成功产生怀疑，他们自己也承认，当时陷入了困境。这件事不只在美国引起了极大的反响，也在所有

around the world and is active on all the international markets, though primarily on the Asian ones.

The Consequences of the IBM Acquisition for Germany

Find out more about the merger of coporate cultures in "Post-Merger Integration and Corporate Culture"

Before Lenovo took over the PC division, IBM Germany in Stuttgart (other subsidiaries were distributed over the rest of Germany) was a Württemberg-based and down-to-earth company with a strong and traditional corporate culture.Managing director Marc Fischer recalls that in contrast to this Lenovo Germany GmbH after the takeover resembled a "start-up" which was involved in pioneering work.

> This change in the corporate culture on the one hand required a high degree of flexibility on the part of the employees, but also provided many opportunities for participation.

In this way the company reacted to changes in the market and prepared for a systematic and aggressive expansion of the business. Chief executive Yuanqing Yang personally informed the workforce about Lenovo's plans for the future and declared that on account of the size of the market Lenovo's activities would now be centred in Germany. His regular visits to Stuttgart and his personal support for the German branch subsequently lent credence to his announcements.

Not all employees wanted to go along with this upheaval. Many left to join other divisions of IBM or found similar jobs in the Stuttgart area. But others, especially younger employees, saw the opportunity that this change brought with it, for example, a faster career, greater opportunities for personal involvement, and cooperation characterized by flatter hierarchies. Furthermore, they were no longer part of a (rather small) business division of IBM. They were now employees of one of the largest makers of PCs in the world, who considered this to be its core business.

> However, it was of crucial importance for the success of the venture that the Chinese leadership did not embark on speedy restructuring and exercised no direct influence on the management.

The opposite was the case. It took the employees and the customers as they were, and appointed a manager in the person of Marc Fischer who on account of his many years of experience as head of the Stuttgart branch enjoyed the trust of the

IBM拥有较大子公司的地方引起了广泛关注，比如在巴黎的欧洲总部或苏格兰的发货仓库。

收购三年之后，联想集团已经成为全球领先的PC厂商，拥有7.4%的全球市场份额（根据Gartner咨询公司的市场调研）。在此期间，联想除了PC机之外还生产和销售显示器、大屏幕电视放映机和手提电脑。联想2007年的销售额近146亿美元，2008年达164亿美元，2008年息税折旧摊销前利润（EBITDA）与上年（3.75亿美元）相比翻了一番，达到7.98亿美元。联想在全球拥有约23,000多名员工，并活跃在所有国际市场上，特别是亚洲市场。

收购IBM对德国的影响

在IBM的PC事业部被联想收购以前，设在斯图加特的IBM德国分公司（其它分公司遍布全德国）是一家符腾堡的本地企业，有着传统色彩浓厚的企业文化。据总经理马克·费舍尔回忆，并购后，联想德国有限公司站在了一个全新的起点上，一切都从头开始。

您可以参阅《企业后台管理与企业文化》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于企业文化的内容。

> 企业文化的改变一方面要求员工具有高度的灵活性，另一方面也使他们拥有了更多的话语权。

企业和员工们一起对市场的变化作出反应，并为系统地大举拓展业务范围做好了准备。董事会主席杨元庆亲自向员工们通报联想的未来计划，并解释说，德国是联想在欧洲的重要市场。他定期对斯图加特的访问以及他对德国有限责任公司所作的个人努力都证明了他之前所说的话。

employees, was well acquainted with what was going on locally, and acted on the basis of long-term thinking.

This stability is especially noticeable in Fischer's human resources policy. He first waited until the initial emotions occasioned by the acquisition had died down. In the ensuing period, when the positive developments at Lenovo slowly became common knowledge, he was able to recruit qualified employees without undue haste, giving them demanding tasks, and tying them to the company with attractive career prospects. In the meantime the number of employees at the German locations Stuttgart, Düsseldorf and Sulzbach am Taunus has risen from 85 to 170,

不是所有的员工都愿意顺应这一转变。一部分员工转到了IBM的其它部门或者在斯图加特地区找到了相似的工作职位。而其他员工，特别是年轻的员工却看到了这次转变所带来的机遇：更快的升迁、更多的选择以及可以在更宽松的等级制度下进行合作。另外，他们不再是IBM众多业务单位中的一家小小分支机构了，而是世界最大的PC生产商之一的员工，他们所属的部门正是企业的核心业务部门。

so that only half of the workforce still comes from the time before the takeover. Thus as time went on the new corporate culture with its higher flexibility, faster decision-making routes and greater responsibilities was able to take root. That the employees take a positive view of the new corporate culture is demonstrated by the low fluctuation rate, the growing number of applicants, and even the fact that former “IBMers” are now displaying an interest in the development of the subsidiary.

Adaptation of Global Human Resources Management

When recruiting new employees Lenovo Germany is interested in the abilities of the applicant and not in his or her nationality. Vacancies are always advertised globally within the corporation first, and then made public. In this area the corporation works on the principle of “world sourcing,” the aim of which is to hire “the best people from every culture,” as the HR Director Recruitment once put it. The systematic assessment system on the individual, divisional and corporate levels is based on identical global targets and includes regular feedback. Special emphasis is placed on “soft skills” such as displaying independent initiative, playing one’s part in a team, and entrepreneurial behaviour. The intercultural training sessions, which take place on a regular basis, are an established part of the human resources development programme.

The human resources management systems were developed jointly by Chinese and foreign executives. Preference was given to neither western nor Chinese systems, nor were any of them applied in unadulterated form. The object of the exercise was to combine the advantages of both cultures.

对成功起到决定意义的因素还有，中国领导层没有急于进行结构重组，也没有在业务领导层面上对企业进行直接干涉。

相反，它将员工和客户收为己用，并任命马克·费舍尔为总经理。马克·费舍尔由于在斯图加特分公司拥有多年领导经验，从而获得了员工的信任，而且熟悉当地的各种关系。

这种稳定，特别在人事政策层面上的稳定是费舍尔看得见的。他先是等待，直到并购后首轮情绪波动平息下来，当联想慢慢显示出良好的发展势头时，他才放心地招募高学历的员工，委以重任，并向他们描绘企业长期的、颇具吸引力的职业前景。并购后，德国斯图加特、杜塞尔多夫和陶努斯山区的斯祖尔茨巴赫分公司的员工从85人上升到170人，这使得收购时的员工只占目前员工总数的一半。由此，随着时间的推移，新的企业文化逐渐树立起来，这种文化包含更高的灵活性、更快的决策过程和更强的责任感。员工对新企业文化的良好评价表现在很多方面，比如较小的人员流动性、申请工作的人数增长，甚至前IBM员工也有意来到分公司发展。

全球人事管理的调整

联想德国在招聘新员工时注重的是申请者的能力，而不是国籍。原则上，空缺的职位首先在集团内部进行全球招标，然后才到企业外招聘。在此过程中，企业采取“来自全世界”的原则，意思是雇用“来自各种文化背景的最优人选”，就像企业人力资源招聘总监所说的那样。对申请者将在个人、部门和企业层面进行系统的评估，全球统一标准，最后还会进行反馈。在这里“软实力”特别受重视，首先是自主性、参与精神和企

Adaptation of the Organizational Structure to the International Markets

However, the need for continuous integration was clearly apparent to both sides at the time of the takeover. Thus a “2-in-the-box” system was initially introduced in order to accelerate the exchange between the two corporate cultures. For example, in the supply chain area local and Chinese employees worked together on a project in order to understand as quickly as possible the system, the problems and the advantages of their partner’s way of doing things, and above all in order to merge their networks. At the start of the convergence process in particular this system provided a real boost. The teams had to function together under difficult circumstances. There were different languages, little information about the situation on the other side, and life as a Chinese expatriate in a hotel room. Although such teams were deployed during the initial phase that followed in the wake of the takeover, they are now formed only on a short-term basis for the solution of specific problems. In order to guarantee the exchange of knowledge, internal communication is nowadays of central significance. The departments frequently encounter each other in meetings at which information is exchanged not only on a “top-down” but also on a “bottom-up” basis, and ideas are discussed, proposals evaluated, and procedures coordinated. This is of importance for integration, and especially for the innovation cycle that plays such an important role in the computer industry. In order to do justice to these requirements, a global corporation such as Lenovo needs internationally mixed teams which work together on the basis of mutual trust and intercultural understanding.

Changes were also made to the organizational structure and local advantages combined to forge a global arsenal.

The Lenovo centres in China and the U.S. still reflect the origins of the corporate leadership and the employees from various different countries.

业行为方式。定期举办跨文化培训活动是人力发展计划的固定组成部分。与此同时，对各个国家的客户都要用所在国家的语言同他们交流。

人事管理系统是由中国和外国的管理人员共同建立的，在此过程中，无论西方的还是中国的体系都不会被优先或完整地采用，而更多地是将两种文化的优点结合起来。

对组织结构进行调整以适应国际市场

双方在并购的时候就已经意识到了进行持续整合的必要性。因此企业在初期引入了一种“双元”体系，以此促进并购后双方企业文化的交流，也就是说，在供应链部门中，让一个当地员工和一个中国员工共同为一个项目工作，这首先是为了将他们各自掌握的网络汇合起来，同时也能够促使他们尽快熟悉这个体系，理解合作伙伴工作方式的优缺点。在双方网络汇合之初，这个体系起到了促进作用，当时国际团队只能在艰难的条件下协作，比如不同的语言、对其他人的情况缺乏了解、中国外派员工还需要在酒店房间中生活等。度过了并购后最初的艰难，现在就只有在出现具体问题时才会短期组建这种团队了。为了确保知识的交流得以延续，目前内部沟通是关键。不同部门的同事经常在会议上碰头，在这类会议上，不只进行“自上而下”或“自下而上”的信息交流，而是首先讨论提出的想法，审核建议，协调工作方法。这不仅对企业的整合具有重要意义，更对计算机行业中重要的创新周期意义非凡。为了应对这些挑战，像联想这样的国际化企业需要拥有一支国际化的团队，其成员能够在相互信任并理解对方文化背景的条件下合作。

However, cooperation is very close and amicable, and the Chinese chief executive, Yuanqing Yang, now lives in Raleigh, NC. The regional companies are responsible for either specific countries or groups of countries (for example, Stuttgart is also responsible for Austria), and European headquarters in Paris are in charge of the EMEA business (Europe, Middle East, Africa). Centres for special tasks are scattered over a number of different countries. A "Marketing Centre of Excellence" in India, a "back office" in Bratislava, manufacturing plants and works in Poland, Mexico and China, but also research centres in Yamato in Japan, in Raleigh, NC, as well as in Beijing and other Chinese cities.

This organizational structure enables Lenovo to make use of numerous local advantages, though in something which is as dynamic as the PC market it needs to be kept under review. For example, the EMEA markets in Russia or Turkey resemble the markets in India and China more than those in central Europe, and Africa is more like Southeast Asia than Europe.

From Nobody to a Global Brand

"Who or what is Lenovo?" was probably the most frequently asked question when the news came out that IBM's PC division was being sold to a Chinese manufacturer. This state of affairs has not changed significantly. Whereas in China about 70 per cent of the population knows the Lenovo brand, and in the U.S. the figure is still about 26 per cent, in Germany it is merely 9 per cent (Maier 2008). When one compares it with IBM, which almost everyone knew, this is a very low score. Thus the long-term aim of the corporation is to increase its brand recognition quite significantly. The initial marketing situation of the acquired IBM division was not as negative as it might have seemed at first sight. IBM customers came from the business segment, and to a large extent were loyal buyers who knew that IBM products such as the ThinkPad notebook, for example, were already being made by Lenovo before the takeover on an original equipment manufacturing (OEM) basis, and that therefore the quality was not about to change. "For this target group, which makes its purchasing decisions on the basis of criteria such as quality and innovation and for whom design is of secondary importance, it is essential that the service element functions smoothly," says Alexandre Blumenthal, marketing director of Lenovo Germany and Austria.

Lenovo would like to expand its business in other segments, above all in the private customer segment. But here the company is up against quite considerable obstacles. On the one hand the computer market is hotly contested by powerful competitors. Secondly, in order to be successful in this area it will be necessary to

组织结构也进行了一些调整，从而将当地的优势与全球机构整体联系在一起。时至今日，

> 虽然在联想中国和美国的总部可以明显看出领导和员工来自不同的国家，但双方的合作非常密切友好。

而且董事会主席杨元庆在罗利也有了一个固定住址。地区性的公司负责所在国或周边地区的业务（例如，斯图加特分公司也负责奥地利事务），位于巴黎的欧洲总部主管EMEA业务（欧洲、中东、非洲）。专向任务的中心分布在不同国家，"卓越市场营销中心"设在印度，"企业内部管理中心"设在布拉迪斯拉发，生产车间和工厂在波兰、墨西哥和中国，研发中心在日本、美国罗利以及中国的北京和其它城市。

虽然这样一种组织形式能够使联想多方面利用当地优势，但是在像PC市场这样一个具有生命力的市场上，企业要不断地认真考虑这种结构形式。比如俄罗斯和土耳其的EMEA市场与印度和中国的市场更相似，而不是和中欧的市场相似。非洲更应和东南亚相提并论，而不是和欧洲。

从无人知晓到世界品牌

当IBM将全球PC业务卖给一家中国生产商的新闻见诸报端的时候，经常有人问："谁是联想？"这种状况到今天也未彻底改变，在中国，大约70%的人知道联想这个品牌，在美国也有26%左右的人知道，但在德国仅有9%（麦尔，2008）。因此，企业的长期目标就是大幅提高知名度。被收购的IBM业务部门的市场营销基础不像人们想象的那么差，因为IBM的客户主要来自商业领域，大多是固定客户，IBM产品诸如笔记本ThinkPad之类在质量

approach and reach not only end users, but also the retail chains which dominate the market. Lenovo's corporate leadership – chairman Yuanqing Yang and CEO Bill Amelio – has already announced on a number of occasions that it intends to focus increasingly on this segment.

Lenovo would very much like to create a corporate identity, both externally and internally, which reflects its four fundamental principles: customer service, innovational wealth and entrepreneurship, precision and truthfulness, and trustworthiness and integrity. Raising the recognition of its brands and projecting Lenovo as a global corporation with a global brand are the challenges facing the corporation. In order to meet them intercultural teams have developed international marketing strategies such as sponsoring the Olympic Games in Turin 2006 and Beijing 2008, or the Formula 1 AT&T Williams team. In addition to these global campaigns Lenovo would in future like to increase its brand recognition quite deliberately in regional markets. Thus the local subsidiaries support sportswomen and sportsmen who are not yet world-class stars, but are recognized in their nations as achievers. The corporation is also active in the field of social responsibility. For example, after the earthquake in the Chinese province of Szechuan Lenovo donated 10 million yuan RMB and organized a blood donor campaign among its employees.

Two Companies Grow Together

New and former employees have commented favourably on the positive working atmosphere and the upbeat mood during this initial establishment phase.

> This was not only due to the German management, which certainly made a significant contribution, but also to the Chinese leadership, which refrained from interfering, gave the local employees more competences and thus accorded them a high degree of independence.

The great interest shown by top Chinese executives – in contrast to the previous American management – in what was happening in Germany was an added motivation for the workforce. It felt that it was being taken seriously, and that it was needed. The most important post-takeover challenges have been surmounted, and in future the success of the company will depend to a crucial extent on whether or not it proves possible to keep developing a common corporate culture in which executives with a variety of national and cultural backgrounds can combine the advantages of their ways of thinking and doing things.

上并没有改变。“对于购买时主要考虑质量和创新性，然后才是设计的那部分目标客户群，服务是否到位也很重要。”联想德国和奥地利市场营销主管亚历山大·布卢门塔深知这一道理。

联想也在将其业务向其它市场板块，尤其是私人客户市场拓展，但在这方面企业遇到了巨大的阻力。一方面是因为计算机市场竞争激烈，对手实力强大，另一方面也不是仅仅和终端客户联系就行，还要打通一整条市场交易链。因此联想董事会主席杨元庆和CEO比尔·阿梅里奥这两位最高领导多次发表公告并已经着手开展大量工作。

联想要创立企业识别系统，不仅对外，而且也对内。这一系统反映四项指导原则：客户服务、知识财富和企业家精神、准确性和实事求是以及可靠性和完整性。如何提升企业品牌的知名度，以及联想作为一个拥有世界知名品牌的全球化企业如何向世人展示自己，是企业面临的重大挑战。为了应对挑战，这支跨文化融合的团队制定了国际营销战略，比如联想是2006年都灵冬奥会和2008年北京奥运会的赞助商，联想还赞助了一级方程式赛车（F1）AT&T威廉姆斯车队。除了这些国际性的推广活动外，未来联想还想扩大在区域性市场上的知名度。各国的子公司现在都在赞助一些运动员，虽然他们可能还不是世界明星，但他们都为本国做出了成绩。在企业社会责任工作方面，企业也承担了很多工作，例如，2008年，面对四川地震灾害，联想率先捐款1000万元人民币，同时联想员工踊跃献血挽救宝贵的生命。

两家企业的共同成长

新老员工都对企业环境及建设阶段的气氛给予了很高评价。

It is no doubt also one of the tasks of the parent company to ensure that its foreign subsidiaries work together smoothly with the corporate headquarters and that they are in a position to make use of the resulting synergies. Utilizing this potential and bringing the two parts of the company more closely together constitutes a challenge for the executive leadership which, Marc Fischer believes, calls for a proficient management team with international experience, and a precise knowledge of the various markets and general conditions. But not only the executive leadership has recognized that combining the strengths of both companies and cultures constitutes an opportunity. People are also aware of this in the company itself, as head of department Qiao Song puts it. “Lenovo, has a very entrepreneurial culture, but we perhaps had less of an orientation around tightly defined processes and structure than IBM did. IBM is very analytically oriented, very systematic, and we needed more of that in order for the new Lenovo to get to the next level.” Lenovo seems to be well prepared to move on to the next level. ■

对此不仅德国管理层做出了重大贡献，中国领导层也付出了很多努力。他们没有进行过多的干预，而是放手让当地管理人员负责了更大的业务范围，并给予他们高度的自主性。

与以前美国的主管人员相反，中国的最高领导对在德国发展所展现出的强烈兴趣，激励着员工的士气，他们觉得自己被接纳和被需要。这项并购后最重要的挑战被成功地克服了，企业未来的成功将在很大程度上取决于，是否能够继续发展共同的企业文化，将来自不同文化背景的全球经理人在思维和行为方式上的优点结合起来。

让海外子公司能够与总部顺利融合，并使各方的协同效应能够得到充分利用也是母公司的一项重要工作。对此协同效应的利用和继续推进企业两个组成部分的融合，对企业管理层来说是一个不小的挑战。马克·菲舍尔认为，这项管理和协调工作需要一个精明强干的管理层，他们应该既拥有国际经验，又熟悉各自的地区市场及框架条件。不仅企业的最高领导意识到，将两个企业及两种文化进行优势互补可以带来机遇，而且在企业内部，大家也都有了这样一种意识，正像全球供应链高级副总裁乔松所说：“联想具有非常鲜明的创业文化，但是与IBM相比，我们可能更缺乏按照严格定义的流程和结构办事的精神。IBM非常注重分析，非常有系统性，为了让新联想能够更上一层楼，我们需要学习IBM的这些优点。”为了攀登这个新台阶，联想已经做好了准备。■

Speaking with Meiting Zhu

Lawyer and expert on intellectual property rights,
ZHU lawyer, Cologne

朱美婷律师访谈录

中德知识产权律师

"In the foreseeable future intellectual property rights will have a similar position in China as in the industrialized nations. Many companies have already recognized that cheap imitation leads nowhere."

"不久的将来，中国在知识产权保护方面将会与西方工业国并驾齐驱。廉价的仿制只有死路一条，已为众多企业所认知。"

Ms Zhu, China has the reputation that the majority of legal infringements are in the area of intellectual property. What in your opinion are the reasons for what we might consider to be a lack of respect for the law?

Many people claim that what is to some extent unrestrained product piracy in China has cultural roots, because product piracy is "Confucian" in character. Copying an "old master" is done as a mark of respect, and certainly not in order to break the law. In my opinion this explanation is insufficient. It makes more sense to trace infringements of intellectual property rights back to the fact that China's economy is currently still in a phase in which it is moving away from the old planned economy, and trying out the new market economy. Up to the opening of China 30 years ago the state-run economy left little room for private initiative. Private individuals who sought to make a profit were deemed to be immoral, and sometimes what they did was illegal. However, the economic reforms at the end of the 1970s unleashed an enduring mood of optimism. The private striving for profit was suddenly no longer anathema, and has now become the most impor-

朱女士，中国盗版最多，在知识产权保护方面名声不太好，您以为导致我们认为中国人法制观念淡薄的根本原因是什么？

不少人认为，中国人的这种频繁的剽窃盗版行为有其深远的文化根源，是孔子教导所至——弟子模仿"大师"乃非侵权违法，而是对大师的敬重。此种理论未免有些牵强。以我之见，造成知识产权侵权行为的关键原因，是中国尚处于由旧的计划经济体系向新的市场经济体系的转型阶段。改革开放三十年之前的中国，一切掌控于国家手中，个体经济几乎没有生存和发展的空间，发财致富，追求利润即使不被禁止，也被视之为大逆不道。直至改革开放，个体经济才得以抬头，喜获生机，发财营利一时间变成了名

tant item on the agenda. In contrast to this the importance of the rule of law has receded into the background. In China neither the holders nor the violators currently perceive intellectual property rights to be worthy of protection.

The activities of private medium-sized and small businesses in the Zhejiang region are a typical example of this. As in many towns and cities, numerous companies which specialize in making a certain product, for example, ties, pens or socks, or a range of products such as iron or leather goods, have been set up here. The concentration of similar companies in one place makes it possible not only to lower costs, but also to copy one another. If it becomes apparent that a product is selling really well, the companies immediately begin to imitate it en masse. All this is reminiscent of the typical way of doing things in the early years of the industrial revolution, when people imitated and copied each other in a completely unrestrained manner. This comparison does not of course justify acts of imitation, but it may help to explain why they happen.

How has the legal framework for the protection of intellectual property rights in China developed?

The legal framework for the protection of intellectual property rights was created in the PR China in the middle of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. The Trademark Law was promulgated in 1983, the Patent Law in 1984, and the Copyright Law in 1990. Finally, in 1995 these were followed by the Law against Unfair Competition. Since then, these laws have been refined step by step. The most important reforms of the laws concerning intellectual property rights, which affected the Copyright Law, the Trademark Law, and the Patent Law, occurred before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001. China had to introduce them in order to be in compliance with the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Aspects (TRIPs).

In addition to the legislation itself, China is faced with the task of establishing or remodelling the judiciary and the administration for the enforcement of intellectual property rights on the lines of the TRIPs principles – "transparency" and "predictability." It is a tremendous task, very time-consuming, and work is still in progress to this day. In China people often quote a statement made by the former secretary general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Arpad Bogsch, who praised China because, with regard to the protection of intellectual property, it has traversed the path within 25 years for which the industrialized nations needed more than 100 years. In my opinion, western countries, with their head start of several decades in dealing with property rights, should be

正言顺的头等大事。然而，公众的法律意识和法制观念却未紧随而上，知识产权保护的重要性既未引起权利所有者的注意，也未得到侵权者的认知。

活跃在浙江地区的中小型民营企业就是一个典型的实例。与中国的许多城镇相仿，那里聚集着专门生产领带、钢铁制品、铅笔、皮革制品以及长筒丝袜等等的各种厂商。同类产品的制造商集中于一个地区不仅可以降低生产成本，而且有利于彼此之间的相互模仿。发现某一产品销路好，市场需求量大，大家便一拥而上去模仿复制。此一特征使人联想起工业革命始初，模仿在那个时代也很常见。尽管这个不能为模仿复制开脱责任，但至少是一种合乎情理的解释。

迄今为止，中国在知识产权保护方面都建立了那些法律法规？

中国有关知识产权方面的法律法规先后建立于上世纪的八十年代中期和九十年代初之间：《商标法》颁布于1983年，《专利法》1984年，《版权法》1990年，《反不正当竞争法》1995年。从那以后，中国的知识产权保护制度不断地得到改进和完善。2001年12月11日，正式加入世界经济贸易组织之前，中国在知识产权保护领域进行了一次有史以来规模最大的改革。本次改革涉及到《版权法》、《商标法》以及《专利法》等三个层面，旨在接轨《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》，简称《TRIPs协议》。

在引入知识产权概念，建立法律法规的同时，中国还必须以《TRIPs协议》为指针，建立一个完整全面、具有"透明度和可预见性"的司法保护和行政执法体系。此乃一任重道远的法律工程。世界知识产权组织前总干事阿帕德·鲍格胥对此给予了充分的肯定。他说：中国用了二十五年时间，走完了

aware of the fact that what they consider to be self-evident principles when it comes to dealing with intellectual property rights cannot be applied to China or implemented without further ado.

西方工业国家在知识产权保护方面花费了一百多年才走完的立法路程。鲍格胥的这句话经常为中国人所引用。我想借此提醒在知识产权保护方面先行于中国几十年的西方工业国家，不能把自己习惯的法律原则，不加思索地拿到中国去用。

In China membership of the WTO has accelerated the transformation process from a planned to a market economy and intensified China's relations with other countries. What effect has this had on the development of the protection of intellectual property?

加盟世贸组织不仅加速了中国由计划经济向市场经济转型的进程，也促进了中国在国际经济技术和文化方面的合作与交流。请问这一转变在知识产权保护方面产生了那些影响?

As a result of membership of the WTO the protection of intellectual property has become far more important both in China and abroad. Since then Chinese courts have dealt with about 15,000 civil cases, more than 3,000 criminal cases and about 500 administrative cases annually in the area of intellectual property rights. About 80 per cent of these cases are concerned with violations of property rights, whereas cases with references to other countries, for example in which a foreign party is involved, amount to about 5 per cent.

通过加盟世贸组织，中国的知识产权保护无论在境内还是境外都赢得了前所未有的重视。自2001年以来，中国法院平均每年受理的民事诉讼程序高达15000例，刑事诉讼程序3000余例，行政诉讼程序大约500例，而涉及知识产权保护的法律诉讼占总数的80%，其中一方为非中国当事人的涉外侵权诉讼占大约5%。

At the same time the number of lawsuits against Chinese companies abroad, especially in the U.S. and in the countries of the European Union, is on the increase. For example, in April 2007 the U.S. government instigated a WTO lawsuit relating to copyright violation against China on an institutional level. On a private level the number of lawsuits against Chinese companies in other countries has increased dramatically. In the electronics industry alone (above all for DVDs, televisions, mobile phones and MP3 players) Chinese companies have paid more than one billion US dollars in damages on account of violations of intellectual property rights between China's accession to the WTO and 2007. Whereas it is true that there are no precise official statistics about lawsuits against Chinese companies in other countries, the very fact that the Chinese government, in the "Action Plan on IPR Protection 2007," envisaged the provision of a hotline and an online service platform for companies which are affected by claims for damages, makes clear how serious the situation is.

此外，对中国境外的中资企业的法律诉讼案例，主要来自美国和欧盟国家，亦有所增多。在政府层面，美国政府于2007年4月向世贸组织提出了中国政府版权侵权行为的法律诉讼。在非官方层面，对境外中资企业的诉讼程序数目急剧上升。中国自加入世贸组织起至2007年止，仅仅在电子行业，其中包括DVD光碟、电视、手机、MP3播放机在内的侵权盗版行为，就导致赔偿罚金10亿美元以上。尽管官方对境外中资企业所遭遇的诉讼程序未有确切的统计数据，但从中国政府所采取的一系列应急措施来看，譬如“2007年知识产权保护宣传周”，譬如为有涉嫌侵权的企业和公司开设热线电话和在线服务平台等等，足以证明事态的严重性。

Lady Justice in front of the town hall of Hamburg – 汉堡市政厅前的正义女神雕像

Can you name examples of where legal rulings on intellectual property in China and Germany resemble each other, and where there are differences which might explain the way in which Chinese companies deal with intellectual property rights in other countries?

There are similarities and there are differences. For example, the application procedure for patents in China is similar to the German one. However, in contrast to Germany the word “patent” (“zhuan li”) is construed both as an inventor’s patent and also as protection for utility models and industrial design.

Obtaining trade mark rights is also different in the two countries. In China trade mark protection can be obtained only by means of an entry in the trade mark registry and not, as in Germany, on account of prevalent use.

The differences in the law relating to industrial design are often a source of legal disagreement. For example, when evaluating the danger of confusing a product, it is of decisive importance in both China and Germany whether or not the

中国和德国在知识产权保护方面存在着哪些异同？您能否举例说明，境外中资企业缺乏知识产权概念的原因？

中国与德国在知识产权保护方面既有其相同之处，也有其不同之处。譬如有关专利注册程序两国就十分相似，只是中国的专利概念稍广，发明专利、实用新型专利和设计专利皆被称为“专利”。另外，两国获取商标注册保护的程序亦有所区别。在中国，只有注册商标才能获取法律保护。而德国不然，在德国使用商标也能得到保护。最后，两国很大的一个法律分歧，是对外观设计专利的不同理解。判断某一产品是否涉嫌剽窃侵权的关键在于，涉嫌侵权产品的整体外观形象是否与受保护的设计专利相同或相似。德中两国的分歧点，存在于涉嫌侵权外观设

overall aesthetic impression of the product under attack is identical or similar to the design. However, the essential difference is how the product which violates a design is put on the market. Including such products in a product catalogue or exhibiting them at a trade fair does not in itself constitute a violation of the design and is not illegal in China. One is breaking the law only when it has been demonstrated that the advertising is intended to promote the sale of a certain product. For this reason, for example, many Chinese exhibitors at trade fairs believe that merely advertising the protected products of a third party does not represent a violation of the law. Thus they are often very surprised when in Germany this leads to a cease-and-desist order.

What are the differences between the two countries when it comes to enforcement, and where does China stand on its way towards creating effective legal protection?

Enforcing intellectual property rights in China is considerably different from the usual kind of enforcement in Germany. A telling example of this is the temporary injunction procedure. In Germany it is indispensable in the field of commercial legal protection, whereas in China it is used only reluctantly. This is partly due to the fact that temporary legal protection was first introduced when China joined the WTO and many holders of rights are still unfamiliar with this legal instrument.

In China, in contrast to Germany, the administrative agencies have traditionally played an important role in the protection of intellectual property. Together with the courts they form the so-called “dual system.” When intellectual property rights have been infringed upon, holders of rights as a rule turn to the administrative agencies, since in the investigation and enforcement of claims for protection they can do far more than a private person or a company. It is partly for this reason that the U.S. is asking China to make greater use of the administrative agencies in the fight against the infringement of intellectual property rights. However, there is still legal insecurity about how administrative decisions are implemented, how competences are distributed and what discretionary powers can be used. Furthermore, there is the fact that the resources of the administrative agencies are limited. As a result the enforcement of administrative decisions continues to be a problem. Further proof of the ineffective nature of the administrative agencies is afforded by the fact that in poorer regions or in the Chinese hinterland one has to fight local protectionism when attempting to enforce intellectual property rights.

计产品的许诺销售。在中国，宣传册上和展销会上的产品供应尚未构成对外观设计专利的侵权，只有当被证明，被告以受到外观设计专利保护的产品，以营利为目的、为促销某个产品做广告时，方构成对设计专利的侵权。这也是为何许多中国展商面对突然而至的诉前临时禁令，常常感到十分惊异，因为他们不知道，仅仅因为对受到专利保护的第三者的产品做广告，也会构成对知识产权的侵权。

中国与德国在法律的实施和执行方面有何不同？中国在执行知识产权法律法规方面究竟取得了那些成效和进步？

中国在知识产权保护的具体实施和执行方面与德国还是有区别的，其中最大的差别是对诉前临时禁令的使用。在德国，申请诉前临时禁令是企业对知识产权保护的一个必不可少的法律手段，而中国对诉前临时禁令的使用相对还比较少。这是因为，中国目前的有关诉前临时禁令的规定在进入世贸组织之时才制定，实行时间不长，许多权利所有者对该法律救济手段还不了解。

与德国不同的是，中国的行政机构在知识产权保护方面扮演着重要的角色。行政与法院双管齐下，构成一个所谓的“双轨制”。一般来说，权利所有者更喜欢行政机构的参与，这是因为行政机构比个体或企业拥有更多的可能性去调查和执行。这也是为什么美国政府要求中国政府加强行政部门的执法功能，严厉制止和打击知识产权的违法侵权行为的原因。只是中国在行政执法、司法管辖以及酌处范围方面还存在着诸多不确定因素，加之工商行政管理部门人手不足、财源拮据，致使行政裁决的执行难以行之有效。在一些贫穷偏远的地区，知识产权则因地方主义的阻挠不能得到应有的保护，又是一个行政机构执法无力的实证。此外，行政部门

Besides, Chinese authorities can annul claims for compensation if they have initiated administrative action on the basis of incorrect information. On account of the uncertain chances of success of action taken against a violator, the authorities insist on high standards in regard to the evidence. For the holder of the rights this can mean that the burden of proof is considerable.

Cooperation between the institutions on the one hand and the executive and the judiciary on the other still needs to be improved in order to reinforce intellectual property rights in China throughout the country.

Chinese companies are embarking on more and more international business partnerships, are keen on establishing themselves in foreign markets under their own name, and are trying to improve their image. How would you assess these aspirations in the light of the lamentable subject of "product piracy"?

In the foreseeable future intellectual property rights will have a similar position in China as in the industrialized nations. Many companies have already recognized that cheap imitation leads nowhere. Export-oriented companies in particular have learned the hard way in other countries. The number of applications for the protection of industrial design rights within China and in other countries continues to grow. It is also noticeable that Chinese companies are beginning to defend themselves in other countries against charges of breaking the law. At the moment the number of lawsuits in Germany initiated by Chinese holders of rights is still small. However, I believe that it is more than likely that in the foreseeable future China will also begin to play a more active role in this area. In China, in my opinion, it is only a question of time until an awareness of what is legal and illegal in regard to intellectual property rights develops and becomes firmly established. ■

一旦裁判失误，必将面临着承担经济赔偿的风险。由于行政机构无法确保假定权利所有者的胜诉，故而要求权利所有者提供充分翔实的证据，这对权利所有者而言，是很大的财力和物力地投入。故此，在中国，若想大面积的普及和加强对知识产权的保护，必须首先协调和改善各个行政机构之间、执法和司法之间的合作。

愈来愈多的中资企业跻身于国际商贸市场，希望创世界名牌，改善自己的国际形象。您如何估计中国知识产权保护的未来？剽窃盗版等侵权行为是否会有所收敛？

不久的将来，中国在知识产权保护方面将会与西方工业国并驾齐驱。廉价的仿制只有死路一条，已为众多企业所认知，尤其是那些经营外贸出口，常年耳熏目染，交纳了足够学费的涉外企业。中国厂商在境内境外申请商标专利或版权注册的数量迅速增长。另外，值得注意的是，在国外的中资企业也开始对侵权指控进行应诉。目前在德国，由中国权利所有者提出的法律诉讼为数还很少。然而，我敢大胆的预言，在不远的将来，中国在知识产权保护方面将扮演一个举足轻重的角色，知识产权保护意识的提高与巩固，仅只是一个时间的问题。■

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Baosteel Europe

The Internationalization Model and Germany, the “European Headquarters”

宝钢欧洲有限公司

德国的国际化楷模：“欧洲的总部”

The Making of a Global Corporation

The name “Baosteel” is made up of the Chinese place name Baoshan, a district in Shanghai, and the English word steel, and stands for a Chinese company with a global outreach. However, experts on Asia think that there is an added twist here, as is often the case with company names in this region. In Chinese “bao” signifies “valuable” or “precious,” and a free translation of Baosteel might be “premium steel.” That is certainly something to which the company aspires.

Its home ground, the Chinese steel market, is in a certain sense staggering, to say the least. On the demand side it reflects the sheer and insatiable needs of the largest and most successful emerging economy in the world. However, on the supply side it is fragmented like no other market of its kind in the world. About 260 steelmakers of various sizes (some sources say there are more than 1,000), some of them profitable, though most of them insufficiently profitable, divide it up between them. It comes as no surprise that the Chinese government is urging them to turn themselves into large steelmaking corporations on the lines of the Baosteel Group.

Today’s Baosteel Group was founded in Shanghai in December 1978 under the name of Baoshan Iron and Steel Complex in Shanghai. However, to all intents and purposes it is the result of a large merger between Shanghai Metallurgical Holding Group Corporation and Shanghai Meishan Group Co., Ltd. carried out in November 1998 on the basis of a government decree. The latest acquisition was in April 2008, when Baosteel took over the Bayi Steel Group in the province of Xinjiang.

The Baosteel Group is a holding consisting of six different business entities, which produce and sell steel primarily for and to carmakers, shipbuilders, the electronics and household appliances sector, oil drilling installations and pipelines, as well as the building industry. In addition to this the Baosteel Group

宝钢，一个世界级企业的诞生史

宝钢的公司名称Baosteel是由两部分组成的，Bao就是中文地名宝山，这是上海的一个区名，后面的Steel则是钢的英文写法，Baosteel，一个来自中国，面向全球的企业。熟悉亚洲的内行人士从公司的名称上还看到了更多的东西——在亚洲这个地区，很多企业的名称都有一定含义——宝的中文含义是“有价值的”或“宝贵的”，宝钢可以直译成“优质钢”，而宝钢正是以这样的标准来要求自己的。

宝钢的所在地市场，也就是中国市场，在某种意义上来说是一个奇迹：从需求的角度来看，这个世界上最大最成功的蓬勃增长的国家的市场胃口几乎总也填不饱，从供应的角度来看，没有任何一个其他市场象中国集中度那么低：各种规模的钢铁生产厂有260家（有些渠道称超过1000家），有些盈利情况较好，大部分则赢利情况不令人满意。难怪中国政府迫切希望通过兼并重组提高集中度，更多地形成象宝钢集团那样的大厂家。

今天的宝钢集团的前身是1978年12月在上海建立的宝山钢铁总厂，在政府的批准下，1998年11月宝钢和上海冶金控股集团公司以及上海梅山集团有限公司进行了大规模的联合重组。2008年4月宝钢集团收购兼并了新疆八一钢铁集团。宝钢分6大业务板块，其钢材的生产销售主要用于汽车制造业、造船

The "Bird's Nest", the national stadium in Beijing –
鸟巢——位于北京的国家体育场

has another seven business entities in areas such as financial services, trading or logistics services. Thus in comparison to other international market participants it displays a high degree of diversification, though this is typical for many large Asian corporations. The Baosteel Group is wholly owned (100 per cent) by the state. It is true that the largest business unit Baoshan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. – or Baosteel for short – has been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since December 2000, though currently ca 78 per cent of the shares are held by the Baosteel Group and thus by the Chinese government.

In recent years the turnover of the Baosteel Group has risen annually by ca 10 per cent, from 162 billion yuan renminbi (RMB) in 2004 to ca 200 billion yuan RMB (ca 18.5 billion euros) in 2007. At the same time steel production has risen from 21.38 million to 28.6 million tons. The Baosteel Group, which currently has 122,780 co-workers, is China's largest producer of steel. It has worked on prestigious and complex building projects such as the principal venue of the 2008 Olympic Summer Games, the so-called "Bird's Nest" in Beijing, the headquarters of CCTV state television in Beijing, and the terminals of the international airports in Beijing and Pudong/Shanghai. In international terms the company is also one of the largest corporations of its kind. Since 2006 the Baosteel Group has been in fifth place in the global steelmaker category, and in 2004 was the first Chinese manufacturing company to be included in the Fortune 500 list, where it came in as number 372. By 2008 it had already reached number 259. The stated aim is to become one of the three largest steel producers in the world as soon as possible.

Strategic Positioning and Global Activities

This goal has not only been proclaimed. Many experts now believe that its attainment is a distinct possibility. All these developments, which the Western media would not have thought possible in the case of a Chinese state enterprise, speak for themselves. In the course of the merger the workforce was cut from 176,000

业、电器及家电业、输油管线以及建筑业。另外宝钢集团还有其他的7个业务板块如金融业，贸易，物流等。宝钢的多元化程度和其他国际上的同行比较来讲相对较高，但对很多亚洲的大企业来说却是较为普遍的。宝钢集团为100%国有，2000年12月宝钢股份或简称宝钢在上海证券交易所上市，宝钢集团也就是说国家控股78%。

宝钢集团的营业额在过去几年中保持了平均每年约10%的增长，从2004年的1620亿人民币到2007年的2000亿人民币（约185亿欧元），同时其钢产量也从2138万吨增加到了2860万吨。宝钢目前员工122780人，是中国的最大钢铁生产企业。在中国一些具有权威代表性的复杂工程项目上，都有宝钢的参与，如2008年夏季奥运会的主会场，即北京的"鸟巢"，北京中央电视台的主楼，北京国际机场及上海浦东国际机场的候机楼等。不仅在国内，在国际上宝钢也是属于重量级的，2006年以来，宝钢是世界上第5大钢铁生产企业，2004年作为第一家中国的制造企业在财富世界500强排行榜中排名372位，2008年排名已经上升到259位，宝钢已明确的目标是，尽快成为世界三家最大的钢铁生产企业之一。

全球战略目标的建立

很多业内专家现在就已经明白，宝钢的目标不仅已经公之于众，而且也是有可能实

to 122,780. In future, success is no longer going to be based on cheap labour, but on automated production. The main Chinese plant of the company in Shanghai is considered to be one of the most modern and most efficient manufacturing sites for steel products in the world, and not only in China. At Baosteel the new management concept is visible in many areas. For example, the “Six Sigma” quality management system was successfully introduced in 2005. The steel producer engages in strategic planning and has an integrated management system designed to regulate and assign responsibilities, executive order powers and communication channels between the business entities.

The topic of “Corporate Social Responsibility” is becoming increasingly important as a result of political changes and the evolution of environmental technology in recent years. Thus the Baosteel Group bankrolls numerous social projects, for example the establishment of a Baosteel further education fund, or a foundation which has set up 38 so-called “hope primary schools,” and provides support for sustainability and environmental projects.

Baosteel Group is the first Chinese company to publish annual sustainability reports, which have appeared since 2005.

In 2006 the management went so far as to proclaim the goal, with the help of the slogan “Green Baosteel, our common home,” of turning Baosteel into the cleanest and most sustainable steelmaker in the world.

The preconditions for turning the company into a global player are good. On the one hand, the Baosteel Group, since its foundation, has never been a typical Chinese state enterprise, for it dates back only to December 1978, that is, the exact point at which the Chinese economic reforms got off the ground. Thus, unlike many state-owned companies, it was not burdened with the legacy of the Chinese Communist past. On the other hand, it has been shaped by the cosmopolitan tradition of Shanghai, which is reflected above all in long-lasting relationships and numerous joint ventures with other global players. Thus the Baosteel Group, via its subsidiary Shanghai Pudong Iron & Steel Group, has held a 40 per cent minority stake in a joint venture with ThyssenKrupp Stainless AG in Shanghai, “Shanghai Krupp Stainless & Co., Ltd.”

The Baosteel Group is prepared to confront the future, especially since it realizes that the challenges are enormous. Special market segments such as those of Baosteel have for some time seen higher growth rates and much higher demand levels than other emerging markets such as India and Russia. To some extent

现的。尽管西方媒体不相信中国的国有企业，但宝钢的发展说明了一切：在联合重组的进程中员工数从176000下降到了122780，宝钢不再用廉价的劳动力，而是以自动化的生产来保证未来的成功。宝钢在上海的主体企业不仅仅在中国，在世界上也属于最先进最高效的钢铁生产基地之一。2005年宝钢成功地引进了“六西格玛”质量管理体系。公司进行战略规划，并实行一体化的管理体系，来控制并管理不同业务单元之间的职责范围，命令授权，沟通渠道等等。

“企业社会责任”随着近年来政治上和环保技术上的变化而备受瞩目。宝钢集团支持大量的社会公益项目，如成立宝钢继续教育基金和1家有38所“希望小学”的基金会，并关注可持续发展和环保问题。

作为第一家中国企业，宝钢从2005年开始每年发布可持续发展报告。

2006年公司管理层提出目标，在“绿色宝钢，我们共同的家园”口号下，把宝钢集团建成世界上最清洁、最有可持续发展力的钢铁生产企业。

上述的发展已经为宝钢成为一个全球性的企业打下了良好的基础。一方面来讲，宝钢建设始于1978年12月，正是中国经济改革的开始阶段，从这个意义上来讲宝钢从一开始起就已经不是传统意义上的国有企业了，没有中国共产主义制度下很多老国有企业拖着的那些包袱。另外也受到上海向全世界开放的传统影响，主要是指和外国的大企业合建公司的过程中建立起来的长年的关系和互相参与，如从1998年开始，宝钢集团下属的子公司上海浦东钢铁集团占40%的少数股份，和蒂森克虏伯不锈钢股份公司共同组建了“上海克虏伯不锈钢有限公司”。

they have even caught up with those of established industrialized countries such as the U.S. The latest OECD research suggests that this trend is visible in every segment of the Chinese steel market and is bound to become more pronounced. Exports are growing despite the gigantic demand in China. In 2004 Chinese steel exports exceeded imports for the first time.

In order to get ready to meet the high demand – more than 90 per cent of the Baosteel Group's turnover is in China – and in order to enhance its negotiating position in the struggle for scarcer natural resources, the company is planning further mergers and acquisitions at home and abroad, both on the horizontal level and with companies on the upstream or downstream sections of the value chain. The consolidation of the Chinese steel market, which is currently taking place and open access to international markets make it possible, by means of purchases and participation, to acquire new plants, and above all to integrate important mining sites. Currently Baosteel Group imports ca 80 per cent of its need for iron ore. As early as 2001 the company had taken a 50 per cent share in the Brazilian iron ore mine Água Limpa, and in 2003 acquired shares in Hamersley Iron, an Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto. Loose partnerships and numerous meetings with other steel giants in East Asia such as Nippon Steel in Japan and Posco in Korea keep nurturing rumours that a merger is in the offing.

Find out more about the merger of corporate cultures in "Post-Merger Integration and Corporate Culture"

Of decisive importance for the Baosteel Group's strategic planning are not only the economic goals but also the acquisition of international management experience.

The internationalization of the board was designed to underpin this development. Today the directors cover three important areas. They are concerned to maintain the best possible relationship with the government, the owner of the company; to procure an exact knowledge of the Chinese market and of modern production methods; and to obtain more experience of international business methods.

宝钢做了很多针对未来的准备工作，主要原因是宝钢面临巨大的挑战：由于中国长时间的高增长率，对一些特殊的细分市场产品的需求已经远远超过了其他新兴国家如印度或俄罗斯的需求水平，有部分甚至已经和一些发达国家如美国持平。最新的经济合作与发展组织的研究表明，中国这种钢铁需求日益增长的趋势将不会仅仅局限于某类产品，而是会传递到整个中国钢铁行业的各类产品，并会表现得更为强烈。在需求强劲的同时，中国的钢铁产品出口也在增长，2004年中国的钢铁产品出口首次超过了进口。

为了满足强劲的国内需求，宝钢把超过90%的产品销往国内，为了在有限的原料争夺的谈判中争取有利位置，宝钢计划在国内外进行进一步的兼并重组，包括同一水平位置的企业或者处于价值创造链前后位置的上下游企业。随着在中国钢铁市场的兼并和国际市场的开拓，通过收购和参股，宝钢一方面有可能取得新的生产能力，更重要的是对收购过来的重要的老生产能力进行整合。目前宝钢集团的80%的铁矿石是通过进口的，早在2001年，宝钢就取得了巴西埃圭林帕矿山的50%的股权，2003年取得了巴西力拓公司的澳大利亚子公司哈默斯利铁矿的部分股权。和东亚的另外两个钢铁巨头日本的新日铁以及韩国浦项的松散型的合作以及大量的会谈，使人们对几方联合的可能性也有了一定的猜测。

您可以参阅《企业后台管理与企业文化》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于企业文化的内容。

宝钢战略计划中具有决定性的不仅仅是经济上的目标，还有对国际管理经验的获取。

为了支撑企业的发展，董事会的国际化也正向前推进，目前的董事会成员们覆盖

Setting up a Branch in Hamburg

The Baosteel Group has been doing business in Germany for a long time, though its activities have changed significantly over the years. At the beginning it was impossible to think about selling steel products, and the main task was to supply Chinese companies with "vital" replacement parts for their domestic production. This changed when in 1993 the senior management decided to found Baosteel Europe GmbH with a nominal capital of four million German marks. Germany was chosen because the local courts can provide European customers and suppliers with more legal security than if the business were to be conducted via Hong Kong or China itself.

> The decision to locate the business in the Hanseatic metropolis was based on rational motives such as the direct links to the shipping routes. Certain cultural aspects also played a role,

as the current manager of Baosteel Europe, director Meng Ye, acknowledges. "Hamburg and China can look back on a long history of partnership. There really are quite a lot of Chinese companies and trading entities here. The parent of Baosteel Europe GmbH comes from the city of Shanghai, Hamburg's partner city and also a port. Both from a cultural perspective and for geographical reasons Hamburg in our opinion provides us with favourable conditions for the development of our company."

In the meantime business has been booming. In the last three years turnover increased to about 500 million euros. This means that Baosteel Europe is among the largest Chinese companies in Germany. It is making a profit, though it is certainly not resting on its laurels. It not only wishes to increase its share of the global market, but is seeking to expand its businesses in Germany and Europe with new products and innovations. For this purpose the Hamburg location is due to be expanded and there will be a drive to recruit new specialists. However, under Meng Ye the structure of Baosteel Europe GmbH has changed considerably in the last four years. At the Hamburg location 28 co-workers now work in six units, and on top of this there are 27 Baosteel Europe co-workers in other offices throughout Europe, the Middle East and Shanghai. The finance department and the Shanghai office are responsible for the internal organization of what happens in Hamburg. Looking after customers and suppliers is the task of the business areas steel trading, spare parts and equipment, and metal products. Recently the "New Business"

Find out more about Diversity Management in "Synergy by Diversity"

了三个重要的领域：和国家拥有人保持最好的关系，对中国市场有准确的判断并掌握先进的生产技术，以及日益增加的国际业务经验。

汉堡业务基地的设立

宝钢集团在德国开展业务已经很多年了，然而其业务内容在这些年来也有了重要的改变，一开始的时候并没有考虑到钢铁产品的销售，而主要是当时还有些神秘色彩的钢铁生产所"赖以生存"的备品备件的供应，于是在1993年建立了注册资金400万德国马克的宝钢欧洲有限公司。把地址选在德国，是因为和通过香港或中国大陆自身开展业务相比，因受理法院的所在地在欧洲，使得用户和供应商有了更多的法律上的安全感。

> 而选择汉堡这样一个港口大都会城市，除了合理的动机——比如直通海洋运输线路外，文化上的因素也是一个重要的原因。

现任宝欧公司总裁的叶萌先生表示："汉堡和上海的合作有悠久的历史，汉堡这里有很多中国的企业和贸易机构，宝钢欧洲有限公司的母公司位于上海，和汉堡是姐妹城市，而上海本身恰好也是一个港口城市，我们认为，从文化角度和地理条件上来看，汉堡给我们公司的进一步发展提供了最优越的条件。"

宝欧的公司业务从开始起一直不错：在近三年来更是把营业额翻番，达到了将近5亿欧元，宝欧也得以成为德国最大的中资企业。公司持续盈利，但并没有对现有的成就满足，宝欧不但要在世界市场上扩大份额，而且还要凭着新产品和创新在德国和欧洲拓展业务。为此汉堡的总部就必须扩充，并招募更多的专业人员。在叶萌总经理的领导

department has been given the job of expanding into new business areas. In order to be able to deal with a variety of tasks, the company employs co-workers from a number of different countries. In Hamburg Chinese expatriates work side by side with Germans, whereas at other foreign branches co-workers from the various countries are actually in the majority.

Business Areas of the German Baosteel Branch

Procurement, which was of considerable importance at the start of the Baosteel Group's activities in Germany, plays an important role even today. The transactions involved are complicated and interculturally demanding, and require good coordination. The procurement process is set in motion at a certain company location – perhaps even in a Chinese province – which needs some spare parts obtainable only from Europe. This requirement is relayed to the Baosteel head offices in Shanghai, which transmit an enquiry to Hamburg. It is received by a Chinese or German co-worker, who places an order with a local supplier. After the spare parts have arrived, another German or Chinese co-worker arranges for them to be sent to China. Enquiry, order processing and transport are dealt with in Chinese, German and English, which means that the co-workers of both nations deal with many tasks together and have to engage in an ongoing dialogue.

> Thus at the Hamburg location business success is absolutely dependent on Sino-German cooperation, which is based on years of experience and mutual understanding.

A Chinese head of department supervises four tandems each consisting of a Chinese and a German worker, who know each other and work together in a coordinated manner.

In steel trading, which is fundamentally different to procurement, ten Chinese co-workers – most of whom are engineers – work under the direction of the internationally experienced deputy managing director Zheng Guo. The working language is Chinese. In keeping with international business practices, English is used when communicating with the outside world.

In steel trading the German market plays a subordinate role. Sales orders are sent via Hamburg, where the contracts are concluded, to the whole of Europe and the rest of the world, though primarily to Italy and Spain. The majority of customers value Baosteel's quality, reliability, punctual delivery and service. The price becomes more important in certain countries, though Baosteel does not

您可以参阅《多元化协同》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于企业文化多元性的潜力的内容。

下，过去4年里宝欧公司结构上的改变也是巨大的：现在汉堡总部有28名员工，在欧洲，中东，上海的其他办公室还有27名员工。关于汉堡总部的内部组织由财务部和上海代表处管理。用户和供应商的管理协调则由钢铁贸易部，设备备件部负责，最新的部门是“新事业部”，具体负责其他的新业务。根据业务的不同，宝欧配备了不同国籍的员工，在汉堡有中方和德方员工，在欧洲其他国家以当地的员工为主。

宝钢德国子公司的业务开拓

资材备件的采购是宝欧在设立时的主要业务，到现在依然是公司的一项重要业务。采购的工作流程很复杂，对国际文化有很高要求，需要良好的协调能力。采购的需求来自宝钢的某个部分——即中国的某个省份，如需要德国生产的某项备件，该需求通过宝钢集团总部发询价到汉堡，中国的同事把该任务转交给德国同事，然后在德国的供应商那里订购备件，当得到想要的备件后，该流程再反向传递回去。

> 成功的合同执行最重要的一点在于德国和中方员工在汉堡总部相互合作，这需要长期的经验和相互的理解。

在一个中方部门总经理领导下，共有4个工作组，每组有一个中方员工和一个德方员工，两者互相协调配合。

钢铁贸易，和资材备件采购不同，有10名中方员工，大部分是工程师，他们在富有国际经验的公司副总裁郭征的领导下工作。工作语言是中文，对外则是英语，遵守的则

position itself in the lower price segment, preferring to have a price level akin to that of ThyssenKrupp AG and ArcelorMittal. In order to increase its market share in Europe, the company is pinning its hopes on premium quality and customer orientation. The turnover volume, currently about 500,000 to 600,000 tons annually, is still a very small percentage of the total output.

The area “New Business” is also managed by a Chinese expatriate with experience of foreign countries. “New” refers both to new regions, above all the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa, and to new activities such as investments in sectors other than the steel industry. The current planning phase involves making feasibility studies (with the help of external expertise) and studying market entry methods.

Corporate Culture and Working Atmosphere

In recent years in particular, the senior management of the Baosteel Group has come to realize the importance of a common corporate culture – for both Chinese and foreign co-workers –

and in January 2004 started a programme which augurs well for the future. It refers to “good faith” and “synergy” as basic values and emphasizes the significance of culture as the basis of all economic action. “Baosteel’s culture is the soul of management, while Baosteel’s management is the vehicle of culture.” The executives in Hamburg emphasize words such as “integrity, teamwork, loyalty,” and are thus transferring to the co-worker level the essence of their cooperation with the head office in Shanghai and the elucidation of the right strategy. In order to underline the high opinion of the local workforce, all the German co-workers in Hamburg were invited to stay in Shanghai for a week. There they were shown the organization of the head office, met their counterparts, with whom they often telephoned or exchanged emails, and experienced Chinese hospitality – and gratitude for their achievements and their loyalty to the company. The German co-workers have also been included in the Chinese bonus system, so that they participate in the success of the company. At the works meeting, which is held twice a year, the management reports at length about the successes and goals of the parent company and the Hamburg branch, hoping in this way to foster a community spirit. The German co-workers were pleasantly surprised that the Chinese executives were clearly trying to respect German habits and customs and did not expect German co-workers – as was often the case with Chinese expatriates – to stay in the office until late in the evening. They have come to understand that despite different attitudes to work, in the final analysis the efficiency is the same.

是国际贸易的惯例。在钢铁贸易上，德国市场的角色并不重要，销售通过签约地汉堡销往整个欧洲及全世界，主要是意大利和西班牙。大部分用户看重的是宝钢的质量，可信任度，交货的信誉，以及服务，根据买方的不同价格会有差异，但总体上来说宝钢的产品定位并不低，而是和蒂森克虏伯股份公司以及阿塞洛米塔尔的在一个价格水平线上，为了扩大在欧洲的市场份额，企业注重产品优质及用户导向，目前50到60万吨的销售额在总的产量上来讲占的比重还很小。

新事业部的领导是一位有国外经验的中方员工，“新”意味着新的地区，主要是中东、东欧和非洲，另外还有新的业务，如在钢铁业务之外的投资，在目前的规划阶段需要外部的支撑进行可行性研究，并检验进入市场的具体措施。

企业文化和工作氛围

在近几年来宝钢的领导层发现，一种共同的企业文化是那么的重要，包括对中方员工和外方员工。

从2004年1月开始了一个面向未来的计划，其以“诚信”和“协同”作为基本的价值观，强调以企业文化作为一切经济贸易活动的基础：“宝钢文化是管理的灵魂，宝钢管理是文化的载体。”宝欧汉堡总部的最高层领导提出了“融合，团队合作，忠诚”的价值观，并要求员工和上海总部在思想上保持一致。为了强调对当地员工的重视，宝欧邀请所有汉堡当地的外籍员工到上海一周的时间，在那里他们学习总部的组织结构，和以前经常电话或邮件联系对口的工作伙伴见面，领略中国式的热情款待，这也是对外方员工的工作成绩和忠于企业的一种感谢。外方员工也参与中方的奖金分配，这让他们能分享企业成功的成果。宝欧每年两次的员工

The German co-workers are particularly appreciative of the respect with which Chinese superiors treat their subordinates in every situation. The experience of working together on a daily basis means that Germans at Baosteel certainly do not share the picture of China disseminated by the media. The opposite is the case. Most of them have developed a far more positive picture of China. For example, no one has ever observed any kind of state or party influence, which is so often in the news, or the retention of information for political reasons.

Apart from the good atmosphere at their place of work, co-workers are also motivated by other aspects. An expanding large Chinese company is synonymous with safe jobs, protection against dismissal is based on the Chinese and Confucian belief that one has a duty to look after the well-being of others. The high one-off payments confirm the social attitude of the senior management. For this reason co-worker fluctuation is small. A spell in a position of responsibility at the head office is required if one wishes to gain promotion within the company. For this one currently needs professional qualifications and the ability to speak Chinese. Co-workers who do not speak Chinese still find it extremely difficult to reach the senior management level at Baosteel Europe.

Human Resources Management

Recruiting at Baosteel Group, which enjoys a very good reputation on account of its excellent compensation and the career opportunities on the Chinese domestic market, is a very careful process. The company selects candidates for its comprehensive examination procedure from among a large number of applicants who are all university graduates. For this reason – and this is rather unusual in East Asia – the company hardly ever recruits side-door candidates or at job fairs. As is usual in China, the successful applicants are then introduced to the corporate culture in their first years. If the candidate does well, the company will defray the costs of further education, for example a one-year higher education course at home or abroad. After this one is likely to be employed as a senior executive, alternating between China and other countries. Whereas until recently it was a welcome opportunity for everyone in China to work abroad for a number of years, above all on account of the chances of earning good money and obtaining qualifications, it is nowadays often considered to be a burden.

> Income and career opportunities have developed enormously within China, and the quality of life in Shanghai is now higher than in many cities of the West.

大会上，公司领导会详细介绍母公司和子公司的成绩和目标，让员工产生一种共为一体的感觉。外方员工感到高兴的是，中方领导很明确地在努力尊重德国的风俗习惯，例如，不期望外方员工象很多中方员工经常做的那样，很晚还留在办公室加班。让德国同事特别尊敬的是，中方领导在任何情况下都考虑到保护他们的下属。日常共同工作中的经验让德国同事没有认同通过媒体宣传的中国形象，而是相反，他们大多对中国产生了相当积极的印象，比如没有人感到任何常被批评的国家或政党的影响，也没有感觉因政治原因而在信息言论上有所保留。

在良好的企业氛围之下员工还找到了其他的激励人心的因素：一个扩张中的中国大公司保障了工作岗位，在解聘保护方面体现了中国儒家式的仁爱，并比以前制订了更合理的规则。较高的特别奖励则显示了领导层的社会人性化的一面，与之相应的是员工的流失率较低。在企业中要获得晋升必须要在总部的负责岗位上工作过，这就要求在专业资质以外还要有中文的知识。对不会说中文的员工来讲，要在宝欧成为领导层，这还是一个很大的挑战。

人事管理

宝钢集团作为当地的招聘方享有极好的声誉，一方面是薪酬优厚，另外是晋升机会良好。宝钢的招聘非常谨慎，在大量前来应聘的大学毕业生中通过各种测试程序层层筛选。和东亚的典型招聘方法不同，宝钢几乎从来不从跳槽者或者人才招聘会上招人。在宝钢成功应聘的人在第一年要熟悉企业文化，这在中国是很普遍的。如果成绩良好的话公司会承担继续教育的费用，比如为期一年的大学学习，包括留学。接下来是在企业的岗位锻炼，包括到国外工作。以前，在国外工作几年对宝钢员工来讲很受欢迎，一方

Further burdens might be separation from one's family or problems with the children's schools. Even though the Baosteel Group takes into account these reservations and offers its Chinese co-workers abroad numerous incentives such as job guarantees for spouses, the willingness to work in other countries is declining. However, successful spells abroad considerably facilitate access to the senior management level and to executive posts in the branches and at the head office.

In recent years the company has expanded the scope of its human resources management. Thus there are regular assessments, and the skills of co-workers are continually being enhanced by means of systematic training. Preparatory country-specific or culture-specific instruction for foreign assignments is to some extent available, as are returnees' programmes. The Chinese mentoring system is well organized. Talented young executives are watched over and given advice by people appointed to look after them. If their mentors rise in the company hierarchy, this will sooner or later lead to advancement for their younger colleagues, who may also receive recommendations for employment elsewhere. In addition to good professional work, this network is indispensable if one wishes to advance to decision-making positions.

Baosteel Europe Paves the Way for Integration and Expansion

For the Baosteel Group numerous economic and cultural aspects were of decisive importance when it chose Hamburg as its location, and its relationship to the city government, and especially to the area of business subsidies, has developed very well on the basis of mutual interest. The company stays in touch with the media, its representatives participate in public events, and it engages in sponsoring. The Baosteel group now also practices this external representation in China. Baosteel has already developed some ideas about networking with other Chinese organizations in Germany for the joint promotion of their interests, and maintains loose partnerships with the logistics services company Cosco and the Bank of China.

> Baosteel Europe GmbH exemplifies the "large Chinese corporation abroad." It occupies a forerunner role in two senses of the word, and is at one and the same time "a test case and a model."
>
> Handelsblatt no. 43, 01 March 2007.

Many Chinese still find it difficult to be internationally competitive, and there is often a discrepancy between an impressive success story at home and hesitant

面收入较高，另外也有获得提高能力的机会。但现在大家经常把这作为一种负担，

> 因为收入和晋升机会在中国也发展得很快，上海的生活质量已经超过了西方的许多城市，

另外在国外工作和家庭分离，小孩的教育也会成问题。尽管宝钢集团愿意为此买单，也提供了很多激励措施，如配偶一起出国生活将为其保留工作岗位等，但出国工作的意愿还是下降了。当然，国外的工作为将来个人在公司总部或分公司进入管理层如一些领导岗位还是创造了非常有利的条件。

在近几年来，公司的人事管理也取得了很大进展，如定期的评价制度，通过系统化的继续教育不断提高员工的能力。对出国工作的人员除了当地的国情和文化方面的准备以外，回国后的安排也是准备内容之一。中国式的指导人制度做得很好：有天赋的年轻人接受其指导者的观察和建议，指导人本身被提拔到企业的某个层级，则指导人会在或长或短的时间内提拔年轻人或进一步推荐。除了具备良好的业绩以外，中国领导人员的人脉关系在晋升上是必要的决定性因素。

宝欧作为整合和扩张的领头羊

宝钢选择汉堡作为宝欧公司的总部有很多经济上和文化方面的因素，和汉堡市政府尤其是经济发展方面的关系，因为双方互利，发展得非常好。宝欧和媒体保持接触，公司代表出席汉堡公开的社会活动，并进行赞助：正如宝钢集团在上海也是经常这么做的。宝欧的第一个考虑是和德国的其他中国机构根据共同的利益建立起联系，宝欧现已经和中远集团和中国银行建立起了松散型的合作。

progress overseas that is partly marred by setbacks. This could change quite quickly if “pilot projects” such as the internationalization of Baosteel are a success and the senior management of other companies draws the right conclusions from what it sees. Then the assessment of those competitors who at the moment do not consider Chinese companies to constitute genuine competition could begin to change. But it is not only the views within an industry that are of importance. Chinese companies, especially those with international pretensions, must assume that they are being watched intently by the public, and must behave in a responsible manner.

After getting off to a rough start Baosteel has made significant progress in recent years. Admittedly, the situation has been rather auspicious for the steel industry. An essential basis for further expansion in the international sector is a systematic development of human resources beginning with recruiting, and leading via integration to career planning and further education. The aim is to use the talents of both German and international specialists and to form international leadership teams which will be in a position to meet the challenges of international management and intercultural decision-making. And in the case of international customer-supplier relationships it is important to preempt conflicts based on cultural differences by increasing the level of intercultural competence and strengthening an overarching corporate culture. Baosteel should be able to master these challenges, especially against the background that in the course of its foundation in Shanghai it already united a variety of very different companies, and has developed a distinct “we feeling” among its co-workers with “blue, yellow, white and red helmets” and created a common corporate culture. The former chairwoman Qihua Xie once coined the slogan “Quality, not quantity” for “hard skills.” Actually, this can just as well be applied to “soft skills.” ■

宝钢欧洲有限公司作为“中国大型企业在海外”的模范性代表，在两个方面担任着领头羊的角色：即“试验”和“榜样”。

中国的大量企业很难做到具有国际竞争力，他们面临的矛盾是一方面在国内市场书写着企业成功的故事，另一方面海外业务上却犹豫不决甚至遭到挫折。这些公司的高层管理者在观察到宝欧这个宝钢国际化的成功的“样板工程”后，应该很快能从中得出关键的结论。如果说目前很多德国同行在中国企业中还没有看到能与自己竞争的实力的话，随着更多的企业象宝欧那样成功地国际化，这些德国同行的判断恐怕很快就要改变了。这不仅仅是业内人士的观点：每个中国企业，尤其是有国际化要求的企业，一定要接受公众的观察，并相应地担负起自己应该担负的责任。

在宝钢经历了艰苦的起步阶段后，近几年来取得了重要的进展，获得了开展钢铁业务的良好基本条件。对进一步拓展国际业务的重要条件就是系统化地进行人才开发，从招聘，到融合，到职业生涯计划以及继续教育。要使用好德国和国际上的专业人才，建立起一支能接受国际化管理挑战，能完成不同文化背景下的决策的国际化领导队伍。

在与国际上用户及供应商的关系上因为不同文化而产生的冲突也能够随着企业不同文化背景兼容性的提高，以及企业自身文化的深化来进行预防。

宝钢应该能够完成这个使命，因为宝钢从自身形成起，已经在上海整合了不同的企业，把戴着“兰色，黄色，白色，红色安全帽”的员工形成了一个“我们”的感觉，形成了共同的企业文化，宝钢的前任董事长谈到“硬技能”时讲了一句格言：“以质量代替数量”，这可以理解为“软技能”。■

Speaking with Heinrich Lieser

Managing director of HWF
Hamburg Business Development Corporation

李瑟海先生访谈录

HWF汉堡经济促进局总经理

"With regard to the prospects for the future, I am banking on an ongoing positive trend in Sino-German cooperation, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms."

"展望未来，德中两国之间的合作前景灿烂，无论在数量上还是在质量上都将继续发展上升。"

Mr Lieser, Hamburg is one of the most important locations for Chinese companies on the European mainland. What, in the light of the professional experience of HWF, motivates Chinese companies to establish a branch in Germany or Hamburg?

In China Germany has traditionally had a very good reputation. German engineers, German cars and German machine tools are very much admired. A German car, as in many other countries, is a status symbol in China. On account of its geographical location in the heart of Europe, its good infrastructure and the high educational standard of its workforce Germany continues to be an interesting business location. What is primarily so attractive about Hamburg as the location for a branch of a Chinese company is the port and the well-developed transport network on land to which it is linked. In addition to this, "Hanbao," the "castle of the Chinese," as Hamburg is called in Chinese, has traditionally had close links with China and in particular with Shanghai, which, being a large port and metropolis, has many things in common with Hamburg. Furthermore, Hamburg has one of the largest Chinese communities in Germany.

李瑟海先生，汉堡是中国公司在欧洲大陆"安家落户"的首选要地，您以为——根据贵局的经验，致使中资企业到德国抑或汉堡缔建分支机构的动因是什么？

德国在中国历来享有很高的声誉。德国的工程师，德国的汽车，德国的机器制造等等倍受中国民众之青睐。同世界许多国家一样，在中国，德国的汽车象征着一个人的身价和社会地位。一直以来，德国因其地处欧洲中心的地理位置，良好完善的基础设施及其高素质的人才，成为了极具魅力的经济中心。而汉堡吸引中国公司来安家落户的地方，首先在于这里的港口，及其四通八达的水陆交通运输网。另外，"汉堡"，中文称之为"中国人的城堡"，历史上与中国过往甚从，尤其是与海港大都市上海，彼此之间

You have just mentioned some special aspects of Hamburg as a location for branches of Chinese companies. Could you tell us a little more about this?

The relationship between Hamburg and China is based on a long and profound friendship. Since the 18th century the trade between the two has been very brisk. As early as 1731 the first Chinese merchantman from Canton arrived in the harbour at Hamburg. With its numerous trading agencies, banks, insurance companies and foreign consulates, Hamburg is a key city in the context of trade relations between Germany and the rest of the world, including Asia. The port in Hamburg is the most important entrepôt for goods between Germany and East Asia which are transported by ship. We have seen again and again that these facts are of central significance for Chinese trading companies. In the year 2007 Hamburg's container trade on the East Asia and Southeast Asia routes posted double-digit increases. All in all about 5.6 million TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, a standard container size) were shipped to Asia via Hamburg. Furthermore, in Hamburg there are numerous experienced consultants who have for many years dealt with the specific needs of companies with a Chinese background. They include lawyers, accountants, auditors, estate agents, insurance brokers and financial services advisers. These consultants have the necessary intercultural sensitivity. They usually have Chinese-speaking staff or can themselves speak Chinese.

Which Chinese companies have already selected Hamburg as their location?

On account of its remarkable competence in the area of trade and logistics, Hamburg has proved to be a favourite location for entrepreneurs from the People's Republic. About 400 companies from China are currently doing business in and from Hamburg. Between 30 and 50 new Chinese companies come to Hamburg every year.

The majority are import and export enterprises which use Hamburg as a location from which to pursue their businesses in Europe and Germany. Among them are companies such as Baosteel, Sinosteel, Chint and Harwa Electronics GmbH, a subsidiary of electronics manufacturer XOCECO. Many have set up their European central offices in Hamburg, and use the city as a gateway to the European markets, especially those in northern, eastern and central Europe.

存在着诸多的平行相似之处。德国最大的华人社区也在汉堡。

您刚才提及汉堡作为投资基地的若干特殊优势，可否谈得再具体一点？

汉堡与中国之间的关系可谓是由来已久，密切而友好。自十八世纪起就开始了频繁的贸易往来，早在1731年，就有第一艘来自广州的商船靠岸汉堡。在汉堡，商贸企业，银行，保险公司，以及外国领事馆云集，使之成为联系德国和世界，包括亚洲的一个举足轻重的外贸枢纽。汉堡港则是往来于德国和远东之间海运商品货物的一个极其重要的中转站。据我们所知，此点亦为中资商贸企业看好汉堡的一个关键原因之一。2007年，汉堡港东亚和东南亚集装箱的吞吐量分别达到了两位数的增长率，统共有560万TEU（20尺货柜，标准集装箱单位）往来亚洲的货物经由汉堡港装卸和周转。除此之外，汉堡还拥有为数众多、涉及领域广泛的各种咨询公司，以及大量富有执业经验，具备中国背景的律师、税务顾问、审计师、房地产和保险公司经纪人，包括财经专家顾问，他们不仅具备必要的文化敏感，而且拥有通晓中文的雇员，有的甚至本身就具备雄厚的华语能力。

请问都是些怎样的中资公司选择到汉堡“安家落户”？

汉堡以其商贸和物流两大领域的强大优势深受来自中华人民共和国企业家的瞩目。迄今为止，共有大约400家中资企业在汉堡从事各种商贸活动，大约有30至50家的“新来户”每年在汉堡注册“登陆”。

在汉堡安家落户的中资企业大多经营进出口贸易，它们以汉堡为基地，与欧洲和德国进行贸易往来，譬如宝钢、中钢、正

The range of goods being traded is very large in the case of the import and export companies. However, the emphasis tends to be on the chemical industry, electronics products and consumer goods. Furthermore, a growing number of companies is part of the logistics services industry. In addition to shipping lines such as Cosco, China Shipping or Sinotrans, more and more medium-sized logistics services companies are coming to Hamburg.

The first companies to come to Hamburg in the 1980s were state enterprises. Nowadays private companies are in the majority. To date these have mainly been small branches of important parent companies, but we are seeing that the size of companies is increasing, and that they are chalking up an increasingly large turnover in their Hamburg branches.

Chinese companies may decide in favour of Hamburg, but surely Hamburg is also interested in encouraging Chinese companies to come to the city. What is the significance of Chinese businesses for the economy of the Hamburg metropolitan area?

You are right, the advantages are mutual, of course. In recent years the port in Hamburg has grown on average by just about 13 per cent. It is a success story which would be inconceivable without the contribution made by our Chinese partners. Chinese companies use the port as the gateway to European markets and in doing so make use of numerous Hamburg logistics services providers. The large Chinese companies such as Cosco or China Shipping have each created far more than 150 jobs in their European central offices. Here we see a great deal of development potential, and in the years ahead we are expecting an increase in the number of jobs which are directly or indirectly created by Chinese entrepreneurs.

Furthermore, the activities of foreign and, of course, Chinese companies in Hamburg naturally has a positive effect on other sectors of the economy such as services, housing and property, and financial services. And this has a positive influence on the economic development of the Hamburg metropolitan region.

It looks as if the conditions in Hamburg for getting off to a good start are just right. However, one is bound to encounter certain difficulties when one embarks on something new in completely unfamiliar surroundings. What in your opinion are the most frequent difficulties with which Chinese companies are confronted in this situation?

泰，以及厦门华侨电子股份有限公司的子公司——厦华电子有限公司。许多公司都将其欧洲总部设立在汉堡，利用汉堡这个大门挺进欧洲，首先是北欧、东欧和中欧的市场。

来往于汉堡和中国的进出口产品种类繁多，其主要组成部分是化工产品，电子产品以及消费用品。另外，经营物流运输业的企业数量也日渐增多，有如中远集团、中国航运、中国外运等等海运公司，以及一些中小型的物流公司也愈来愈多地到汉堡来寻求发展。

上世纪八十年代最早落户汉堡的中资公司均为国有企业，而后来进入汉堡的中资公司则大多为民营企业。虽说它们仅仅是母公司的小小分支，然而，据我们的观察，这些公司们始终未断增长，它们经由汉堡分支产生的营业额也与日俱增。

中资公司“投奔”汉堡，而汉堡肯定也“何乐不为”，惠助中资公司到这里安家落户。请问中国方面到汉堡投资办企对该地区的经济发展有何重要意义?

您说得没错，双方互利互惠，各有好处。在过去的几年中，汉堡港的年平均增长幅度几乎高达到13%，倘若没有中国这个合作伙伴的介入和贡献，这个增长速度可谓是无法想象。中资企业在把汉堡港作为进入欧洲市场跳板的同时，也需用当地各种物流部门和行业的服务。以两大中资企业中远集团和中国航运为例，他们设立在汉堡的欧洲总部就分别创造了150多个就业机会，且潜力巨大，预期在未来的几年里，汉堡将会直接或间接地因为中国公司的原因，而产生更多的就业机会。

Containership in the port of Hamburg – 汉堡港口的远洋货轮

The most frequent difficulties that confront Chinese companies in Germany are of a practical nature. The following questions arise. How can I set up a subsidiary or a branch of my company in Germany? Which legal form should I select for my company? What is the legal and taxation framework? What do I have to comply with in regard to residence and work permits? How can I find suitable office, storage and production space, and how do I find the right kind of employees?

Other teething problems frequently come about as a result of the notorious "cultural differences." These become apparent, for example, when Chinese companies transfer their business methods and business model, which were a complete success in China, to Germany lock, stock and barrel. This pertains to things such as product design, market cultivation and communication, but also management and human resources. For example, in the vast majority of cases marketing a product in Germany is usually quite different to the way it is done in China. Furthermore, German staff, in contrast to Chinese employees, are used to a considerably more open and flexible leadership style which gives the individual more personal responsibility and decision-making powers.

How can an organization such as HWF help people to overcome these teething problems or, to put it in more general terms, how can it support Chinese companies which are proposing to invest in Germany?

In this context organizations for the promotion of business such as HWF are the first contact point for all foreign companies which would like to set up a subsidiary or a representative office in Germany, and in our case the Hamburg metropolitan region. HWF, for example, begins to provide its services in China. We have two office – in Shanghai and in Hong Kong – where the staff can be contacted by companies which are interested in what we have to offer, which initially is fairly simple and noncommittal information. The next step is that organizations such as ours arrange for visa invitations, for example, which are needed for applications for a business travel visa that will enable the manager entrusted with the project to visit Germany or Hamburg for the first time.

What – taking HWF as an example – is the next specific advisory step?

In the framework of the first visit to Germany – and if necessary prior to it – we supply the Chinese company with comprehensive introductory information on all the questions which will arise in connection with the foundation of a subsidiary or a branch of the parent company. We give advice on the legal and taxation

不仅如此，外资企业，自然包括中资企业在内的投资经商活动，也将给汉堡地区的其它经济行业，譬如整个服务行业、房地产行业，以及财政经济行业等等带来诸多积极的影响，继而可推动整个汉堡地区的经济发展。

如此看来，汉堡具备着外资企业在这里成功投资开业的良好先决条件。尽管如此，在一个全然陌生的新环境里经商创业，难免会遭遇许多意想不到的困难。您认为，中资企业最常遭遇的困难有那些?

中资企业在德国开办公司最常遭遇的困难首先是些十分现实的实际操作问题。譬如，如何为我的母公司在德国建立一个子公司或分支机构？应该选择一种怎样的公司形式？当地的法律和税务的框架条件是什么？如何申办居留签证和劳务许可？如何寻找合适的办公室、库房或生产场地？如何选聘理想的工作人员？

接下来的难题始之于被常常引用的"文化差异"方面。譬如当中资公司将自己在国内卓有成效的业务行为，商业模式、一对一地套用照搬到德国，具体而言，牵涉到产品设计、市场营销、交往通讯，直至企业管理和人事管理等诸多方面。德国的市场营销方式在大多数情况下，绝然不同于中国的市场营销方式。德国员工的管理也非同于中国员工的管理。前者更习惯于开放和灵活的管理风格，即老板须给予属下员工更多自主自决的工作空间。

请问像贵局这样一个经济促进机构能够为解决所谓的启动困难，或者宽泛地说，为那些欲投资德国的中国企业提供那些具体的咨询和帮助?

类似HWF这样的经济促进机构，旨在协助所有欲投资德国，具体到我们公司，即协助所有欲在汉堡建立子公司、分支机构或办事处的外资企业成功有效地迈出第一步。HWF的咨询服务始之于中国：我们在上海和香港分别设置了两个办事处，那里的员工将首先为有兴趣到德国投资的中国企业无偿提供简明扼要的前期咨询。接下来，我们将为初次来德国抑或来汉堡访问考察的负责经理出具申办商旅签证时所必需的邀请函。

framework, and arrange for meetings with lawyers and accountants who are specialists in this area and can provide more detailed advice.

We provide them with an estimate of what the cost of their activities is likely to be, and information about various general aspects of life in Hamburg. Our property service helps companies to find suitable offices, as well as storage and production space. Furthermore, we help them to find qualified staff and can put them in touch with experienced human resources services companies.

Incidentally, one of the most important pieces of advice that we give to Chinese companies which have decided to come to Germany for the first time is that they should hire German employees, ideally from the same sector, as soon as possible. A German employee, especially one with the right business background, is familiar with the way people do business here, knows the German mentality, possesses linguistic competence, which is particularly important when contacting customers, and in this way can help to prevent "cultural misunderstandings."

We also offer advice and support with regard to the necessary residence and work permits. Very important in this connection is the fact that the services of HWF are strictly confidential and completely free.

Nowadays many German regions concentrate their business subsidies on certain specific business sectors. Does Hamburg have such specific sectors, and, if so, does HWF offer any corresponding services?

In certain sectors, especially the media and IT, aerospace, logistics and life sciences, we offer the companies which we are dealing with – in conjunction with the initiatives which exist in Hamburg precisely for these segments – detailed sector-specific advice and access to comprehensive sectoral networks.

HWF support is not restricted to the initial set-up phase. We subsequently continue to be a contact point for companies which have chosen the metropolitan region for their operations. Providing support for companies which are already here is very important for HWF.

This means that we are willing to help companies as they struggle to overcome the teething difficulties or "cultural differences" alluded to earlier. For example, together with our Hamburg partners we regularly arrange a series of meetings, the "China Info Forum," in which we inform Chinese companies that are already here in Hamburg about business topics that might be of interest to them such as

接下来呢？HWF下一步将会做出怎样的具体咨询？

下一步我们将向初次到德国考察访问的中国企业——必要时在他们尚未出访之前——提供大量的关于如何在德国建立子公司或分公司的第一手情报和资料。譬如，帮助他们了解当地的法律和税务的框架条件，并为其进一步的详细咨询，联系相关领域专业的律师和税务师事务所；使他们对自己在汉堡投资创业所必需的经费数额，以及在汉堡生活的方方面面心中有数；通过我们的房地产服务帮助他们寻找合适的办公室、库房、以及生产场地；提供有经验的人才服务公司地址，协助他们寻找合适的当地员工。

在此，我们极力建议初来乍到的中国公司，尽快地聘雇本土的德国籍员工，最好是来自对口的行业。这是因为德国籍员工，尤其是一个有专业背景的德国籍员工，不仅熟悉本土的日常生意往来，游戏规则，了解德国人的心态，而且没有语言障碍——这在与客户打交道的时候十分重要，可以避免"文化误解"。

在申办居留签证和劳务许可时，我们也将给予必要的咨询和帮助。此外，我们HWF汉堡经济促进局在提供咨询服务时，对外严格保密，且不收任何费用。

眼下，有不少德国城市和地区把对引资招商的经济促进惠助集中到一些重点工商项目。汉堡也有类似的投资侧重吗？HWF也提供相应的咨询服务吗？

在某些行业中，尤其是传媒、IT、航空、物流运输以及生命科学等行业，我们与在汉堡的相关行业协会合作，为我们的客户提供详尽的业内咨询服务，连接上四通八达的行业网络。

employment legislation, marketing and advertising, taxes, human resources, or mergers and acquisitions.

Are even more companies from China going to put down roots here?

With regard to the prospects for the future, I am banking on an ongoing positive trend in Sino-German cooperation, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. When we compare today's enquiries and the companies being set up with those of 20 years ago, we come to the conclusion that there has been a marked change in quality. The managers have been adroitly prepared for their work abroad, have the necessary language skills, and possess a thorough knowledge of the market conditions and opportunities on the German and the European markets. On top of this there is the fact that entrepreneurs nowadays select their locations in Germany very precisely. They compare different cities. Despite growing competition from other locations, Hamburg is considered to be a very central and strategically important location for the establishment of a European business. For this reason China will in future continue to be of very great importance for HWF and its work. ■

此外，HWF的咨询服务不仅只停留于安设公司的初期阶段，我们将是中资企业落户汉堡之后的联络人。汉堡经济促进局十分重视对已落户外资企业的跟踪服务。

帮助外资企业克服开头提及的“文化差异”，也是我们公司跟踪服务的重要内容之一。与汉堡的其他合作伙伴一起，我们定时定期合作举办“汉堡中资企业资讯论坛”，期望通过类似的咨询方式，为 “已定居”在汉堡的中资企业就他们所关心的问题，譬如劳工法、市场营销、广告、税务、人事抑或并购等等事宜给予解答和帮助。

您怎样评断中国公司在德国的前景？

展望未来，德中两国之间的合作前景灿烂，无论在数量上还是质量上都将继续发展上升。与二十年前相比，我们可以相当肯定地说，于今到德国办公司求发展的中资企业发生了巨大的质变。进驻国外的业务经理准备充足，外语能力强，且对德国和欧洲的市场走向相当了解。他们比较权衡各个城市，有目标地寻找自己的投资地点。尽管有日趋增多的竞争对手，对开拓欧洲商务而言，汉堡作为极其重要的的战略性投资中心的地位，仍然无可替代。而对HWF而言，中国也一如既往是未来的工作重心。■

HWF

HWF Hamburg Business Development Corporation is the service partner and main contact for any company wanting to expand, restructure or relocate in the Greater Hamburg Region. The HWF sees its role as a pilot who guides business interests through the "jungle" of public authorities and institutions.

汉堡经济促进局

汉堡经济促进局是所有计划在汉堡地区开设、拓展或重组企业业务的国内外公司的服务伙伴和中心接待处，我们的任务是为企业“导航”，在国家管理机构和组织面前为企业界说话。

Minmetals Germany

From Buyer to Seller in Düsseldorf

德国五矿有限公司
MINMETALS GERMANY GMBH

德国五矿有限公司

在杜塞尔多夫由买方变为卖方

The Corporation's Four Development Periods

The Minmetals trading company was set up in Beijing in 1950 shortly after the foundation of the People's Republic as a state-owned enterprise called "China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation."

The development of the company reflects the development of the Chinese economy as a whole. Both processes went through four different phases.

In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the 1970s, Minmetals was one of the ten foreign trading companies which dealt with the whole of China's foreign trade. Minmetals possessed the monopoly for trade with metals and minerals. However, in those days the size of the business was still very small and was restricted to two core tasks: On the one hand, it had to purchase steel products for the Chinese economy, though on account of its low foreign reserves Beijing issued orders that imports were to be restricted to what was absolutely necessary. On the other hand, Minmetals exported and sold natural resources and minerals on the world market. In those days the country did not produce many competitive finished goods. Even if business during this early period was still rather limited, the company at least managed to garner its first international experiences. In Germany its trading partners were companies such as Mannesmann, Thyssen and Krupp (still separate entities in those days).

The second phase in the development of Minmetals began in 1978 concurrently with the economic reforms introduced by the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Xiaoping Deng. These led to the opening of the first representative offices abroad and thus to a significant increase in foreign trade. In the third phase, which began in 1984 with more political reforms, the representative offices were transformed into legally independent foreign subsidiaries. In those days the staff at the subsidiaries still came primarily from China. The fourth phase began

企业发展的四个阶段

中国五矿集团公司在新中国成立后不久，于1950年以国有企业集团的形式在北京成立，全称为“中国五金矿产进出口公司”。

它的企业发展历史也恰恰折射出了中国总体经济发展历程。无论是企业的还是国家的发展都经历了四个不同时期。

第一阶段截止到七十年代末。这一时期五矿是中国十家综合型外贸公司之一，它垄断了金属和矿产贸易。但当时企业的经营范围还非常狭窄，仅限于开展两项核心业务：其一是为国内的经济发展采购钢产品。由于当时外汇紧缺，因此只有在最必需的时候，政府才会下令进口。与此同时，五矿向世界市场出口的主要是原材料和矿产，而具有竞争力的产成品在当时的中国几乎生产不出来。尽管五矿的业务范围在早期受到了严格制约，但企业还是积累起了最初的国际经验，包括在德国与曼内斯曼，蒂森或克虏伯（当时尚未合并）这样的贸易伙伴进行商务往来。

五矿的第二个发展阶段于1978年与中共中央副主席邓小平倡导的经济改革同时拉开序幕。这一时期它在海外开设了第一批代表处，走出了国际贸易中意义非凡的一步。1984年，随着更多政治改革措施的引入，在第三阶段的发展中，这些代表处得以真正转变为独立营销

in 1992, when China's government ended the "phase of corrections" and declared that it was introducing a socialist market economy. The subsidiaries started to employ more and more local staff and the corporate strategy was no longer based exclusively on the needs of the Chinese government, but on the notion of operational success. This case study examines the consequences for the organizational structure and the management of a Chinese company in Germany.

Minmetals is still the largest Chinese trading company for steel, metal, ore and coal, and continues to be under the control of the central government in Beijing. However, the opening of the markets and the abolition of the monopoly for steel trading – new enterprises such as the Chinese steel corporation Baosteel have ramped up their own sales organizations – prompted the corporation to rethink its strategy. Minmetals subsequently developed into a diversified resources corporation which has acquired stakes in important mines and purveyors of raw materials in virtually all of the world's important resources markets and is able to construct complete metallurgical plants costing up to 100 million euros and more. Recently the Minmetals subsidiary "Beijing Minmetals Tenglong Information and Technology Corporation" has also started to manufacture computer hardware and, as is also typical of other Chinese enterprises, is involved in the financial and property sectors. In other words, the company, which in 2004 was renamed "China Minmetals Corporation," is a diversified multi-national global player which has added new businesses to its core activities of trading in, mining and refining natural resources.

The strategy seems to be succeeding. In 2004 Minmetals had a turnover of just on15.5 billion US dollars, and in 2007 was able to increase this by more than 40 per cent to about 21.8 billion US dollars. Currently the company has slightly more 33,000 employees and "Fortune" ranks it as the 11th of China's "Top 500" corporations. In the global "Fortune 500" ranking it has reached the 435th place. And rightly so, for since the 1980s the company has pursued a consistent strategy of internationalization. It has bought shares in mines and in mining and production sites, and is expanding its presence abroad by opening new branches. In 2006 the corporation partly or wholly owned 168 enterprises in China and 44 elsewhere in the world. According to corporate sources, 24 per cent of its turnover comes from outside China – a remarkable quota when one compares it to similar Chinese companies.

的海外子公司。当时这些子公司的工作人员绝大多数仍来自中国。第四阶段始于1992年，当时中国政府刚刚结束了“调整时期”，并宣布引入社会主义市场经济体制。由此，海外子公司开始提高员工本地化程度，同时企业经营战略也不再仅限于满足中国政府的需要，而是转为获取企业经济效益的最大化。这个案例说明了上述变化给一家设在德国的中国公司在组织结构和管理上带来了怎样的影响。

五矿集团时至今日仍是中国最大的经营钢铁，金属、矿产品和煤炭的贸易公司，并仍隶属于北京的中央政府。但市场的不断开放，和对钢铁贸易行业垄断的取消——一些新企业如中国宝钢集团公司就建立了自己的销售机构，促使企业从根本上转变了思想。五矿集团正在发展成为一个多元化的原材料企业集团，它通过在全世界几乎所有重要原材料市场上参股而保障了重要矿产资源可为中国所用。同时五矿集团已发展为成套冶金设备供应商，其产品价格甚至可以高达上亿。不久前，五矿集团的一个子公司，北京五矿腾龙信息技术有限公司也开始生产计算机硬件，并且——象其它中国企业一样，活跃在金融和房地产领域。换句话说：这家2004年更名为“中国五矿集团”的企业是一家多元化的跨国企业，它在主营业务原材料贸易、开采及加工之外又拓展了新的业务领域。

这一战略看起来正在开花结果：2004年，集团公司的总经营额为155亿美元。2007年增长至218亿美元，涨幅超过40%。企业员工现阶段接近33000名，并在《财富》杂志的中国企业500强排行榜中名列第11，在同名世界排行榜“财富500强”中名列第435。准确的说，自从80年代以来，五矿集团始终坚定地执行国际化战略：参股矿山、开采和生产基地，并通过在海外设立子公司来扩展其覆盖面。截止2006年，五矿集团在国内20个省区建有168家全资或合资企业，在世界主要国家和地区设有44家

The Rhine metropolis Düsseldorf – 莱茵河畔的杜塞尔多夫

From the First Representative Office to a Private Limited Company

Minmetals opened its first office in Germany as early as 1980. In those days it was one of the first Chinese companies to embark on such a step.

The decision to locate in Düsseldorf was taken because the large German steelmakers have their corporate headquarters here and in the vicinity, and delegations from the company were familiar with the city on the Rhine from earlier business trips. Düsseldorf for its part could look back on very positive experiences with the location of Japanese companies, and was very much interested in a repeat performance with Chinese corporations. Therefore the heads of Chinese delegations were welcomed by "the municipal authority for economic development . . .which helped in all sorts of ways," as a member of Minmetals' staff put it. The German steel corporations were also very eager to help inasmuch as they were in any case planning to expand their businesses in China at the time and were thus very interested in being on good terms with one of the leading Chinese state-owned enterprises.

The efforts being made by the capital of North Rhine-Westphalia and the local steel corporations on behalf of the Chinese became apparent in 1986 when Minmetals was planning to establish its first subsidiary and looking for a suitable property. Düsseldorf sold the corporation a municipal site in the city centre which had been selected and proposed by the then Mannesmann AG. There were offices on the first three floors of the new "Minmetals Germany GmbH" building, and on the floors above them there were apartments for the Chinese staff. During the first phase of Minmetals' presence in Germany the staff of the company came almost exclusively from China, and most of them could hardly speak German. For this reason it seemed a good idea to provide lodgings for such employees so that, even though they were "abroad," they could none the less live together in a community. At the time the company employed German

海外企业。据企业自己调查统计，其24%的销售额来自海外——这一比例在同类中国企业中十分突出。

从第一家代表处到海外子公司

早在1980年，五矿就设立了第一家驻德代表处，从而成为最早敢于迈出这一步的中国企业之一。

地点最终选定了杜塞尔多夫，除了因为很多大型钢铁生产企业都将其集团总部设在杜赛尔多夫及周边地区之外，也因为企业代表团以前出差时就认识了这个莱茵地区的大都市。另一方面，杜塞尔多夫在将自身建设成为日本企业聚居地的过程中，已经积累起了大量成功经验，并有意将这一成果在中国企业中发扬光大。有鉴于此，正像一位五矿员工说的那样："市政府的经济促进局"公开为中国代表团负责人们"提供了大力支持"。德国的钢铁企业也非常合作，加之它们当时就已有意将业务扩展到中国，因此很有兴趣同中国行业领先的国有企业进行接洽。

当1986年，五矿寻觅合适的地点建立他们的第一家子公司时，这个州首府和驻扎在周边的钢铁企业集团向中国人显示出了他们的诚意：杜塞尔多夫市政府向企业售出了市中心的一幢市政建筑，这是由当时的曼内斯曼股份公司介绍和挑选的。这栋建筑的下三层用作新成立的德国五矿有限公司的办公用房，上面几层是为中国员工建造的企业旅馆。将员工安排在企业自己的旅馆居住在当时是出于现实考虑的：在五矿来德国发展的第一阶段中，几乎所有员工都来自中国，大部分人都没有多少德语知识。因此，企业为员工就近安排了这样一个

staff only where it was absolutely necessary in order to be able to communicate with its environment. Examples of this were answering the telephone or dealing with the authorities, the internal revenue, etc. Thus Chinese expatriates, even in daily business life, did not have many opportunities to meet German people. One interface even in those days was an interpreter for Chinese. A member of the German staff, she helped with the frequent linguistic problems, and looked after people sent out from China, most of whom had no knowledge whatsoever of foreign countries, helping them to find their bearings in and to get used to their new environment.

Now that the German subsidiary was a GmbH (Ltd.), it was possible to do business on the basis of German law without, as had hitherto been the case, first referring to headquarters in China. Such procedures were the reason why trading from Germany was a rather complicated affair. Minmetals had at last put itself in a position to set up the infrastructure in Germany, to expand its trading activities, and thus to gain a better foothold in the German market. Purchasing German iron and steel products for the Chinese market could now be organized directly in the country where they were made.

As a result of the incipient economic boom in China the volume of trade increased and the demand for high quality products continued to rise.

Strategic Positioning as a Global Player

However, selling Chinese steel products in Germany still played a rather minor role at the time, even though the quality of Chinese metals and mineral resources gradually improved and began to edge up into the middle segment. China began increasingly to process its natural resources itself, and to expand its range of finished steel products. Domestic demand was very high and production facilities were insufficient, which made it impossible to serve foreign markets at the same time. There were no suitable marketing strategies which might have made it possible to increase exports of these products. The international management experience of the Chinese sales staff was limited and deliveries were impeded by the fact that items had to be procured from suppliers scattered all over the huge country. The long and complicated communications and procedural routes to a Chinese manufacturer kept leading to delays.

At the headquarters in Beijing people were aware of the fact that there was a need for action, but several years were to elapse before decisive steps towards reposi-

住处，使得大家在陌生的大环境下还可以一起过集体生活。由于当初公司只在一些需要与外界进行交流的岗位上雇用德国员工——比如电话服务，或与财政局等官方机构进行联络，因此中国的外派员工在工作中几乎没有机会和德国人建立联系。当时就已由德国员工担任的一个联络性工作就是中文翻译：翻译员不仅要帮助公司解决经常出现的语言问题，也要照管那些通常缺乏海外经验的中国外派员工，为他们了解和适应这个新环境提供支持。

五矿德国子公司的法律形式为有限责任公司，它可以根据德国的法律开展交易业务并缔结合同，而不需要向原来那样必须先向总部请示。那套复杂的流程给此前在德国进行的贸易工作增加了不少难度。通过成立子公司，五矿为在德国扩建基础设施、拓展贸易业务，从而更好地在德国市场站稳脚跟创造了前提条件。同时，中国也可以直接在原产地对钢铁产品的采购进行调控，使之更好地适应国内需求。

由于当时中国经济正在开始蓬勃发展，因此对高质量产品的需求和贸易额也与日俱增。

国际化企业的战略定位

尽管中国金属和矿产原材料的质量日益提高，并已打入中层市场，但相对于从德国进口这项主业来说，将中国的钢产品销往德国的业务当时还处于次要地位。与原先不同的是，中国越来越多地自己进行原材料再加工，这样就使得成品钢铁制品品种更加齐全，在当时内需强劲的情况下，生产能力还无法供应国外市场。然而要想扩大产品的出口，当时的中国企业还欠缺一项合适的市场营销战略；中国销售商的国际管理经验比较匮乏，供货渠道有限，加之货物必须先从分布在全国各地的供货商处订购，与中国生产商之间冗长而复杂的沟通和运作链条一再拖延了中国生产商的前进步伐。

tioning these organizational structures were initiated. President Gengshu Miao finally paved the way for change and enabled Minmetals to jettison its bureaucratic structures and become a corporation which espoused normal business principles. When Zhongshu Zhou became his successor in 2004 he continued to pursue the same strategy. For one thing Minmetals changed its human resources strategy: It decided that in future it would send fewer Chinese managers to Germany, though those it sent needed to have good qualifications for international trade. On the other hand, it intended to appoint more German executives and to enlarge their competences step by step.

The reorganization also meant that a sales division was added to complement the hitherto predominant purchasing division, and this necessitated a considerable change in the corporate structure. Years earlier and with great foresight the then president Genshu Miao had chosen and prepared for this task the current president of the Düsseldorf subsidiary, Gang Han. In 2003 the then 34-year-old, who still adheres to his maxim "shorten the path to the customer," was appointed head of German operations by the Beijing headquarters. This appointment demonstrates that the repositioning of the corporation was planned on a long-term basis and had the support of top executives.

New Approach to Human Resources

Gang Han began in a systematic way to appoint suitable employees from Germany and other countries, and to expand their competences on an ongoing basis. Selection criteria, especially for executives, were far-reaching experience and a corresponding reputation in the industry, and a willingness for above-average commitment. Knowledge of China was not a precondition. In exchange Minmetals offered good compensation, a secure job, good career prospects in an up-and-coming corporation and responsibility for a large operational area.

In January 2007 Wolfgang Pentzek was the first German employee to be accorded full power of attorney. Other German executives subsequently received the same rights. Until 2004 the majority of the workforce continued to be Chinese (ten employees were Chinese, and five of local origin). In the years that followed this proportion gradually changed. In 2008 twelve Chinese employees were working together with 13 German colleagues. Minmetals Germany has now moved on and no longer only sends over Chinese staff from its Beijing headquarters to Germany, but also recruits Chinese people living in Germany. It currently employs five Chinese employees who were recruited via advertisements in Chinese media published in Germany. The practice of recruiting Chinese people who live in Germany

北京的总部意识到了这种运作需求，但这种情况还是要持续一些年，直到企业迈出组织结构重新定位这决定性的一步。集团总裁苗耕书着手革除五矿的官僚架构，使其成为一个顺应市场的经济实体。2004年，当他的接班人周中枢当选为总裁后，延续了这一改革。人事战略的革新是其中之一：他要在未来减少派往德国的员工人数，但这些人必须是熟悉国际业务、受过良好培训的中国经理人；相反，企业要更多地聘用德国本土的管理人员，并逐步扩大他们的职能范围。

这样的结构重组，为此前一直以采购为主导的业务范围向销售业务方向拓展铺平了道路，而这种业务拓展也正需要企业结构的重大调整。为了完成这项任务，时任五矿集团总裁的苗耕书在几年前就已极具远见地挑选并培养了杜塞尔多夫子公司的现任总经理——韩刚。2003年，时年34岁的韩刚，被北京总部委任为新一任德国主管。他奉行至今的座右铭是"缩短通往客户的道路"。这次人事变动显示，企业的新定位是经过长期酝酿，并由最高领导执行的。

人事政策的新道路

韩刚开始了有系统地录用合适的德籍和外籍员工，并不断扩大他们的权限。特别针对管理人员的选择标准是：拥有丰富的行业内经验及相应的声望，并已做好全力以赴投入工作的准备。与中国相关的经验并非前提条件。作为回报，五矿可以为他们提供优厚的报酬、稳定的工作岗位、在这个蓬勃发展的企业里良好的发展前途以及宽广的发展空间。

2007年1月，沃尔夫冈·潘在克成为了第一位被授予全权代理权的德籍员工，此后更多的德国领导者也被授予了这项权力。到2004年，中国员工还占多数（10位来自中国，5位来自当地）。但这一比例在接下去的一段时间

is new and still the exception rather than the rule in Chinese companies. In the past state-owned enterprises were in fact forbidden to employ such people. As a result of this new human resources strategy the workforce now consists of three distinct groups: There are Chinese employees sent out from Beijing, Chinese people who live or were born in Germany, and Germans. In addition to the tensions which normally arise between expatriates and local employees, there are now two additional areas of potential conflict, that is, between the two discrete Chinese groups, and between Germans and Chinese people who live in Germany. The "new" group of employees is still faced with the task of defining its role in the company.

> An important advantage enjoyed by "bi-cultural" Chinese employees is that they are able to speak German and are wholly familiar with the local lifestyle. Thus they can act as intermediaries between the two cultures.

On the other hand, they have lost touch with their homeland and, unlike their expatriate Chinese colleagues, have not experienced the Minmetals corporate culture in China at first hand. At home the company does not recruit highly qualified staff via adverts or applications, but largely via universities. Minmetals selects suitable candidates from among a hundred graduates of elite universities on the basis of extensive aptitude tests.

The employees of Minmetals are very loyal to their company. Nevertheless their willingness to go abroad for the company is declining. There are various reasons for this: Nowadays careers with the appropriate compensation can also be made in China, where the standard of living keeps rising. Family problems can also be a big drawback. Spouses may have well-paid jobs which they are unwilling to give up. And if there are children, there is always the problem of finding a school for them after the family has moved abroad. If expatriates have left their families back in China, their thoughts are quite understandably back home and they are preoccupied with when they will return. Thus the trend is to let local employees deal with most of the operational business in Germany. Customer relations and the inner organization of the company are in any case exclusively in the hands of German staff. The function of communicating with headquarters or suppliers is performed by Chinese expatriates who are increasingly being supported by young Chinese employees of local origin. In this way the corporation is developing the next generation of employees who are home in both cultures. The strategic decision-making and coordination with the overall strategy defined at the corporate headquarters is carried out by managers from China, who by now have been integrated to a far greater extent into their German surroundings.

里逐渐发生了改变：2008年，12位中国员工与13位德国员工一起工作。与此同时，德国五矿不再仅仅从北京总部派遣中国员工来德工作，而且也开始雇用在德国生活的中国人。目前已有五位中国员工是在看到德国中文媒体上的广告后应聘来到德国五矿工作的。雇用在德国生活的中国人，这种做法是全新的，在中国企业中并不常见，早先在国有企业中甚至是被禁止的。在这种新的人事战略指引下，企业中出现了三个员工群体：北京总部派出的中国员工、在德国出生或生活的中国员工以及德国本土员工。除了通常的外派人员和本土员工之间的紧张区域外，现在又增加了两个新的紧张区域：总部派驻人员和在德国生活的中国人之间以及德国本地员工和在德国生活的中国人之间。这就要求这些在德国招聘的中国员工必须先找准自己在公司的定位。

> 这种具有"双元文化"背景的中国人，其主要优势不仅在于他们掌握德语知识，更重要的是他们熟悉这里的生活环境，因而能在两种不同的文化之间起到桥梁和纽带的作用。

但是另一方面，他们由于长期生活在国外，对自己的家乡已经陌生，而且也没有像派驻德国的中国同事那样熟悉中国五矿的企业文化。中国五矿很少通过广告招募高学历员工，而主要是到高校去募集人才：五矿通过对候选人进行全面的能力测试，从上百名重点大学毕业生中挑选一个合适的人录用。

五矿的员工对他们的企业非常忠诚。尽管如此，愿意为公司而远赴海外的人还是越来越少；这当然有多方面的原因：其一是这几年来在中国也可以找到类似收入的工作，而且生活质量在不断提高。其二家庭方面的原因也是一个巨大障碍：通常他们的配偶也有一份不错的工作，不愿放弃。再加上孩子，出国之后他们要面临教育问题。如果外派员工把家留在中

Chinese executives now learn German and no longer live as they used to do in company apartments, but individually and in a normal German environment.

This modification of the human resources structure makes it all the more important to develop a strong common corporate culture. A fundamental feature is to understand and respect cultural differences. For example, German workers are sometimes puzzled by the whys and wherefores of Chinese decision-making and the associated hierarchical structures. In Sino-German systems it is also sometimes difficult to align hierarchical ranks because the assignment of titles, functions and areas of responsibility is so significantly different in the two countries. Seemingly rather banal, though typical of what the consequences of such cultural differences can be is the ranking on telephone lists. Since titles are interpreted differently in both cultures, this sometimes leads to irritation within and without the company. Another cultural difference becomes apparent when there are differences of opinion. In contrast to the rather typical German habit of carrying on until everything is out in the open, Chinese executives often break off a heated discussion abruptly and meet for dinner later on in order to talk about the contentious issues in a less formal context. Even if the two sides occasionally find each other's customs and habits rather disconcerting, there are some differences for which people are very grateful. For example, the Chinese bonus system dispenses generous stepped bonuses depending on how successful the company, the division and an individual have been.

国，那么他们理所当然地就会牵挂家乡，关心回国事宜。有鉴于此，德国的日常业务几乎完全由本地员工来开展已经成为大势所趋了。客户服务和内部组织早已交给德国员工管理，与总部或供货商进行沟通的工作由外派中国员工担任，并越来越多地由掌握中文的当地中国员工承担；集团发展了一批在两种文化中都能如鱼得水的后备力量。战略方针的制定并将其与总部的总体战略进行协调，仍然由中国派遣的管理人员负责，但他们也已融入了德国的生活：

管理人员开始学习德语，而且不再像以前那样住在企业自己的公寓里，而是单独搬到了普通的德国环境中。

这种人员结构上的变化对一个强健的共同企业文化的发展提出了很高的要求。而这种共同企业文化的基础是对文化差异的认识和考虑：比如德国员工对于中国式的决策方法和相关的等级结构并不总是完全理解。也有些时候，在中德双元系统中，很难协调好彼此的等级和头衔，这也是因为两国的头衔、职能和责任范围的体系存在巨大差异。比如电话列表上的等级顺序就是一个看似平平无奇、却非常能够说明这种文化差异所产生后果的例子：因为双方对于职务头衔的理解不同，有时会导致在公司内外发生一些不愉快。另一种文化差异表现在发生意见分歧的时候：通常德国式的做法是把问题讨论清楚，但与此相反，中国人却经常中止热火朝天的讨论，以便稍候共进晚餐的时候，在轻松随意的气氛下再继续讨论这个有争议的话题。尽管双方偶尔会对对方的风俗习惯感到不适应，但也有一些不同之处会令人欣然接受：比如中国的奖金体系是按照企业、部门和个人的成果划分等级的，较之德国的奖金补贴优厚许多。

Sino-German Cooperation as the Basis for Internationalization

The company's decision to delegate more responsibility to the German subsidiary and, in keeping with the specific demands of the local market, to permit it to act on a largely independent basis is accompanied by an occasionally painful loss of control on the part of headquarters in Beijing. As their decision-making freedom increases, German executives are beginning to communicate directly with headquarters in Beijing without the help of a Chinese colleague. Here German brashness often comes up against Chinese reticence and reserve. Since they are not familiar with the foreign culture and do not know the colleague concerned personally, this is where both sides need to keep on learning. And in order to accelerate this process, Minmetals Germany pursues a strictly "open door" policy. Everyone has access to everyone else, and discussions are candid and to the point.

> It is not a question of whether or not the German or the Chinese view gains the upper hand. The more convincing argument and technical competence are the things which really matter.

The executive leadership of Minmetals knows that such adaptation processes take a long time. The Germans can all too easily interpret Chinese placidity, caution and courtesy as decision-making weakness, whereas German assertiveness and effectiveness can be interpreted as arrogance and rashness. Even during the short time in which the new system has been in operation it has become apparent that open communication supports and accelerates the adaptation process. Minmetals has introduced a number of measures designed to promote such open communication and mutual understanding. They include such things as meetings of Chinese and local employees, or company parties and joint outings with partners and children which give employees the opportunity to get to know each other in their spare time. In addition to events of this kind Minmetals attaches great importance to joint ways of dealing with conflict situations.

Minmetals is not primarily motivated by short-term or medium-term goals such as profit maximization, but places its faith in a forward-looking and long-term alignment. The strategy espoused at the corporate headquarters has set its sights quite clearly on internationalization, which, as the president of the Düsseldorf subsidiary, Gang Han, puts it, signifies "adaptation to the global market, but also to world culture." As the company sees it, its survival depends on whether or not the strategy to internationalize and localize simultaneously, that is, to prosper

中德双方的协力合作是国际化的基础

放手让德国子公司承担更多责任，并在很大程度上独立应对当地市场特殊要求的决策，也会使北京总部对子公司的控制权有所削弱，这有时也是一件痛苦的事。随着决策自由度的增加，德国管理人员越来越多地直接和北京总部进行交流，而不再知会他们的中方同事。这时，德国式的直接就遭遇中国式的含蓄了。双方既不了解对方文化，又不认识对方同事本人，这时就需要为此好好学习一下了。为了加快学习进度，德国五矿制定了严格的"门户开放"政策。每个人都能和其他人畅通无阻的沟通，任何问题的讨论都是公开而客观的。

> 这里并不是说，应该采用德国的还是中国的观点，而关键是要看谁能拿出更有说服力的论据和专业知识。

五矿的领导们深知，这样的协调过程是长期的。中国式的冷静、深思熟虑以及礼貌很容易被德国人视为决策上的弱点，反之德国人的执行力和高效会被中国人当成骄傲自大和轻率鲁莽。这套新体系尽管只运作了较短时间，但已显示出，开放的沟通方式有力地支持和加快了双方的磨合过程。为了促进这种公开的交流并加深相互理解，德国五矿采取了一些措施。比如召开中德员工会议或举办可携带生活伴侣及孩子出席的企业节日和集体郊游活动等。这样的活动促进了职工们在工作之余，有更多的私人交往和了解。除了这些活动之外，在双方发生摩擦的时候举办一些社交活动也是大有裨益的。

五矿不以利润最大化之类的中短期目标为指导方针，而是始终坚持可持续的长期发展战略：总部的战略明确定位于国际化，这意味着——正像杜塞尔多夫子公司总经理韩刚所说："不仅要适应世界市场，也要融入世界文化"。按照企业的理解，它能否生存下来取

globally with powerful subsidiaries, turns out to be a success. A precondition for this is that employees of all nationalities can communicate openly and effectively in the teams, that they can overcome cultural barriers through formal and informal interaction, and that executives set a good example on a daily basis of the new leadership style which president Gang Han is striving for in the company. Also part of this strategy is the creation of the requisite organizational structure and a network of subsidiaries abroad.

Find out more about value creation structures in "Managing the International Value Chain"

Minmetals reached a point where it could no longer handle its European trade from Düsseldorf. Thus in 2007 the company founded a new subsidiary in Italy and is currently engaged in setting up another one in Spain. The acquisition of the special steels trading and service company Siegfried Pilz in Sottrum is part of the strategic repositioning for the expansion of activities in Germany and Europe. This erstwhile north German family business is now known as "Minmetals Service Center (North Germany) GmbH." With the help of the experienced German workforce the company wishes to meet the demands of European customers better than in the past by being closer to the market, by insisting on punctuality, by providing the best possible service, and by installing a professional complaints management system. A similar service centre is also being planned in France.

The restructuring provides new business opportunities and the best preconditions for a growing turnover and rising profits. In the light of the skills of the local employees in Düsseldorf, the acquisition of the Service Center, and the new strategy and marketing concept devised by executive Wolfgang Pentzek, the intention is to keep pursuing the same path. Features such as reliability, quality, continuity and adaptation to customer wishes are at the heart of the company's endeavours, and are designed to promote further growth. All this is happening as a result of close cooperation between the president of the subsidiary, Gang Han, and Wolfgang Pentzek, who, as he says himself, has unusually large decision-making powers for this industry. Nevertheless all important decisions are taken jointly. In the meantime the Düsseldorf branch, which has sales of about 200 million euros, has become one of the Minmetals subsidiaries with the largest turnover – and there are now more than 50 outside China. The company would like to strengthen its position on the international market by focusing on forward-looking and profitable businesses in the high-price segment of the metal industry, and on a new alignment with regard to production, particularly the processing of steel products. This was one of the reasons why at the beginning of 2008 Minmetals acquired HPTec GmbH in Ravensburg, a company specializing

决于它是否能够制订出一项战略，使企业同时实现国际化和本土化，也就是说，带领各个强有力的子公司实现全球化发展。实施这项战略的前提是，企业中所有员工，无论来自哪个国家，都能够坦诚而有效地进行沟通，通过正式和非正式的交流来消除文化隔阂，管理人员也能够在企业日常工作中以身作则地实践韩刚总经理倡导的管理新思路。另外，这项战略的实施，还要以相应的组织结构和海外机构网络作为基础。

您可以参阅《国际性新创价值管理》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于新创价值的建构的内容。

仅在杜塞尔多夫设点，控制全欧洲的贸易对五矿来说已经不够了。2007年企业在意大利新设了一家子公司，现在又在西班牙增设了一家。五矿这一拓展德国和欧洲业务的新战略部署中也包括并购位于索德尔姆的希格弗里德·皮尔茨不锈钢贸易和服务公司。这个前北德的家族企业现已更名为"五矿服务中心（北德）有限责任公司"。有了这些经验丰富的德国员工，企业将会更好地满足欧洲客户的需要：通过更贴近市场、更及时的最佳服务以及专业的投诉管理。类似的服务中心企业计划在法国也成立一家。

这项结构改革打开了新的业务领域，并为销售和盈利的攀升创造了最佳条件。鉴于杜塞尔多夫的本地员工拥有很高权限，加上新成立的服务中心，以及新制定的战略和在全权代理人沃尔夫冈·潘在克的领导下草拟的与新战略相符的营销方案，这项结构改革有望得到进一步推进。在此过程中，客户的利益，如可靠性、质量、连续性和按照顾客需求所做的调整是中心议题，它们也应会继续促进增长。所有这一切都是建立在子公司的两位总经理韩刚和潘在克的密切合作基础上的，正如潘在克自己所说，他拥有这个行业中非同寻常的广阔决策空间，但所有重要决定都由双方共同作出。

in high-quality drills and cutters, which in its turn has subsidiaries throughout the world and is already present at two places in China.

Interim Report on Minmetal's Business in Germany

The emergence of a Sino-German company is assuming clear contours as a result of the changes in recent years. The operational work is carried out by local employees, who already make up more than 90 per cent of the workforce. Strategic plans are developed jointly by Chinese and German executives. For the German employees working in a Chinese company is not in any way unusual, since everything is regulated by German law, and when they assess the pros and cons, the positive aspects predominate.

A similar pattern was seen in the case of the numerous Japanese companies which put down roots in Düsseldorf and are now sought-after employers who are making a contribution to the internationalization and enhancement of the economic strength of the region. However, in contrast to the Japanese, who are well integrated on account of the establishment of communities of interest and a Japanese school, the integration of Chinese expatriates into German society is still in its infancy. In Chinese companies the informal exchange of information still tends to predominate. The opening in 2005 of the "Düsseldorf China Center" (DCC), a meeting point for Germans and Chinese in the city centre, has created new opportunities to establish contacts and to deepen them. President Gang Han's efforts to organize a group of supporters for a Chinese school are designed to ensure that Chinese employees at Minmetals will feel happy in Düsseldorf and have an incentive to stay for a longer period of time. In this way Minmetals Germany would have taken another step to achieving its stated aim of being a "bridge between China and Europe," which is the company's motto. ■

现在，杜塞尔多夫分公司的销售额达到了2亿欧元左右，已名列中国以外的50多家五矿海外子公司的销售之冠。德国五矿现在将精力集中于可持续发展的高收益业务领域高价金属市场板块，并将新定位瞄准钢产品的生产，特别是加工，企业希望借此巩固自己在国际市场上的地位。同样是出于这个原因，五矿在2008年初收购了位于拉文斯堡的HPTec有限责任公司。这家企业以生产高价值的钻机和铣床闻名，其本身就在世界各地设有分公司，在中国也开办了两家代表处。

对德投资的中期成果

伴随着过去几年发生的变化，一个设在德国的中国公司的发展轮廓逐渐清晰起来了：日常的工作由本地员工负责——他们已经占到职工总数的百分之九十以上。战略规划则由中德管理人员共同制定。对德国员工来说，供职于中国企业也没有什么奇怪的，特别是当所有事情都规范在德国的法律框架内，而且权衡利弊，优势尽显的时候。

众多的日本企业当年也曾有过类似的发展经历，他们在杜塞尔多夫安家落户，同时不只满足于成为一般意义上的雇主，而是还为地区经济的巩固加强和国际化做出了贡献。与日本企业通过建立利益共同体和日本学校来融入社会不同的是，中国的外派员工在德国社会中还仅仅处于起步阶段——在中国企业中，直到现在还依然盛行私下交换意见。2005年，"杜塞尔多夫中国中心"（DCC）开业，这个开设在城内的中德交流中心为两国人民建立和加深联系提供了新的机会。同时韩刚总经理的不懈努力"建立一所中国学校"也会让五矿在杜塞尔多夫的中国员工倍感温馨，并从中得到鼓励，愿意长期留在杜塞尔多夫工作。如果学校真的建成，德国五矿就又向它在企业口号中所说的目标——成为"中国与欧洲之间的桥梁"上前进了一步。■

Speaking with Brigitte Sitzberger

Expert on international human resources management, GlobalMindsets, London

布丽吉特·西茨贝格尔访谈录

伦敦全球思维组合有限公司国际人事管理专家

"Intercultural competence that enables the manager to work successfully in the new environment and to adapt to different working and communication styles will be crucial for a successful assignment."

"跨文化整合能力在国际性商务活动中意义重大，它赋予管理者适应能力和沟通能力，使其在一个全新的工作环境中运筹帷幄，游刃有余。"

Ms Sitzberger, only recently, Chinese companies have started to internationalize their businesses and, as a result, have had to face management challenges of all kinds. A crucial but often neglected field of management is the internationalization of human resources. What are the key considerations for Chinese companies when staffing subsidiaries abroad?

As a first step, the company needs to decide on an overall approach to international staffing, with the choice dependent on the overarching company strategy. In general, there are four major approaches to managing and staffing subsidiaries abroad, based on the work of Perlmutter. The first approach is ethnocentric, in which strategic decisions are made at headquarters with limited subsidiary autonomy; headquarters' personnel hold key positions in domestic and foreign operations. The second approach is polycentric. In this approach, each subsidiary is a distinct national entity with some decision-making autonomy; host country nationals manage subsidiaries but are seldom promoted to the executive level. The third is geocentric, which is a global approach utilizing worldwide integra-

西茨贝格尔女士，中国企业国际化的进程刚起步不久，在企业管理方面尚面临着各种各样的挑战。一个十分重要，然而又常常被忽略的领域是跨文化人事管理，您认为，中国在驻外机构人员聘用上，最应注意的是那些方面？

中国企业首先要从企业管理全球化战略出发，明确和设定对驻外机构人员聘用的基本规则。跨文化企业管理专家帕穆特将跨国际企业管理人员的聘用规则归纳为如下四大导向模式。其一是以母体国为主，以外国分支机构为辅的母国导向模式。即无论是本国的，还是国际性的商务活动，皆由母公司的管理人员领导和决策。其二是所谓的当地国导向模式。在这里，驻地海外的分支机构

tion; each part of the organization makes a unique contribution and nationality is ignored in favour of ability. And finally, there is the regiocentric approach, which reflects a regional strategy and structure and features regional autonomy in decision – making. In this approach, staff members move within the designated region, rather than globally.

Each of these approaches has its distinctive pros and cons, and each company needs to evaluate carefully which would be appropriate considering the stage of internationalization it has reached. Chinese companies entering the German market and expanding into other markets need to determine their philosophy first, then decide how they want to staff their operations: whether they want to fill key positions with Chinese expatriates or recruit local employees.

Key considerations for selecting expatriates for international assignments are the launch of new initiatives, technology transfer, the need for control, the transfer of knowledge, competence, and procedures and practices. Employees can be transferred internationally for varying lengths of time, depending on the nature of the task. Short-term assignments – those which last from three months to one year – are usually used for troubleshooting or project supervision, whereas long-term assignments – which last anywhere from one to five years – are used for a clearly defined role in the foreign operation. Typically, long-term assignments are for a period of three years, which allow the expatriate to get adjusted to the local environment and have a clear impact in the role.

Whereas it has been common practice for many Western companies to send their employees to China, it is a new experience for Chinese companies entering the German market. Due to its very recent emergence there is little research; nevertheless, a balanced approach of ethnocentric and polycentric aspects might lead to success. The company should select a few Chinese key management members to ensure the new subsidiary in Germany complies with overall corporate objectives and policies, and employ local German staff both in managerial and operational roles to eliminate language barriers and facilitate the understanding of the business environment, reduce the need for cultural awareness training programmes, save costs, and ensure continuity to the management of the German subsidiary.

“自成一体”，部分情况下“自决自治”。此类分支机构大多由来自所在东道国的管理人员领导和把握，但他们却很少有升迁到母国公司高位管理层的机会。其三是所谓的多元性全球导向模式。企业各个部分八仙过海，各显神通。员工的聘用也没有国籍疆界之分，重要的考量是雇佣人员自身的素质与实际技能。其四则是区域导向模式。该模式强调区域或地方的策略、结构及其自主权。其下属员工大多产生于公司所在区域，而非跨国际雇佣劳动力。

这四个导向模式各有其长短利弊，故此，每个企业都要量体裁衣，根据本企业国际化进程的具体程度和需要，审慎选择其中一种最合时宜的模式作为导向。有意开发德国市场，并向其它市场进行扩张的中国企业，首先要深谋远虑，清晰理念，然后再开始着手人事安排方面的决策，譬如是向东道国派谴中国籍管理人员呢，还是从东道国起用当地管理人才？

向国外遣派管理人员（外遣人员）首当其冲的目的是引进新的创意，以及技术装备、知识转移、检查监督、获取跨文化整合能力、包括特殊生产程序及其实际操作技巧等等。根据不同的任务和不同的目标，外遣人员的外派时间亦有长短之分。三个月到一年之间的短期派遣，其主要目的是澄清疑难，攻克障碍，抑或领导某一项目。而一个外派时间在一年到五年之间的人员派遣，其派遣目标则必须十分精确明了。诸如此类的长期外遣通常的规定期限为三年，这样，外遣人员可赢得充足的时间去适应新的工作环境，正常发挥自己的管理才能和作用。

向中国进行人员派遣对许多西方企业来说早已成为兵家常事，而对初入德国市场的中国企业而言，却还是万里长征的第一步。由于它尚属稚嫩幼新的新生事物，故此到目

In some cases we have seen that expatriates were assigned based on their social networks in the Chinese headquarters rather than according to their qualifications. How can Chinese managers and specialists be selected for operations in Germany based on an analytical approach?

Indeed the existence of a strong personal network ("guanxi") helps when trying to find a job in China. It is certainly not the only place in the world where certain connections might be useful to get a certain position within a company, but the significance of such a network is much greater in China than in other countries. Overall, the HR function in China can still be considered a rather new function and certain areas such as recruitment, personnel development, and the role of HR as a strategic business partner to the management need to be further professionalized and developed.

In general, it is a challenge to determine appropriate selection criteria for international assignments. The selection process for Chinese expatriates going abroad needs to be carefully managed in order to avoid so-called "expatriate failure" or the premature return of the expatriate before the period of the assignment is completed. Another form of expatriate failure happens when employees underperform on a particular assignment as a result of difficulties in adapting to the new cultural environment. In such a case, expatriate failure usually represents a selection error. Considering the very high costs that are connected with expatriate failure – both direct costs, such as airfares, relocation expenses, salary, training, etc. and indirect costs, such as damaged relationships with key stakeholders in the foreign location, negative effects on local staff, etc. – Chinese companies need to put great effort into the appropriate expatriate selection process in order to make a decision based on a set of objective criteria and not on pure "guanxi".

There has been little empirical research on expatriate management conducted up till now. Tung is one of the few who investigated a sample of American, Western European, and Japanese multinationals. The main reasons for expatriate failure of Japanese expatriates, for example, were the inability to cope with larger overseas responsibilities, difficulties with the new environment, personal or emotional problems, lack of technical competence, and the inability of the spouse to adjust.

前为止尚无多少文字研究。尽管如此，若能恰当合理地交替运用母国导向与当地国导向的跨文化管理理念，必将为企业经营带来效益和成功无疑。一方面，将企业的几个要害部门交由中国管理人员经管，以确保母国公司的企业战略目标在德国分支机构得以贯彻实施。另一方面，起用德籍人员，赋予他们上至管理，下至一般性的业务工作。这样，不仅可以消除语言障碍，还可以协助初来乍到的中国外派人员，更好地熟识和了解企业的业务环境，缩减在文化沟通和理解方面所必须投入的时间与精力，节省开支，并保持德国分支机构企业运转和管理的连续性。

有些时候，中国的上层管理人员不是因为他们的实际工作能力，而是因为私人交情和社会关系的原因而被派送到国外，如何可以更为客观地选派到德国分支机构工作的管理人员？

的确如此。在中国，私人交情和社会关系对于求职应聘者有着不可低估的影响和帮助。虽说中国肯定不是地球上仅此唯一的一个个人关系影响求职结果的国度，但私交与关系网的重要程度却远远大于其它国家。总而言之，中国企业在人事管理方面尚处于初始阶段，由此，人事安排、人员培训，以及将人事管理作为企业管理层的一个重要战略伙伴等等方面，亟待于发展和专业化。

确立适度合理的外遣人员选择标准对许多企业来说都是一个挑战。外遣人员的选定必须要协调审慎，以防止他们兵败异国，提前打道回府。造成外遣失败的一个常见原因，是外遣人员缺乏对异国文化的适应能力，导致发挥失常，无法胜任所赋予的管理重任。类似的失败主要归咎于人事政策和人事安排上的错误。想一想由此产生的巨大经济支出和投入——直接支出如机票、搬家费、薪酬、培训费用等等，间接支出如导致

Factors in Expatriate Selection

海外分支机构人员择选标准



Source: Peter J. Dowling, Denice E. Welch, International Human Resources Management, 4th Edition (2005), Thomson South Western, pp. 98-106.
来源：请参阅陶陵与维尔契2005：第98–106页。

BertelsmannStiftung

分支机构与所在国股东之间的关系恶化乃至破裂，或给当地雇员留下负面影响等等。鉴此，中国企业必须大量“投资”于对外管理人员的选派上，从客观实际出发，而非凭借私人关系，以确保 “真正的”、有胜任能力的人选被输送到国外。

迄今为止，研究和考察跨文化管理抑或管理人员外遣经验的专家和学者廖廖无几，罗莎莉·彤便是其中的一位。她跟踪调查了一些美国，西欧和日本的跨国公司，发现造成日本外遣人员失败的几个主要原因是，能力单薄，缺乏适应新环境的能力，个人和情感问题，不懂技术，以及缺乏适应能力的生活伴侣。

What core competences should Chinese companies look for in employees sent on assignment to Germany?

A person's technical ability to perform the task is the key consideration. Technical and managerial skills are therefore essential criteria for selecting expatriates. However, considering the cultural differences between China and Germany, the cross-cultural suitability of the Chinese candidate becomes as important. Intercultural competence that enables the manager to work successfully in the new environment and to adapt to different working and communication styles will also be crucial for a successful assignment. It is highly recommended to choose candidates to work in Germany who have worked in an international setting before. They should prove that they are able to relate to people from other cultural groups and show cultural empathy, adaptability, emotional stability, and, in general, a positive attitude towards change and a new environment. Furthermore, individual family requirements should not be underestimated in the selection process, since statistics clearly prove that the family, and in particular the spouse, are important in determining how well the expatriate adjusts to new circumstances. The recruitment of both the single and married expatriate needs to be evaluated very carefully. The latter will cause significant costs for the company, and it needs to be clearly proven in advance that the Chinese family will be able to cope with living conditions in Germany. On the other hand, it will also be difficult to just send the expatriate and leave the family behind in China for the time of the international assignment. Traditionally, family values play an important role in the Chinese culture and the separation might lead to problems for both sides.

Besides these individual factors, several factors which are influenced by the specific situation need to be considered as well. The ability to speak the local language is linked to the cross-cultural suitability of the Chinese manager. Local language knowledge may be critical for some positions, such as managerial positions but less so in others, such as those involving technical functions. Chinese companies need to make sure that the expatriate should have at least some basic German language skills and show some willingness to learn the language, since a lot of local business is done in the German language and some basic knowledge of German will be important to survive in daily life. MNE requirements also influence the situational factors in the selection process, for example the mode of operation in the specific country, the duration and type of assignment and the amount of knowledge transfer inherent in the expatriate's position in the subsidiary abroad. If the nature of the job includes training of local staff, training skills may also be included as selection criteria. Last but not least country requirements, such as the procedures for dealing with the government in order

被选派到德国的中国外遣人员必须具备哪些能力?

他首先要具备专业技术能力。专业技术能力和管理领导能力是衡量外遣人选的两个主要标准。鉴于存在于中国与德国之间的巨大文化差异，跨文化整合能力也是选择候选人时的一个必须考量。管理人员在新的工作环境里能否成功地展开工作，跨文化整合能力是一个决定胜负的重要因素。对于驻德机构而言，建议最好择用具备跨国工作经验的候选人。此外，还要考虑他们对不同文化背景人群的态度。譬如是否能够开放地走向对方，是否能够理解他们，并与之和谐相处。他们必须具备较强的适应能力，心态平衡，情绪稳定，对新环境新变化持乐观积极的态度。此外，也不能忽略各个候选人的具体家庭背景。统计数字明确显示，家庭，首先是婚姻状况与生活伴侣，亦左右着外派工作人员适应能力的强弱好坏。由此，无论对单身的或已婚的候选人，都要进行认真的筛选。这是因为家庭对企业来说，是一笔不小的经济支出。所以，事先必须得澄清和落实，该候选人的家庭是否有能力适应在德国的生活方式。自然，不携带家属，将某员工只身一人派往国外，更不是一个可取之路。家庭在传统的中国文化中享有很高的价值，夫妇双方劳燕分飞、分居两地无论于哪一位当事者都是一个不小的麻烦。

除了上述个人因素之外，还要顾及和考虑到其它特殊情况之下的环境因素。譬如，与中国管理人员跨文化整合能力密切相关的语言能力。有些时候，譬如在某些管理领导层次，语言能力甚至重要于技术能力。中国企业因而须要确保被派遣人员掌握最基本的德语语言知识，而且时刻准备着，提高和扩充自己的德语能力。这是因为在德国当地的大部分生意往来都是以德语来进行和完成。再者，德语是一门在德国日常生活中不可或

to get the necessary work permit and entry visas for the expatriate and the family members, also need to be considered.

How can targeted preparation for Chinese managers "Going German" be organized?

While selecting the right person for an international assignment is essential, tailored pre-departure training is just as crucial. Overall, the role of pre-departure training is to support both the expatriate's adjustment to the demands of living and working in Germany and on-assignment performance. Components of an effective pre-departure training programme include cultural awareness training courses, preliminary visits and language classes, and support with practical day-to-day matters. A well-designed cultural awareness programme can help the Chinese managers in Germany adapt to the new environment and not feel isolated. A very useful activity in preparing the Chinese manager is to send him on a preliminary trip to Germany, which can serve to introduce the expatriate candidate to the business context and allows the candidate and the spouse to assess their suitability for the assignment. There are many different components a company can chose from when designing their specific cross-cultural training programme for Chinese managers being sent to Germany. The model of Mendenhall, Dunbar and Oddou provides a useful guideline for determining an appropriate programme.

缺的交流工具。除此之外，一些跨国公司的特殊工作要求，譬如分支机构所在东道国的工作风格，外派人员出任时间的长短，知识转移数量，所要完成的任务等等，也是选派外遣人员时所必须的考量。假如还有对外派人员的培训，那么在选拔时，还要考虑其候选人是否具备与此相应的能力。最后，还要注意东道国对劳动许可，候选人本身及其家属申请入境签证时的具体要求和规定。

如何有的放矢地使中国外派管理人员做好相应的出国准备？

有的放矢地对外派人员进行出国之前的准备，至少与正确选拔外派人员同等重要。及早对外派人员施行出国培训，使他们不仅对德国的生活环境，也对他们所面临的国际性商务重任心中有数。譬如提高文化能力，组织到德国前期考察，开办语言培训班，传授域外生活的一些小常识小建议等等。一个设计周全的文化培训可以有效地促进和提高派驻到德国的中国管理人员对异国文化的理解与接收，帮助他们尽快地适应新的环境，避免产生孤单封闭、与世隔绝的不良感受。我以为，一个并非过分的培训方案是，将准备外遣人员送往德国前期考察一段时间，使其对德国的企业环境有所认知，进而可以得出结论，他以及他的家属能否接受和适应面临的挑战。在为派驻德国的管理人员设置跨文化培训项目时，中国企业可以从不同的角度，有所侧重地参考和借用马克·曼德侯、爱德华·顿巴以及盖瑞·奥都三位的培训模式。

The Mendenhall, Dunbar and Oddou Cross-Cultural Training Model
曼德侯、顿巴和奥都的跨文化培训模式



Source: M. Mendenhall, E. Dunbar, and G. Oddou, Expatriate Selection, Training and Career-pathing: a Review and Critique, Human Resources Management, Vol. 26 (1987) p. 338.
来源：请参阅曼德侯、顿巴和奥都 1987：第338页。

There are three dimensions in the model: training methods, level of training rigour, and duration of the training relative to degree of interaction and cultural novelty. So if the Chinese manager, for example, is going to a fairly novel and different country, for example Germany, and the expected degree of interaction with Germans is high, this should also be reflected in the rigour and length of training.

The German and Chinese approaches with regard to communication, working style, time management and leadership differ significantly. It is essential that a profound preparation is given to the Chinese managers to enable them to create Western accountability, assertiveness and professionalism. Furthermore, if the Chinese manager will be responsible for leading German staff, a special leadership component needs to be integrated into the cross-cultural training programme. Topics such as how to give and receive feedback and opinions to and from German staff, how to establish effective cross-cultural teams and synergies and how to interpret German behaviours accurately need to be highlighted.

What kind of problems could arise when repatriating Chinese managers after a typical long-term assignment in Germany?

It is crucial to consider from the beginning that the expatriation process also includes the repatriation of the executive back to China after the assignment in Germany. This re-entry presents new challenges. For example, the Chinese expatriate may experience re-entry shock or reverse cultural shock and some may even leave the company at this point. The multinational's ability to retain current and attract future expatriates is affected by the manner in which it handles repatriation. Despite its importance there is little evidence in the literature that multinationals view the preparation for repatriation as important as pre-departure training. In general the longer the person is away from the home country, the more likely readjustment problems may occur. The Chinese managers might have become accustomed to a different life and working style in Germany, have grown professionally and personally, and might find it quite difficult to adjust to working and living in China after their stay abroad. In the meantime conditions at the headquarters back in China, including the composition of the top management team, might also have changed, all of which can make it very difficult for the Chinese managers and their families to adjust.

Considering that expatriates are expensive and of crucial importance for knowledge transfer, re-entry issues should be placed on the executive's agenda in good time. At least a year before the executive is due to return to China the company

该培训模式涵盖如下三个方面：培训方法，培训强度，培训时间。整个培训内容和强度又因人而异，根据具体的文化融合度和文化陌生度而定。也就是说，假若一个中国员工被派往一个对他来说相对陌生的国家，譬如德国，那么他所面对的，与德国员工相处时的文化融合度就相对较高，那么，其培训强度和培训时间也作以相对的调整与考虑。

德国人的沟通方式，工作方法和管理风格，及其对时间的概念与中国人的相去甚远。因此，对中国管理人员必须进行必要的培训和准备，使他们拥有适合西方尺度的责任感，专业程度和领导能力。如果中国管理人员的下属是一群德国员工，那么，这个跨文化培训项目就要另外加置新的培训内容。譬如，如何对德国下属表述或反馈自己的意见，反过来，如何听取和反应德国下属的意见和反馈；如何建立一个协调得力的跨文化团队，正确理解和领会德国同事的行为方式。

在海外逗留多年之后，外遣人员重返家乡时会出现哪些难题？

重要的是，在离开中国的同时，就开始着手于从德国返回中国的思想准备。返回中国无异于一个新的挑战。中国员工结束海外委托回国之后，也将遭遇并不亚于出国之前的“文化休克”，一些回归人员正是在这个时候，决定离开公司。因此，一个跨国公司能否保留新老驻外员工，并激励他们继续为国际性商务活动效力，完全取决于该公司对这些外派人员回国后的重新融合，处理是否合理得当。尽管再度融合问题事关重大，但在相关文献里却很难找到跨国公司把派遣人员回归之前的准备与派出之前的准备“一视同仁”的文字提示。通常来说，派出时间愈久，回归时问题就愈多。这是因为外派的中

needs to start re-entry sessions to discuss career objectives and plan for the re-entry position in China. During the stay of Chinese managers in Germany, the use of mentors in the Chinese headquarters might be of great value. The mentor system aims to alleviate the "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" feeling by keeping the expatriate informed throughout the assignment. The mentor should ensure that the expatriate is not forgotten when important decisions are made regarding positions and promotions. Typical mentoring duties include maintaining contact with the expatriate, providing updates about developments in China, and providing assistance in the repatriation process.

Looking to the future, how can Chinese companies benefit in the long term from a focused, strategic approach to selecting and preparing managers for assignment in Germany?

A professional and strategic approach to HR becomes indispensible when dealing with international issues, such as the movement of executives across cultures, because what might work on the domestic market in China can easily lead to major and expensive problems in an international setting. This is especially true following the selection of the wrong candidate. In particular, sending young and motivated Chinese employees with German language skills to the German subsidiary can be very beneficial for the Chinese company. This type of assignment needs to be looked at as management development or an on-the-job training measure to support the growth of young Chinese talents, expand their horizons, and help developing a global mindset within the company. A successful internationalization process should be a step-by-step approach based on the level of experience of the Chinese company in other markets. Developing a pool of Chinese managers with a global mindset will be crucial for any business expansion in Germany or other markets around the globe. ■

国管理人员逐渐适应了所在国的生活习惯和行为方式，在德国逗留期间，无论在专业或是人格方面都有所发展。因此，很难再适应原来的中国式的生活习惯和工作方式。此外，在他们逗留德国期间，位于母国的主公司，包括高级管理层亦发生了诸多人事变更。所有这一切，都可能给中国回归人员及其家属的再融合造成困难。

念及企业对外遣人员所投入的巨大开支和花销，以及知识转移的重要意义，企业上层必须及时为外遣人员的回归做好铺垫和准备。至晚在外遣人员正式回归的一年之前，企业领导就要开始与相关人员进行沟通与对话，谈及他们的回国安排，谈及他们的升迁机会及事业前景。在中国管理人员逗留德国期间，最好设置一个与他们互通有无，来自母国管理高层的"联络顾问"。这个"联络顾问"经常向外遣人员输送来自"家"中的讯息和动向，使外遣人员"没有被遗忘"的感觉。在重大的人事决策或升级提拔时，"联络顾问"有责任"提醒"上级，外派人员不能被忘却至脑后。联络顾问的典型任务是，保持与外遣人员的联络，向他们传递国内重大讯息和发展动向，协助外遣人员归国之后的再适应、再融合。

从长远利益来看，策略地、有的放矢地选择和培训派驻德国的管理人员将会给中国企业带来哪些好处？

就国际性管理人才在文化间的转移方面来看，人事管理的专业化和策略化是大势所趋。这是因为曾经在中国市场立下汗马功劳的管理方法，在国际舞台上很可能迅速酿就成一笔重大的经济损失。由此，正确的选派外遣管理人员至关重要。一个企业如果将具有语言能力、思路开放的年轻管理者选送到德国分支公司驻地，必定会给该企业带来巨大好处。此种获取经验、扩展视野、将崭新的全球性思维方式带入企业的人员派遣模式，可以作为人力资源管理的一项举措，一个发展培养途径。一个卓有成效的企业国际化进程应该扎扎实实，一步一个脚印。此外，还有不可或缺的，中国企业在国际市场迄今为止所取得的商务经验。建立一个具有国际取向和竞争实力的中国管理团队，将对中国长驱直入德国和其它国际性市场具有着不可低估的意义。■

Brigitte Sitzberger

Brigitte Sitzberger is founder and managing director of GlobalMindsets Limited, a consulting agency that assists companies in emerging markets to understand, develop, implement, and quantify the effectiveness of their human resources programmes. After studying business administration, Brigitte Sitzberger has worked in various HR management positions in South-Korea, Germany and the Shanghai region, where she established a Corporate Management Development Asia Office for a large international corporation and was founder and director of B! ASIA Human Capital Consulting (HK) Ltd. Since 2005 she has been working on human resources consulting assignments in China, Bangladesh, Russia, UK, Germany, and Central and Eastern Europe.

布丽吉特·西茨贝格尔

作为全球思维有限公司的创始人和总经理，布丽吉特·西茨贝格尔女士协助企业在新兴市场的开拓中，制定、实施人力资源方案，并量化其措施的有效性。企业管理学毕业后，她在南韩、德国和上海地区担任过人力资源的管理职位，为一家大型国际公司建立了亚洲企业管理发展部办事处。同时她创建和领导了B!ASIA人力资本咨询（香港）有限公司。自2005年以来，她在中国、孟加拉国、俄罗斯、英国、德国、中欧和东欧一直致力于人力资源咨询项目。

Haier

A Global Chinese Corporation Feels at Home in Germany

海尔

中国的跨国企业集团——在德国安家落户？

Stages in Haier's Development

Today's Haier Group started out in 1984 as a small "collective enterprise" (on the lines of a German cooperative) with twenty workers in the Eastern Chinese coastal city of Qingdao, a former German colony about 530 kilometres southeast of Beijing. In the year of its foundation the fledgling company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy on account of mismanagement and inferior product quality. At this point the city government appointed the deputy manager Ruimin Zhang – he was only 35 years old at the time, and is still at the helm of the Haier Group today – to the post of CEO. Zhang decided to concentrate whole-heartedly on the core business, which was making refrigerators. He wanted to re-establish and expand this product segment in the market as a strong brand synonymous with excellent product and service quality.

The decision was typical of the first phase in the development of the Haier Group between 1984 and 1991, the so-called "brand-building" stage. A story which is still told about this period has come to epitomize what the company stands for: One day Ruimin Zhang ordered 76 faulty refrigerators to be lined up in front of the factory and had them smashed up with sledge-hammers in front of the assembled workforce. He personally demolished a refrigerator which is now in the Haier museum. This spectacle was designed to instil in the workforce a higher awareness of the need for quality and discipline, and to highlight the strategy of the corporation, which was trying to gain a foothold in the market as a manufacturer of high-quality appliances. In terms of corporate strategy Ruimin Zhang wanted to achieve a permanent improvement in quality management by means of a joint venture with Liebherr, a German company. Liebherr was also the model for the current name of the corporation, for Haier is the Chinese way of writing the phonetic version of the German word "Herr."

After some years of rapid growth the corporation, which in 1991 was renamed Qingdao Haier Group, finally embarked on a second development stage in which

海尔的发展阶段

今日的海尔集团前身是1984年在中国东部沿海城市青岛建立的仅有20名员工的"集体企业"（类似于德国的合作社）。距北京东南约530公里的青岛曾是德国的殖民地。这个年轻的企业在成立当年就因为经营不善及产品质量低下而濒临倒闭。于是，市政府任命当时年仅35岁的家电公司副经理张瑞敏出任厂长，他至今仍是海尔集团的总裁。张瑞敏当时做出决定，将战略重点集中于核心业务——电冰箱的生产上，希望通过提高产品和服务质量塑造出一个强有力的品牌，以此来重建并扩大市场。

这在1984到1991年海尔集团的第一个发展阶段——所谓"品牌建设阶段"中，是一个具有典型意义的决定。这一时期还发生了一件事，预示了企业后来的传统：张瑞敏让人把76台有质量问题的冰箱放到工厂的院子里，然后当着全体职工的面下令用大锤将这些次品销毁。其中一台电冰箱至今仍在海尔博物馆展出，它是张瑞敏亲自捣毁的。张瑞敏希望通过这一行动促进职工提高质量和纪律意识，同时也让他们见证企业要发展为优质产品生产商的决心。在企业战略方面，张瑞敏希望通过与德国企业利勃海尔合资建厂的方式不断完善质量管理。利勃海尔公司当时就对企业今天的名称产生了重要影响："海尔"是"利勃海尔（Liebherr）"中"Herr"这个音节的中文音译。

Haier's Globalization Strategy

海尔的全球化战略



Source: Deloitte & Touche GmbH, 2007.
来源：根据德勤会计师事务所有限公司，2007。

BertelsmannStiftung

it deliberately diversified into other areas. Important stepping stones were a joint venture with the Italian company Merloni Elettrodomestici, and the acquisition of the huge though heavily indebted state enterprise Qingdao Red Star Electric Appliance in 1993 with its washing machine division, a new product segment in the portfolio of the Haier Group at the time. In the same year Haier was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in order to use the money raised in this way to finance a new production line in Qingdao. The diversifying stage lasted until the late 1990s and included numerous forays into areas such as air conditioning equipment, televisions, PCs and mobile phones. On top of this there were areas such as real estate, and financial and tourist services, which were not industry-specific, a pattern found in many other large Chinese corporations (and in Japan and Korea).

During the next stage (1998 to 2005) the corporation became increasingly international as a result of partnerships with foreign companies, so that this can be

经过了几年繁荣发展，这个更名为青岛海尔集团的企业终于在1991年迎来了它的第二个发展阶段，在这一阶段中，企业的目标是将业务拓展到其它领域，实现多元化。在此期间，企业采取了几个重要的战略转变措施，如与意大利梅洛尼家用电器公司合资建厂，以及1993年收购负债累累的庞大国有企业青岛红星电器有限公司的洗衣机业务，洗衣机是海尔集团当时战略构想中新的产品板块。同年，为在青岛建一条新的生产线筹集资金，海尔集团在上海证券交易所挂牌上市。企业多元化的发展一直持续到90年代后期，其业务向更多领域扩张，如空调、电视、个人电脑和手机板块。此外，企业还向其它行业发展，如房地产、金融和旅游服

called the “globalization stage.” This phase saw the advent of production joint ventures with partners in Asia. When it came to making direct investments Haier first went to “easier” locations such as Indonesia and the Philippines (1996) and Malaysia (1998) because they were closer in geographical and cultural terms and presumably more cost-effective. Later there were joint sales ventures with partners in the U.S. and Japan and the acquisition of Meneghetti, an Italian company, that is, investments in more cost-intensive, culturally distant and thus more difficult locations. From the very beginning there was a strategic goal of being able to manufacture in close proximity to the markets in the U.S. and Europe, and thus to be able to react better to changes in demand. Here Haier follows its “3x1/3 rule.” A third of the total annual production is to be produced and sold in China, a third produced in China for export, and another third produced and sold in other countries.

In contrast to the procedure adopted in the case of direct investments, the corporation decided that initially it wanted to channel exports to difficult and more mature markets, and then to follow this up with easier markets that were in the process of development. As far as Haier is concerned, the whole point of this is to build up a brand which has a reputation and to harvest the fruits at a later stage by selling high-quality products. Thus at the beginning of the 1990s Haier was already exporting to the U.S., European and Japanese markets, which are considered to be difficult, even though the corporation – and this was not typical of Chinese companies in this sector – initially relied on local distributors.

From 1998 onwards (with one exception, 2005) the turnover of the Haier Group increased steadily. In China Haier is currently the largest producer of white goods. If one includes production output for other brand name manufacturers (the OEM business), it is currently in fact number one in the production of refrigerators and number four in the production of household appliances. In 2003 Haier managed to become market leader in the U.S. in the market for mini refrigerators, where it had a market share of 50 per cent, and in the lucrative market for wine refrigerators, where it notched up a market share of 70 per cent.

This spate of successes has not gone unnoticed. According to a recent ranking by the Reputation Institute, the corporation is not only the Chinese company with the strongest brand name, but ranked 13th in a list of the 1,000 most admired companies in the world.

务——这个模式在很多其它中国大型企业中（象日本和韩国的企业一样）也得到了应用。

多元化发展阶段过后，在1998至2005年间，企业通过与国际伙伴开展合作日益国际化，因此这一阶段可称之为“全球化阶段”。在这一阶段中，企业与亚洲国家的公司建立了合资生产厂，此时海尔的直接投资先从“较容易的市场”开始，投资地点在地理和文化上与中国比较接近，预计成本也相对低廉，例如1996年在印尼或1998年在菲律宾建合资厂。后来企业又与美国和日本的合作伙伴建立了销售合资公司，并收购了意大利梅内盖蒂公司，这些投资的成本相对较高，文化差异也更大，因此投资难度也有所增加。这些商业操作的战略构想是通过这种方式靠近欧美市场，从而更好地对需求变动做出反应。为此，海尔推行了三个“1/3”规定：全年总产量的三分之一在中国生产和销售；三分之一虽然在中国生产，但用于出口；剩下三分之一在海外生产和销售。

与直接投资的发展方式不同，在出口业务上企业决定首先从难度较大的、发展完善的市场入手，然后再扩展到较容易的、发展中的市场。这种作法的意义主要在于，先树立起一个声誉良好的品牌，然后再通过销售高价值产品来享受这个成果。从90年代初开始，海尔就已将产品出口到难度较大的市场，如美国、欧洲和日本市场，起初企业依赖地区经销商，这对该行业的中国企业来说是非同寻常的。

自1998年以来，除了2005年，海尔集团的销售额一直持续增长，海尔目前是中国最大的白色家电生产商——加上为其它品牌生产的产品（原始设备制造业务）——当前甚至是电冰箱生产企业的第一名和家电生产企业的第四名。在美国，2003年海尔在迷你电

Today the Haier Group has more than 40 manufacturing plants, eight market research and design centres, and 58,000 sales outlets in 160 countries. It has moved on to the "final" stage of its corporate development, in which it intends to increase the international profile of the "Haier" brand and to position it in line with the requirements of specific market segments. "Market first, profit second." The corporation has decided to pursue a differentiated approach which concentrates on increasing its market share and not on profit maximization.

Foundation of Haier Deutschland GmbH and Reorganization

Since Haier's international organizational structure has as yet not been able to fulfil the expectations of the management, the Group is now engaged in setting up a powerful sales organization in Europe. After the acquisition in 2001 of the Italian company Meneghetti Equipment in Varese, Haier began to ramp up its presence in the European market. The site in Italy was transformed into the European central sales office, which had branches in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This organization proved to be rather ineffective. It suffered from an insufficient knowledge of the European market and the problem that communication between the plants in China and the markets in Europe was inadequate. For this reason the corporation decided to restructure the human resources side of the organization, and in August 2006 transformed the German sales organization located in Wettenberg near Giessen into a self-contained and more flexible GmbH.

There were several good reasons for the decision to found an independent subsidiary in the shape of a GmbH. On the one hand, the expansion of business in Germany – particularly the amount of invoicing and the number of employees at the German location – made it necessary to transform the sales branch in Wettenberg

into a fully-blown German company with the legal status of a GmbH. The legal independence of the German company with Chinese roots, as manager Sun describes the German branch, helps to facilitate the direct contact with the customer, and thus the establishment of a trustworthy relationship.

冰箱市场上的份额占到50%。在利润率较高的葡萄酒冰箱市场上甚至占到70%的市场份额，从而成为市场先导。

这项成功引起了关注：根据咨询机构Reputation Institut新近的一次排名，海尔不仅是品牌声誉最好的中国企业，而且在全球声誉最好的1000家企业排名中也高居第13位。

今天，海尔集团在全球160个国家已拥有40多家制造厂，8家市场调研和设计中心以及58000个销售岗位。它已经历了企业发展的"最后"一个阶段，在这一阶段中，它将"海尔"这一品牌的知名度扩大到全球，并打算根据特殊市场板块的需要进行市场定位。企业决定实行分清主次的方式，将主要精力集中于提高市场份额，盈利最大化放在次要地位，"市场先行，利润第二"。

建立海尔德国有限公司及其重组

由于海尔此前的国际组织结构无法满足企业领导的期望，因此集团需要建立一个强有力的销售机构。从2001年收购意大利瓦雷兹的梅内盖蒂设备公司起，海尔就开始扩大其在欧洲市场的影响：它将意大利的这家公司作为欧洲销售中心，并在德国、法国、英国和荷兰建立其分公司。但这个机构没有体现出足够的效率，缺乏欧洲市场经验，导致中国工厂和欧洲市场间沟通不充分。因此企业决定，对该机构的人事结构做出重新调整，并于2006年8月将设在德国吉森附近维腾堡的销售机构转变为一个独立的有限责任公司，作为自己的子公司。

以有限责任公司的形式建立自己的子公司有多方面的原因。一方面要扩大在德国的业务——尤其在作账范围和雇员数量方面，

Furthermore, the foundation of the GmbH enables Haier to adapt products in the best possible way to the needs of the German market. With 39 million households this comprises just about a fifth of all the consumers in Europe and is thus quite clearly the most important. Sun explains the decision to choose Germany as a location as follows. "We are fully aware of the strategic importance of the German market for our European business. This is the heart of Europe, and this is where we have to be successful – there was not the slightest doubt about that in our minds from the very beginning."

In the meantime Europe CEO Kim, who comes from Korea, has come out in favour of Frankfurt am Main as the new base for Haier Germany. It is true that Wettenberg has good links to motorways and airports, but Kim thinks that moving to Frankfurt will make it easier in the long run to recruit well-qualified specialists and to stay in touch with many of his larger customers. Furthermore, Haier believes that the decision also makes sense on account of the City of Frankfurt's long experience of cooperating with Chinese companies.

Whereas the move to Frankfurt and the associated reorganization of the German subsidiary are still pending, new structures have already been introduced, for example, when it comes to assembling teams:

> In 2006 Haier introduced a system which it refers to as "1+1+n-Box." Every team is to be led by an external industry specialist (1) and a Chinese specialist (1), and, depending on the requirements, will have several local employees (n).

The external experts, whatever their nationality happens to be, have many years of sales experience in the industry, and have already been involved in the successful market entry of other corporations. This practice is based on a model from the American market, where the corporation's success is largely due to U.S. top manager Michael Jamal, who worked with the Haier Group from 1994 onwards as the manager of an American importer, and from 1999 onwards ran the joint company Haier America Trading in New York. The Chinese specialists are sent out from the central offices in Qingdao. The combination of external specialists and internal multipliers means that the whole network has access to the profound specialist knowledge of the external consultants, which can then be passed on throughout the rest of the corporation. Such dissemination of knowledge also takes place at the German location, and this enhances the interfaces with the "home base" or with other locations. Thus communication problems between manufacturing and marketing can be systematically resolved, which in turn means that Haier, by

就必须将维腾堡的销售子公司转变为以有限责任公司为法律形式的子公司，德国子公司的员工们这样说。

> 另一方面，通过这个法律上独立而又扎根中国的德国公司——德国子公司主管孙书宝先生这样定义，可以更容易地与客户建立直接联系乃至互信关系。

同时，为了使产品尽可能地适应德国市场需要，也有必要建立有限责任公司。德国市场向大约五分之一的欧洲终端客户提供3900万台家电，它显然是欧洲最重要的市场。"我们完全意识到了德国市场对欧洲业务的战略重要性。德国是欧洲的中心，我们必须在这里取得成功，这一点我们从一开始就没有怀疑过。"孙先生这样解释在德国设立子公司的原因。

现在，韩裔欧洲总裁金先生希望将法兰克福作为海尔德国新的所在地。虽然从维腾堡上高速公路和机场都很方便，但金先生还是许诺要迁址法兰克福，因为长期来看，那里更容易招募到高学历的专业人才，并与众多大客户更好地建立联系。另外，法兰克福这座城市与中国企业的多年合作经验也是海尔做出这一选择的原因。

新的结构在迁址法兰克福并建立相应的德国新机构之前已经启用，例如在团队组织方面：

> 2006年海尔引入了被称为"1+1+n组合"的系统：每个团队应由一名外部行业专家（1）和一个中国专业人员（1）领导，并根据需要再加入若干当地员工（n）。

reacting swiftly to new market trends, can remain competitive – a particularly effective interpretation of the slogan “think global, act local.”

With regard to the appointment of top excutives, this means that as a rule the leadership of local sales companies consists of local managers and staff sent out from China. In Germany Haier Deutschland GmbH has a Chinese director, Shubao Sun, who studied German at university, and has already worked successfully for Haier in other important foreign markets. He is supported by a local deputy (”Sales Director”). The sales department has a local team of product managers, sales assistants and field service staff, whereas another Chinese employee is in charge of the finance department. He is supported by a German auditor who gained a great deal of experience at subsidiaries of numerous foreign companies, many of them Japanese corporations. Currently there are a total of 22 employees, 19 of them local and three from China.

Decentral Communication and Working Methods

The German Haier subsidiary communicates with Chinese counterparts via the central offices in Qingdao, and in many cases negotiates directly with the plants in China, which operate on a largely independent basis under the umbrella of the Haier Group finance holding. The great advantage of such direct contacts is that it makes it possible to act with greater flexibility and to coordinate the product wish lists of the German market with the manufacturer immediately without wasting time and losing information by going through the central administrative system. The product managers at the various plants not only keep in touch with their couterparts in Wettenberg, but often visit Germany in order to evaluate the quality and features of their competitors’ products, to acquire a feeling for what German customers like, and to get to know the peculiarities of German consumer predilections. This decentralized procedure, it is true, makes it possible to adapt better to local conditions, but is also involves a great deal of work and presupposes continuous coordination in order to guarantee a unified external image of the Haier brand.

Find out more about value creation structures in "Managing the International Value Chain"

外部专家无论来自哪一国，都需要具备该行业多年的销售经验，并有过成功陪同其他企业进入市场的经历。这个系统的运用参照了美国市场的先例。在美国，海尔的成功主要归功于美国顶级经理人迈克尔·简马尔，他从1994年开始作为美国出口公司的总经理与海尔集团合作，1999年以来担任纽约的合作企业海尔美国贸易公司主管。中国专家由青岛总部派遣。通过这种外部专家和内部助推力的组合，整个网络吸收了外部人员的多年专业知识，使之可以在整个企业中传播。这种知识的传递也在德国子公司中得到了推广，从而提高了子公司与总部或其他所在地之间联络工作的效率，例如避免了在生产部门和营销部门之间出现沟通问题，同时海尔也通过对新市场需求作出快速反应而保持了竞争力——这是一个特别有效的模式：“思想全球化，行动本地化”。

海尔德国有限责任公司由总经理孙书宝先生主管，他在大学里曾主修日耳曼文学，其能力已在海尔其他重要海外市场上得到了证明。他在当地代表（“销售主管”）的协助下开展工作。当地的销售团队由产品经理、销售助理和外勤人员组成，财务部门则由另一位中国外派人员主管，一名德国财务监控员协助他的工作，该财务监控员在很多外国企业——特别是日本企业的子公司积累了多年工作经验。目前总共有22名员工，其中19人来自当地，3人来自中国。

非中心式的沟通和工作方式

德国的海尔子公司不仅和青岛总部的负责人联络，很多时候还直接与中国的工厂取得联系，这些中国工厂在海尔集团旗下通过金融控股各自独立运作。这种直接的

您可以参阅《国际性新创价值管理》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于新创价值的建构的内容。

Staircase in the Forbidden City in Beijing – **紫禁城台阶**

交流表现出很多优点，它可以令处理方式更灵活，并将德国市场对产品的要求马上转达给制造商，以便它们可以尽快调整产品，这样就避免了由中央管理部门居中转达而造成的时间和信息上的损失。各个工厂的产品经理不仅会定期与维腾堡的负责人取得联系，还经常到德国考察，了解竞争对手产品的质量和装备特性，增强对德国顾客审美观的敏感度，熟悉德国消费习惯的特点。这种非中心工作方式虽然可以更好地适应当地条件，但也需要做大量工作，并要求双方始终保持密切合作，以确保海尔品牌对外形象统一。

The Sales Strategy of the Haier Group in Germany

Haier's sales strategy in Germany makes use of various distributors ranging from retailers to purchasing cooperatives and specialist chain stores, wholesalers, kitchen manufacturers and OEM manufacturing for other brand name companies. Haier is now selling its products via all these sales channels.

> Hitherto the acquisition of powerful marketing partners able to promote its products was of crucial importance for such successes. Currently efforts are beginning to be made to appeal to end consumers themselves.

For example, the corporation has enlisted the services of a German advertising consultancy, and has embarked on a marketing partnership with eismann, the frozen food home delivery service. A sponsor of the Olympic Games 2008, the corporation placed its "green" products at the disposal of the organizers in order to facilitate "green Olympic Games in Beijing." The Haier Group is hoping to improve the image of its household appliances with activities of this kind. It is also trying to document the quality and good operating data of its products by obtaining certificates and recommendations from product testing institutes and foundations. Haier is pinning its hopes on "flagship products" that are designed to lift the brand into the premier segment, and is positioning itself as an environment-friendly manufacturer of energy efficient products.

At the same time the corporation is enlarging its range of products on the highly competitive German market. In addition to refrigerators, washing machines and dishwashers, it is hoping to turn flat screen TVs (manufactured in Poland) into another source of income. This is an unusually wide range of products when compared with German manufacturers of white goods. With regard to sales of large appliances in Germany, maintenance and repairs currently constitute another important challenge. Like many of its competitors, Haier has decided not to provide these itself, but to entrust them to an established and experienced service and maintenance company. In order to be able to minimize repair costs during the warranty period, Haier has identified a need for action in two areas: Rigorous quality management will reduce the possibility of repairs, as will sales of higher quality products. Quality improvement and the development of higher quality products is the task of the Chinese plants, whereas popularizing their profiles in the markets is the task of the local marketing departments. Success will materialize only if both sides – development and marketing, the plants in China and the subsidiary in Gemany – work together.

海尔集团在德国的销售战略

海尔在德国的销售战略是采用不同的分销商：从零售商到采购合作社、专业市场链、批发商、厨房制造商，到为名牌制造商进行外来加工——海尔目前利用所有的分销渠道进行销售。

> 此前，销售的成功主要取决于能否获得强有力的合作伙伴以助其产品销售。但现在的首要任务是与终端客户建立联系。

比如启用一家德国广告代理商为企业提供咨询，以及与本地深层冷冻供货服务商艾斯曼公司建立市场合作关系。作为2008年奥运会的赞助商，企业倡导"绿色"产品，努力打造"绿色北京奥运会"。海尔集团不仅要通过这些行动来改善其家用电器的形象，而且还努力争取获得质检机构和基金会的证书及品质保证，来为其良好的质量及使用价值进行担保。因为海尔的"龙头产品"目标是占领高价值市场板块，同时，海尔也将自身定位于环保的节能产品制造商。

此外，企业也期望在竞争激烈的德国市场上推出自己的产品系列：除了电冰箱、洗衣机和洗碗机外，企业还准备将纯平电视显示器（在波兰制造）发展为另一支柱——与德国其他白电生产商相比，这是非常宽广的产品范围。在德国大家电的销售中，目前服务是另一个特别重要的挑战。像很多其他竞争对手一样，海尔不打算亲自完成这项工作，而决定转包给一家经验丰富的外设服务公司。为了将保质期内的维修费用降至最低，海尔意识到必须采取两项措施：一是实行严格的质量管理以降低返修率，二是定位于高价值产品。提高质量和研发高价值产品是中国工厂的任务，树立产品在市场上的形象是当地营销部门的工作。为了共同取得成

Building a Common Corporate Culture

The German branch of Haier was rather German in character from the very beginning.

> There are hardly any communication problems between the German workforce and the Chinese management, since the latter possesses a great deal of intercultural competence.

However, if other global locations are involved in a decision-making process – for example, the central offices in Qingdao or individual plants in China – differences in work rhythm and communication patterns can certainly become apparent. For this reason Haier has enlisted the help of external consultants in order to make these corporate procedures and processes more transparent, and easier to deal with. It also intends to standardize the hierarchy levels in all the various locations. Furthermore, the corporation is promoting the creation of a common corporate culture. The central offices in Qingdao are not primarily concerned to enforce all their own ideas and notions of value, but to combine positive cultural habits from around the world. American entrepreneurship, German thoroughness, Japanese work morale, and Chinese ethics are to intermingle and thus to form something new.

In its mission statement Haier, in addition to values such as reliability, innovation and customer orientation, emphasized two other main issues at an early stage: committed environmentalism and the interpersonal values which are symbolized by the "Haier Brothers," children from various ethnic backgrounds who like to play together. "Haier University" was set up in Qingdao in order to ensure that these values will continue to play a central role in the corporation. It is a spacious educational centre in which all the employees can take further education courses for two weeks every year. There is also a traditional Chinese garden which, despite Haier's pronounced international character, symbolizes its Chinese roots.

In China Haier is a model corporation which has been successful in foreign markets for a long time and pays its employees far more than other Chinese companies. Thus it is hardly surprising that in recent years Haier has been able to attract many talented young people from famous universities, and that as a result the human resources structure taken as a whole is rather youthful. The average age of the employees is 30, and that of the top management is 38. In order to promote the corporate culture in all the various locations, there are frequent

功，双方——研发和市场，中国的工厂和德国的子公司必须同心协力。

建立共同的企业文化

海尔的德国子公司从一开始就打下了深刻的德国烙印。

> 就连德国职工和中国管理层之间也几乎没有沟通障碍，因为中国管理者已具备了很强的跨文化工作能力。

如果在决策过程中还涉及其他投资地——青岛总部或中国的各个工厂，那么他们的工作节奏和沟通方式当然会明显不同。因此海尔在外部咨询师的协助下，将企业的工序和流程透明化，使其便于监管，并抛开所在地的限制对制度等级进行调整。此外，海尔还推进共同企业文化的建立。对于青岛总部来说，没有必要让子公司与总部在价值观上保持完全的统一，贯彻总部的所有想法，而最好是将世界各地积极的文化因素都融入企业文化中：美国的企业主威望、德国的一丝不苟、日本的职业道德，当然还有中国的伦理，这些因素应该在一个新的整体中共同成长。

在企业方针中，除了诚信、创新和客户导向等价值观外，海尔还从很早就开始强调另外两个重点：坚定的环保主义和人际价值，这表现在"海尔"兄弟的图标中——不同种族背景、正在玩耍的小孩。为了让这一价值观更好地在企业中确立起来，企业在青岛自己创办了一所"海尔大学"，这是一座宏伟的培训中心，每年都为所有员工提供两周进修课程。那里还有一个传统式的中国花园，象征着世界各地的海尔公司都根在中国。

team meetings and further education sessions. As in many other international corporations, the integration of the corporate culture continues to be one of the most important challenges of the future.

Stepping Stones to the Future

Despite international successes and successful market entries in the U.S., in Japan and in the European area, especially in Italy, there are other markets such as Germany, for example, where certain challenges still persist. On the one hand, the German market is targeted by other manufacturers, and on the other hand, it is deemed to be very specific on account of the customer requirements alluded to above. Thus market management strategies that have been successful elsewhere will have to be modified. That a process of this kind is already in progress is reflected in general terms by the fact that Haier's traditional tendency to grow more or less organically in the international arena has been replaced by a policy of acquisitions. This was seen in the attempt to take over Maytag, the U.S. household appliances manufacturer.

Furthermore, the Haier Group, especially in Germany, still has to overcome certain prejudices. Japanese and Korean models show that this is possible, although it will take some time.

The investment in the German Haier GmbH – both in financial terms and in the context of trying to create an intercultural corporate culture – will probably enhance Haier's prospects, partly on account of the additional experience and skills which accrue step by step in a market that is as difficult as the German one. It will certainly bring the Haier Group yet another step closer to its vision of what lies ahead. "Chinese brand is the future." ■

海尔在中国是一家示范企业，它很早就勇于进军海外市场。相对其他中国企业，这里的员工报酬高于平均值。毫不奇怪，海尔在过去的几年中能够从著名学府招募到很多年轻而有才华的新人，使人员结构实现总体年轻化：职工平均年龄为30岁，高层管理人员平均38岁。为了让企业文化能够在所有所在地深入人心，海尔经常举办会议和进修活动——像许多国际企业一样，企业文化整合在未来仍将是一项重要挑战。

未来的战略转变

在国际上，尽管企业已成功打入了美国、日本和欧洲区——首先是意大利的市场，但在其他市场上——比如德国，还有许多困难要克服。因为一方面德国市场已经被其他制造商牢牢占领，另一方面就象上面所说的——客户要求非常特殊，因此在其他市场上已经取得成功的经营战略还要经过修改才能使用。从已经采用的流程来看，海尔原先主要通过有机增长的方式实现全球发展，而收购美国家用电器制造商美泰克的行动却表明企业正在向着通过国际并购来实现增长的方式调整。

此外，海尔集团在德国还要与几个偏见作战。日本和韩国的先例都证明，这些偏见是可以纠正的，但是需要大量的时间。

对德国海尔有限责任公司的投资不仅包括财务上的投入，也包括创造国际企业文化方面的努力，这些投资可以让企业在德国这样困难重重的市场上逐渐积累起丰富的经验，培养出强大的实力，从而大幅提高海尔发展的可持续性，使海尔集团在实现自己远景目标——"中国商标就是未来"的道路上更进一步。■

Speaking with Wei Wang

Senior manager of the Chinese Service Group
at Deloitte & Touche GmbH, Düsseldorf

王炜先生访谈录

杜塞尔多夫德勤公司中国企业海外投资专家

"With a growing understanding for cross-border corporate cultures we will become aware that it is not of decisive importance to tie them into a theoretical model. It is far more important to hone one's own awareness of the key factors of intercultural management."

"随着对跨国企业文化理解的不断加深，我们认识到，起决定作用的并不是理论模式，而是培养对跨文化管理中核心因素的敏感性。"

Mr Wang, Chinese companies are expanding their international business activities. In order to be successful on the competitive markets of the West, they are having to face up to issues such as cross-border and cross-cultural management. How far have Chinese companies progressed with regard to the internationalization of their activities and the development of a sustainable corporate culture?

China looks back on a long tradition of trade. History is full of examples of a successful combination of the positive features of traditional culture and a striving for economic efficiency. This bridge is just as topical today as it has always been. Thirty years after the start of China's reform and open-door policy its corporations are going through a period of repositioning and simultaneous rapid growth. They are at a stage of their development in which they are trying to garner international experience and attempting to establish a modern Chinese corporate culture. In view of this fact and of the growing trend to do business globally far away from the familiar domestic market it is now imperative to become aware of

王先生，中国企业不断地扩展其国际商业活动。为了能够在西方自由竞争市场上成功地占有一席之地，他们必须正视跨境及跨文化管理的问题。中国企业在业务国际化和发展持久的企业文化方面进展如何？

中国具有悠久的商贸传统。历史上不乏将传统文化中的积极因素与对经济效益的追求成功结合的范例，这种结合在当今仍一如既往地具有现实意义。中国改革开放政策实施三十年后的今天，企业在迅速成长的同时正处于一个新定位阶段。目前他们正处在发展阶段，在这一阶段中，企业积累国际经验并构建现代意义的中国企业文化。鉴于这种事实和趋势，企业在建立中国商务关系之外，还必须意识到中西方企业文化的碰撞所

the challenges which materialize when Chinese and Western corporate cultures meet. Since Chinese culture is not yet part of the mainstream or a global trendsetter, Chinese companies in Western countries should strive for cultural integration, which would also be consonant with their traditional and integrative character. In this context it is absolutely essential to look beneath the surface and to acquire a profound understanding of Western corporate culture. It is imbued with an entrepreneurial spirit which encompasses both the idea of modern contracts and an ethical kind of utilitarianism. Dealing with the dissimilarities between one's own and Western corporate culture in the right way makes it possible to transform intercultural misunderstandings into a dynamic kind of innovative power. Such new experiences and greater awareness will not only be of decisive importance for the success or failure of Chinese companies abroad, but will promote the ongoing development of an authentic Chinese corporate culture which as a result of globalization is developing at breakneck speed and at the same time managing to preserve its original core.

带来的挑战。由于中国文化尚不属于世界的“主流”或“影响潮流者”，因此，设立在西方国家的中国公司应致力于文化融合——这也符合其传统的、包容的特性。在这种情况下，必须着眼于表象之下的本质，并对西方企业文化进行全面的解读：西方的企业文化受现代企业家精神影响，既包括现代契约主义思想也包含带有人文精神印记的功效主义。对自身和西方企业文化间差异的正确处理，能够使跨文化的摩擦损耗转化为积极、动态的创新力量。这种意识将不仅成为海外中国企业成功或失败的决定因素，还将推动本土的中国企业文化持续发展。在全球化的背景下，这种发展是高速衍化的，但却能够同时保持其初始的核心本质。

What competences are needed in order to be able to understand the corporate culture of a different civilization?

要想理解其他文化背景下的企业文化，必须具备哪些能力？

Western corporate cultures may be based on the same basic concepts, but they nonetheless have numerous and at times unique features which are partly determined by a company's country of origin. With a growing understanding for cross-border corporate cultures we will become aware that it is not of decisive importance to tie them into a theoretical model. It is far more important to hone one's awareness of the key factors of intercultural management. If someone is doing business for the first time in another country he may find public, professional and private life rather disconcerting. The initial fascination of what is strange can quickly give way to frustration. At the same time the newcomer will be treated with a certain tolerance, though there are limits to such a “trial period.” A local counterpart may initially be prepared to turn a blind eye to certain things, but in the course of time he or she will expect a cultural stranger to adopt the local conventions. Only someone with an educational background of a humanist kind who possesses both the willingness and the ability to be alert and to keep adding to what he or she knows can grasp the social dimension of the corporate culture of a foreign country and adapt his or her conduct accordingly. The rules governing competition in overseas markets, which are subject to constant change and call for entrepreneurial flexibility, also play an important role. A growing number of Chinese managers are working successfully in the exacting high-end markets. In addition to their excellent professional qualifications they are developing an awareness of the significance of social and ethical issues. Such skills

即便西方的企业文化建立在同一基石上，也因受到企业源起国文化的影响而显示出多样的及个别独有的特征。随着对跨国企业文化的不断理解，我们了解到，起决定作用的并不是理论模式，而是培养对跨文化管理中核心因素的敏感性。当某人第一次身处另一国度时，通常他会对那里的公众、职业及私人生活感到惊讶。最初，这种生活方式对于陌生者充满了魅力，但很快又使他们失望；同时新手们也会得到某种程度的宽容，不过这个“宽容期限”也是有限度的。尽管当地人可以在最初宽容地忽略某些事情，但随着时间的推移，他们还是期待文化外来者能够懂得遵守本国的礼仪。只有具备高度人文素质、拥有持续学习的准备和能力的人，才能够正确掌握特殊的、外国的企业文化的社会维度，并使自身行为与之适应。

另外，不断变化、要求企业应变能力的海外市场竞争环境也扮演着重要角色。在苛求的高端市场上成绩卓越的中国管理者的群

ought to play a role in the selection and training of Chinese executives who are being prepared for assignments in Western countries.

What should Chinese companies do if they are beginning to operate on the international market and are looking for an appropriate corporate culture?

As their business takes them overseas, Chinese companies see themselves confronted with a variety of challenges which can often be mastered only by adapting their corporate culture. Once the latter has been designed and coordinated to fit in with its environment, it should be incorporated systematically into the globalization strategy. In order to be able to shape internationalization and make it a success, it is absolutely essential to implant the principles of intercultural management firmly in the organizational development. The Deloitte Culture Blue Print comprises the areas which can provide the orientation needed for a successful globalization strategy: external focus, results, structure, relationships and a learning culture.

体在持续增长。他们除具有出色的专业技能外，还显示出这样一种意识，即社会和伦理问题具有同样重要的意义。因此，在挑选和训练将任职于西方国家的中国管理者时，必须要首先注重上述能力。

对于即将进入国际市场且希望构建相应企业文化的中国企业，您有哪些建议?

在海外的商业活动中，中国企业面临不同的挑战，而这些挑战很多情况下是可以通过调整企业文化予以化解的。所以必须在全球化战略中系统地引进着意构建、且适应其外界环境的企业文化。为能够成功地打造国际化，在集团发展中确定跨文化管理原则是十分重要的。德勤文化蓝图所展示的范围，能够作为成功全球化战略的航标：外部焦点、效益、结构、关系及学习文化。

Deloitte Culture Blue Print

德勤：文化蓝图

External Focus 外部焦点	How the organization responds to the external environment 集团如何对其外界环境做出反应	
	_ Focus on client _ Strategic context	_ 客户关系 _ 战略环境
Results/Achievement 效益/结果	How the organization drives action and achieves results 集团如何开展其行动，如何达到其目标	
	_ Commitment to results _ Action orientated	_ 目标导向 _ 行动导向
Structure/Consistency 结构/持续性	How the organization structures work to achieve consistency 集团组织其活动以达到连续性	
	_ Protocol _ Conformity	_ 行动方针 _ 一致性
Relationships 关系	How people in the organization interact with, and treat each other 集团员工如何交往，如何相处	
	_ Collaboration _ Supportiveness	_ 协同工作 _ 互相支持
Learning/Adaptive 学习文化/ 应变能力	How the organization learns and adapts to change 集团如何学习，如何进行自身适应性调整	
	_ Support innovation _ Encourage learning	_ 创造改革文化 _ 鼓励学习

When implementing these fields corporations should take into account the following suggestions.

_ Assemble an executive team with international experience
_ Define your business model, organization, brand image and procedure
_ Align executive leadership and middle management
_ Communicate with your employees, customers and shareholders
_ Reward willingness to produce results and reactive speed
_ Pursue integration systematically in order to release synergies
_ Formulate the envisaged corporate culture and a goal-oriented initiative plan
_ Enshrine the company values in all organizations step by step
_ Continue to look on a regular basis for ways of adapting the corporate culture to its environment
_ Show your appreciation of cultural diversity

A corporation's cultural diversity and cultural diversity management are often crucial to its success or lack of success. In the course of developing and implementing a global strategy it is therefore important to be critical and to ask the following questions: What elements of the corporate culture are of essential importance for the corporation's global strategy? Is the current corporate culture still viable in the context of the globalization strategy? How do we deal with existing differences? Are we dealing with cultural diversity in an appropriate manner? How can we implant our corporate values in new subsidiaries overseas?

Cultural diversity does not exist only within corporations which operate on an international basis. Their customers also belong to different cultures. What role do cultural differences play in international marketing?

The success or otherwise of international marketing depends on recognizing cultural differences, dealing with them in an appropriate manner, and utilizing them in a productive way. International marketing is a business activity that takes its bearings from people. To date, despite the progress of globalization, it has been impossible to detect the emergence of homogeneous consumer tastes. In fact, the opposite is the case, since geo-cultural preferences are becoming more and more pronounced.

Confucius says that one "should find out about prohibitions, customs and taboos when one crosses a border" (Record of Rites, Book 1, Etiquette). In international marketing a knowledge of cultural taboos is absolutely essential. Some taboos are quite easy to pin down. For example, on Lufthansa aircraft one looks in vain for row 13. Other taboos, on the other hand, are not quite as visible. However, they

除上述表格所示，企业还应当注意以下建议：

_ 组建具有国际经验的领导团队。
_ 明确商业模式、组织、品牌形象以及行为方式。
_ 协调领导层和中间管理层。
_ 与员工、客户及股东进行交流。
_ 促进积极性和快速应变能力。
_ 推动系统一体化以实现协同效应。
_ 制定明确的企业文化以及目标导向的创新计划。
_ 在所有组织中逐步确立企业价值。
_ 寻找不断调整企业文化以适应外界环境的可能性。
_ 表明对文化多样性的尊重。

通常，文化多样性和对文化多样性的管理是企业成功或失败的决定性变量。在全球化战略的发展和实施过程中，我们必须对下列问题进行着重分析：我们企业文化中的哪些要素对于企业全球化战略来说是不可或缺的？我们目前的企业文化在全球化战略的背景下能否继续适用？我们如何应对已经存在的差异？我们处理文化多样性的方式是否适当？如何在海外新设分公司中确立我们的企业价值？

文化多样性不仅存在于国际企业内部，其客户也属于不同的文化群体。文化差异在国际市场上起到哪些作用？

取得国际营销的成功，关键就是要认清文化差异、恰当地对待这些差异并利用这些差异来达到商业成功。国际营销表现为经济贸易，其以人为指向。迄今，尽管市场全球化程度在不断加深，但却没有实现一体化的消费者需求。更确切地说是走向了相反的发展方向：地缘文化所引起的倾向性将越来越显著。

can also be tracked down if one looks attentively at a foreign culture. It is far more difficult to find out about customs, since customs and the cultural factors which influence consumer behaviour change in a never-ending and unconscious manner. Understanding culture-specific consumer psychology and interpreting its meaning is extremely difficult.

With reference to China and Europe, could you clarify some of the difficulties associated with trying to assess consumer preferences?

Cultural differences have an effect on all aspects of marketing – product design, market positioning, pricing and market research. There are numerous examples of the misinterpretation of Western and Eastern cultures. For example, in Europe the assumption persists that products for the Chinese market must never be white, come what may. For, so the reasoning goes, this colour is traditionally associated with mourning. The fact is that the majority of household appliances in China are white. The popular Apple computer is known under its nickname, "The Little White." Another example is the design of household appliances. Whereas in China the emphasis tends to be placed on a bright and user-friendly design, often with playful elements, in Europe the focus is on simple functionality. So it is impossible to use ourselves as a yardstick if we want to understand others. The exact opposite is the case. It is absolutely essential to learn to look at products through the eyes of a European consumer. Thus we must develop a style of our own which is based on the aesthetic sensibilities of European consumers and their insistence on quality, and at the same time harks back to Chinese civilization.

What are the particular challenges of intercultural management which Chinese companies have to deal with in the internationalization process?

The theoretical foundations of intercultural management are rather meagre. However, combining strategic location decisions with systematic cultural integration is the only practicable approach. Yet implementation should not be dogmatic, for local employees have a far better understanding of the various national markets. This does not exclude the possibility that the global brand strategy can be efficiently managed by the top executive level. The relationship between Chinese managers and foreign employees should resemble that which exists between the proprietor of a restaurant and his cook. Even if the proprietor himself is not able to do what his cook can do, he can still evaluate the quality of the food that is being served.

孔夫子言：入境问禁，入境问俗，入境问忌。在国际营销中，这种关于文化禁忌的意识是基本前提。某些禁忌可以明显地感觉到。所以在汉莎公司的飞机上不设第13排。相反，其它的一些禁忌却并非显而易见。但是，如果加以留心，这些禁忌还是能够被发现的。难得多的则是了解习惯，因为影响消费行为的习惯和任何一个文化因素都在不断地、无意识地改变。因此，抓住文化特有的消费者心理及对其做出正确解释是最困难的。

您能否着眼于中国和欧洲在消费者需求评估上的困难做一下详细地阐述?

文化差异对所有的经营领域都产生影响——产品设计、市场定位、价格制定以及市场调研。东西方文化误解的例子是多种多样的。在欧洲，很多人固执地认为，投放到中国的产品绝不可以是白色的。理由是，白色在中国传统上意味着悲伤。事实上，中国大多数的家用器具都是白色的。流行的苹果电脑也以"小白"的爱称而闻名。再以家用器具的设计为例：在中国，鲜明的、便于使用的造型——通常含有愉快甚至花哨的设计元素——十分重要，而欧洲则更关注直接的功能性。我们不可能以自身为衡量标准而去试图理解他人。相反，我们有必要学会从欧洲消费者的视角去看待产品。为此，我们必须打造出属于自己的风格，即既包括跨文化美学感悟力，也符合欧洲消费者的质量要求，同时也体现了中国的文化。

中国企业在国际化进程中所必须面对的跨文化管理的特别挑战在哪里?

当地的员工具有更好的洞察本国市场的能力， 系统的文化融合为唯一可行的方向。但这种运用不能走向教条主义，而这也不排除全球品牌战略可以由上级领导层有效地驾

Ancient Chinese coin – 仿古钱币

Confucius said that “Nature brings forth things which are the same. It is learning which makes all the difference.” He was of the opinion that in essence people resembled each other. However, we should not succumb to blind optimism and transfer marketing and management successes achieved on the Chinese market without further ado to Western markets. By the same token we should not underestimate ourselves by acquiescing in the view that Chinese marketing and management strategies can never be applied overseas. It would be far better to develop a healthy and objective self-esteem.

驭。中国管理者与外籍员工的关系就好比餐厅经营者和其厨师的关系。即便经营者自己没有能力从事烹饪工作，但他依然有对菜的质量做出评价的能力。

孔夫子言：性相近，习相远。据此，人类的本质是相似的。但是我们不能在盲目乐观中迷失自我，将在中国市场上获得的经营和管理的成功经验不加思考地搬到西方市场。同样，我们也不能低估自己，消极地认为中国的市场和管理策略在海外不能适用。正确的做法是树立健康、客观的自信心。

How will Chinese corporate culture develop in the years ahead, and where do you see opportunities for intercultural cooperation?

Chinese companies are increasingly beginning to recognize that business success can have something to do with the economic potential of corporate culture. Furthermore, they are learning fast. Chinese culture is characterized by great adaptability and a high degree of integrative power, and the mingling of Chinese and Western corporate cultures will turn out to be beneficial to both sides, since Chinese companies are learning to understand how to approach Western markets with greater cultural sensitivity. As a result they will be able to shape their business activities overseas so that their success will not only be temporary. On top of this is the fact that rethinking is in progress in international marketing on both the Chinese and Western sides. In future precisely targeted and coordinated marketing strategies will underpin market participation in the respective cultural environments. However, in the long term these changes in corporate culture will only prove to be positive if Chinese companies manage to identify and preserve significant elements of their own civilization. ■

您认为中国的企业文化在未来将会如何发展以及跨文化合作的契机在哪里？

中国企业日益认识到企业文化的经济能力对其商业成功的重大意义，并且学习得很快。这体现出中国文化很强的适应性及高度的整合能力。中西方企业文化的融合在将来必然为双方创造利益，因为中国企业越来越懂得文化敏感地在西方市场上活动。因此，他们的海外业务能够不断地取得进展和成功。此外，在国际营销中，中西企业都产生了思想转变，精确协调的营销策略将给在任一另外文化背景下从业的市场参与者提供支持。但是，只有当中国企业辨明并保持其自身文化的核心要素，上述企业文化中的改变才能在长期的实践中焕发出积极的作用。■

Wei Wang

Wei Wang joined Deloitte in 2004 and is in charge of daily operations at the German Chinese Services Group; besides functions of business development, marketing and internal organization he has been coordinating various out- and inbound projects on the files of assurance, tax advisory, M&A and IPO. Before joining Deloitte, Wei Wang worked as research assistant for Economics at Free University of Berlin (economic theory and politics); he holds Masters degree in Economics of University of Innsbruck (Austria) and Masters degreee in Business Administration at Humboldt University of Berlin.

王炜

王炜先生2004年进入德勤公司，主要负责处理中国服务部的日常工作，在业务开发、市场管理和内部组织的工作之外他还协调管理了多个德国企业在华投资和中国企业在欧洲投资的并购、税务、审计和上市项目。在进入德勤之前，他曾在柏林自由大学担任科研助理（经济理论和经济政策）。他是奥地利因斯布鲁克大学的经济学硕士和德国柏林洪堡大学的企业管理硕士。

The Successful Internationalization of Chinese Corporations in Germany

中国企业在德国成功实现国际化

Aims and Motives of Market Entry in Germany

Whereas it is true that the companies described in this study have invested in Germany in various different ways, they all have similar goals. Their motives can be divided up into three levels which, if one looks at individual cases, can often become effective simultaneously, though the weighting may differ.

进入德国市场的目标与动机

本书介绍的企业虽然在德国的投资方式各异，但是它们的目标大致相似。其动机可以划分为三个层次，而具体到每个公司，这三个层次又往往是同时进行的，只不过各自的侧重点不同。

Structure of motives for market entry of Chinese companies in Germany

进入德国市场的中国企业的动机结构

The primary motive on the basis of which all the companies in the study entered the German market is forward-looking and sustainable development and the enhancement of the resources and skills of the parent company. Thus for companies such as Beijing No. 1, Lenovo or the SGSB Group, the principal elements were technology and the transfer of a brand. Haier was interested in local marketing and industry expertise. For Baosteel and Minmetals the primary needs associated with the German market (in addition to local industry expertise) initially included purchasing raw materials and steels for domestic production and processing.

The secondary motive, which is tapping into new markets inside and outside China, has as its goal ensuring and increasing international competitiveness in the medium and long term. For example, for Haier, the manufacturer of household appliances, Germany, despite the fact that it still constitutes no more than a relatively small proportion of the total European turnover, is the hub of its European operations on account of its central position and the significance of its market, and thus of high strategic importance as it taps into European markets. For companies such as Baosteel and Minmetals Germany is also among the most important markets, and it is from here that sales and trade in all the European markets, and also in those of Africa or the Middle East can be handled and managed.

Another way of tapping into new market segments was chosen by Beijing No.1 and the SGSB Group. With the help of their German subsidiaries they developed new product lines which combine high German quality standards and low Chinese manufacturing costs. In this way it is possible to reach new target groups in China itself and thus to expand the original business in a profitable manner.

Even though its importance differs from case to case, the basic motive shared by all of the companies in the study in the context of internationalization in Germany is the search for new and lucrative investment opportunities. Most of the investment capital does not stem from the much-vaunted Chinese sovereign funds with their billions of dollars, but from available corporate financial resources which have accumulated as a result of the flourishing business environment brought about by the opening of the People's Republic, and which are now being invested to generate more profits.

In general the motives alluded to correspond to the results of other international studies on the overall goals of Chinese internationalization activities. The only motive which is missing is the global search for energy and sources of raw

考察所有进入德国市场的企业，它们的高级动机都是要使母公司能够更好地面向未来、持续发展、拓展资源和增强能力。对于中国企业而言，进入德国市场的高级动机可以归纳为以下几个方面：例如北京第一机床厂、联想和上工申贝集团主要是为了技术和品牌转让，海尔是为了利用当地的营销知识和行业知识，宝钢和中国五矿集团除了利用当地行业知识以外，更是为了给国内生产和再加工采购原材料。

而它们的次级动机——开发中国国内和国际新的销售市场，则是为了以下的目标：着眼于中长期积极应对国际竞争挑战。例如对家电生产商海尔来说，虽然它目前在欧洲市场销售总额所占比例还不是很高，但是由于德国所处的中心位置及其处于欧洲运营市场枢纽的重要地位，对于开发欧洲销售市场而言无疑具有高度的战略性意义。而对宝钢和中国五矿集团来说，德国也是属于重要的市场，从这里开展贸易，产品不仅可以销往欧洲其它所有的市场，还可以为非洲或者中东地区的市场提供服务和进行调控。

北京第一机床厂和上工申贝集团选择了另一种开发新市场环节的可能性：和它们的德国分公司共同开发新产品，将德国的高质量和中国的低生产成本进行优化组合，进而在中国也能够开辟新的消费群体，扩大原有业务领域，带来更多利润。

分析研究案例中到德国来完成国际化的企业，尽管它们的基本动机有强弱之分，无不体现了他们追求新投资能带来丰厚的利润回报。不过这些投资大多并非来自经常提及的数以亿计的中国国家基金，而是自由的、归各自企业所有的资金。这是中华人民共和国改革开放以来经济活力自身所积累的资金，而现在投入这些资金是为了利润。

materials, though in the case of Germany this is easy to understand. The analysis of the motives in the chosen examples also corresponds to studies (Buckley et al., forthcoming; Child and Rodrigues, 2005) which show that Chinese market entries have hitherto tended to be motivated by a desire to amass new resources and skills, and not by the prospective use of existing unique resources and skills. However, this may change in the near future as a result of the rapid development of Chinese multinational corporations

Selected Types of Market Entry

The companies described in the case studies chose subsidiaries or local offices as the way in which to enter the German market. These were either acquired or set up as corporate branches.

Three of the six companies described here entered the German market by means of acquisitions, the SGSB Groups and Beijing No. 1 directly by purchasing Dürkopp Adler or Waldrich Coburg, Lenovo indirectly by purchasing IBM's PC business and its global subsidiaries. In all these cases the companies that were purchased were up for sale, either on account of a change of ownership, as in the case of Dürkopp Adler and Waldrich Coburg, or as a result of a strategy change, as in the case of IBM.

The most important common feature which determined the choice of a particular company was the compatibility of Chinese competences and German skills. In the case of Lenovo and IBM the takeover led to improved processes and even to the emergence of a lively "start-up" culture. In the case of Dürkopp Adler and the SGSB Group, and Waldrich Coburg and Beijing No. 1, cooperation facilitated the move into new markets in China and in Germany.

Even if it was not always easy for the two sides to cope with the new situation and to develop new concepts, the three corporate mergers were none the less a success. The fact that the partners had got to know each other over a long period of time turned out to be rather useful. Beijing No. 1 and Waldrich Coburg knew each other as a result of many years of partnership in China, IBM knew Lenovo because it was an OEM manufacturer, and Dürkopp Adler AG and the SGSB Group had got to know each other in the course of protracted negotiations that went on for years.

In all these companies the takeover had a positive effect on the employment situation, and this proved to be beneficial to the employees and the location: At

总的来看，上述动机与另外一些国际调研机构有关中国企业国际化追求的总体目标调查结果相符合。这里唯一缺少的就是在世界各地寻求能源与原材料的动机，而考虑到德国的情况也就不难理解。这里所选案例的分析也和前几年的调查(参阅：巴克利等，以及查尔德和罗德利古斯，2005)结果一致，表明迄今中国进入国际市场的主要动机是开发新的资源和能力，而不是为了利用现有的专项资源与能力。这也可能会随着中国跨国公司的迅速发展而很快改变。

市场进入方式的选择

案例中分析的企业选择以建立子公司或分公司的方式进入德国市场，要么通过并购，要么通过建立自己的代表处，来达到这一目的。

这里介绍的六家公司当中有三家是通过并购进入德国市场的：上工申贝集团和北京第一机床厂分别通过直接并购杜克普爱华和瓦德里希科堡公司的方式，联想则是直接并购IBM个人电脑业务，及其在世界各地相关联的子公司。上述所有案例中被并购的公司都是待售的企业，杜克普爱华和瓦德里希科堡这两家企业出售的原因是由于企业所有权的变换，IBM则是因为改变了经营战略。

选择企业并购有一个最为显著的共同点，那就是中方能力和德方技术的完美结合：联想通过购买IBM改善了流程，甚至打造了一种生机勃勃的"重组"文化，而杜克普爱华与上工申贝集团以及，瓦德里希科堡和北京第一机床厂则通过合作，使得在中国和德国市场的开发都变得更加容易。

虽然对双方而言，应对新形势共同制定方案并不是一帆风顺，但是这三家企业的重组都是成功的。这些伙伴经历了一个长期的

Lenovo the number of employees doubled within three years from 85 to 170. At Waldrich Coburg it rose within three years from ca 500 to 700, and at Dürkopp Adler in the same period from 450 to 555.

In addition to the employment situation the takeover also had a positive effect on the balance sheet. Both no doubt increased the motivation of the workforce and contributed to reducing the potential for conflict in a critical transitional phase. Initial scepticism or the existential anxieties of the employees either turned out to be unfounded or were dispelled as the business developed in a positive way. An atmosphere of mutual trust emerged.

A different type of market entry was chosen by Baosteel, Minmetals and Haier. They started out in the German market with representative offices which were subsequently transformed into fully-fledged subsidiaries. The most striking similarity is probably the progressive enlargement of the representative offices into independent GmbHs. Whereas the representative office made it possible to get the feel of the German market, the expansion of the business led to more localization, for example, registering the domicile of the court where disputes can be settled, coming under the jurisdiction of the German internal revenue, and the recruitment of local employees. All of the case studies demonstrate that the resolute localization of a business leads inexorably to success.

This was the only way in which the companies were able to deal with the challenge they were all up against, which was to master the task of closing the gap between a globally active Chinese parent corporation and a home-grown German subsidiary. It is to be expected that Chinese companies will increasingly enter the German market with the help of their own subsidiaries, since they can build on the growing experience of their predecessors and are now on a higher level of internationalization. The fact that more intense global competitive pressure makes it increasingly impossible to proceed at a leisurely pace may well be a contributory element.

In the case of this group of the companies included in this survey it also becomes apparent that familiarity or common experiences are helpful when it comes to getting off to a good start at a new location. For example, Minmetals Germany chose Düsseldorf as its location because it had had relationships with local industry for many years, and because Japanese investors had previously found the city very much to their liking. Furthermore, the city had gone to great lengths to help the Chinese company to achieve its aims. Baosteel chose Hamburg as its location because there was a long-standing partnership between Hamburg and China..

互相认识过程，而这已经证明正是他们的优势。作为伙伴，北京第一机床厂和瓦德里希科堡在中国已经合作多年，而联想早已通过为IBM贴牌生产而为其所熟悉，杜克普爱华股份公司和上工申贝则是通过持续多年的谈判而加深了解的。

从就业的角度来看，并购对三家企业的员工和当地就业率都产生了积极影响：联想的员工总数在三年之内翻了一番，从85名增长到170名，瓦德里希科堡的员工总数在三年内从500名增至700名，同期杜克普爱华员工总数从450名增至555名。

在员工总数增加的同时，公司收支平衡表也表现良好，这些都令人感到振奋，而且非常有利于减少在艰难的过渡期可能发生的磨擦。事实证明，员工们在并购初期所产生的疑虑或恐惧感是没有根据的，并为后来的正面发展而一一化解。互相之间的信任感也日益建立起来。

宝钢、中国五矿集团和海尔选择了另外一种市场进入方式。它们先在德国成立代表处，后来又升格成为子公司。它们所具有的最大共同点就是一步步地由代表处成功发展成有限责任公司。代表处找到市场切入点，业务的扩大则带来本土化：登记公司归属所在地法院管理、确立对德国税务局的纳税义务和聘用当地员工。所有的例子都证明，坚持不懈地推进业务本土化是成功的。

因为只有这样，企业才能够成功地应对共同的挑战，在国际运做的中国母公司和德国当地子公司之间完成一个漂亮的高难度动作。可以期待的是，将会有越来越多的中国企业直接以建立子公司的方式进入德国市场，因为它们可以充分利用先行者与日俱增的宝贵经验，在国际化程度较高的层面上进行启动。另外一个因素是：愈来愈大的国际

Measures Adopted During and Shortly after Market Entry

Find out more about the merger of corporate cultures in "Post-Merger Integration and Corporate Culture

Among the workforce of the target company acquisitions often lead to uncertainty about the future of their jobs. In cases where the businesses are very similar suspicions soon begin to arise about the imminence of redundancies motivated by a desire to exploit the possibility of synergies. In the case of Dürkopp Adler and Waldrich Coburg there was some disquiet about the takeover, though the Chinese managed to dispose of this very quickly and thus pre-empted conflict and a loss in performance. At the time of the takeover they clearly communicated their intention to keep the company going at the old location. Chinese president Zhicheng Cui at Beijing No. 1 said "You cannot transplant a German oak" and his words were followed up by deeds, such as refurbishing some of the buildings and increasing the production levels. Apart from this the profits generated were ploughed back into the business in order to keep making further improvements. All these measures promoted mutual trust and cooperation between the two partners.

Human resources measures can do a lot to accelerate the integration process, for example, by the formation of mixed teams. The "2-in-the-box" system introduced by Lenovo for the period after the takeover brought together Chinese and German employees to perform certain tasks, so that mutual understanding for the various different approaches emerged in a very short space of time

Find out more about Diversity Management in "Synergy by Diversity"

Companies which were embarking on internationalization on the basis of organic growth also recognized the significance of intercultural cooperation and made use of similar measures in order to structure the interfaces between the German locations and the Chinese parent companies. Haier, for example, introduced the concept known as "1+1+n" for its European operations. This brings together in a team employees with a knowledge of the parent company, the industry and the local market and thus promotes the development of their skills.

Regional know-how is required in order to be successful in regional markets, and in the companies featured in this study Sino-German teams proved to be very effective when it comes to adapting to local conditions and coordinating their work.

竞争压力将日益挤压小心翼翼往前摸索的空间。

这里介绍的一组企业也表明，长期的关系或共有的经验有助于子公司在一个新的地方成功启动。就拿中国五矿集团德国分公司选址在杜塞尔多夫为例，是因为他们与当地工业界早已建立起联系，在这之前更有日本投资者积累了好经验，而这座城市也长期不懈努力吸引中国企业。宝钢欧洲有限公司选择汉堡扎根，是因为汉堡和中国长期协作的结果。

进入市场时和进入市场后短期内的措施

您可以参阅《企业后台管理与企业文化》（德语及英语版本），了解更多关于企业文化的内容。

并购往往会引起被并购的企业员工对他们工作岗位的担忧。正因为两家企业的业务领域相近，自然担心企业靠裁员来创造优化组合效应。杜克普爱华和瓦德里希科堡公司也曾因为并购而人心浮动，不过中国方面很快就让员工稳定下来，化解了冲突也防止了产能下滑：他们在并购时就开宗明义，公司将继续原地经营。北京第一机床厂厂长崔志成说："德国的橡树不能移栽。"无论是维修厂房还是扩大生产，他说到做到。他还将利润留在企业以图发展。这些措施增强了合作双方的信心，也促进了双方的合作。

在人事方面采取措施，比如说建立中德员工合作小组，尤其能够加快融合的过程。联想在并购后引入的"双元"体系使中德两国员工在完成任务时精诚合作，不同的问题处理方式很快就得到互相的理解。

以有机增长的方式进行国际化的公司也认识到了跨文化合作的重要性，并且采取相

Of course, such cooperation naturally presupposes that the employees have confidence in the company. Such confidence was created by emphasizing the significance of the German location and expressing a high opinion of the German workforce, which had a positive effect on the motivation of the staff and on the corporate culture. For this reason Marc Fischer, the manager of Lenovo, bolstered the confidence of his employees after the takeover by telling them that IBM's PC division had been acquired precisely on account of its outstanding workforce with its specialist and industry-specific skills. The managing directors of Haier, Shubao Sun, and Minmetals, Gang Han, always emphasized, when explaining the role of independent GmbHs, the great strategic importance of the German market for the whole of the European business. The managing director of Baosteel Europe, Meng Ye, spoke of the long and forward-looking partnership between the port cities of Hamburg and Shanghai.

All of the companies managed to say and do things designed to dispel the insecurity of the employees concerned, thereby giving them new motivation and laying the foundations for the establishment of mutual trust. However, this in particular cannot be achieved with the help of short-term action, and needs to be structured on a long-term basis.

Medium-term and Long-term Measures

After having set up a propitious starting point for ongoing cooperation, there was a need for long-term concepts designed to reinforce trust and confidence. Mutual tolerance and understanding among employees on all hierarchical levels for alternative methods of solving problems turned out to be of fundamental importance. Appropriate management of the daily encounter of cultural groups (German and Chinese) with their different views and systems is a distinct challenge. It should be the goal of the corporate leadership, especially in an intercultural environment, to eschew emotional and subjective views, if possible, in favour of rational and objective ideas. Better arguments should determine the outcome of a debate, not the ingrained views of individual employees or departments. In order to attain to this goal, it will above all be imperative to initiate an exchange and a discussion of different ideas and problem-solving approaches, and employees will have to be motivated in every possible way to take part in it. A culture of dialogue should be created in which both sides consider each other's input to be an enrichment and not a restriction on anyone's decision-making freedom. All the case studies demonstrate that in this area the management should serve as a role model.

您可以参阅《多元化协同》(德语及英语版本)，了解更多关于企业文化多元性的潜力的内容。

似措施，在德国分公司所在地与中国母公司之间搭建接口：例如海尔为高层管理引入了与“双元”体系非常相象的“1+1+n组合”的系统，把员工关于母公司、本行业和当地市场的知识在小组里进行整合，从而提升了他们的能力。

若想在某个地区的市场成功，对那个地区的了解是不可缺少的。因为中德员工小组特别适合于伙伴之间的协调，这种形式的人员组合在调查的企业中被证实是成功的。

当然，员工之间的信任是协作的前提。这种信任可以通过强调德国所在地的重要性和德国员工特殊的价值建立起来，它对激励员工积极进取和树立企业文化都发生正面的影响。所以联想总经理马克·费舍尔培养员工的信任，在时间上并不只局限于并购时期。他对员工说：IBM电脑部正是因为员工专业和行业知识出色才被并购的。海尔德国公司总经理孙叔宝和五矿德国公司总经理韩刚在解释独立的有限责任公司的作用时，一直强调德国市场对于整个欧洲业务的战略重要性。宝钢欧洲公司总经理叶萌则提到了港口城市汉堡与上海之间，历史悠久而又面向未来的伙伴关系。

所有企业都成功地做到了言行一致，减少随着并购而加盟新公司的员工心中的疑虑，给予他们新的动力，也为建立互信铺上了基石。而建立互信不仅仅需要短期行为，更须长虑远谋。

中长期措施

在打好了合作的最初的基础之后，必须用长期方案增强信任感：事实证明，各级

Dürkopp Adler has adopted a long-term approach which it uses in the case of its top executives; it resembles Lenovo's "2-in-the-box" system, which helped to overcome obstacles encountered shortly after market entry. The equal status of the partners in the case of Dürkopp Adler and the SGSB Group is demonstrated by the mixed leadership of the top executives. This also sets an example for the rest of the corporation.

In home-grown subsidiaries intercultural cooperation between Chinese managing directors and their German executives should also set an example. Here it is above all a question of which functions and tasks are to be performed by local German or expatriate Chinese managers and specialists, and, generally speaking, how great the influence of the Chinese headquarters should be on the conduct of local business.. The cases all have in common a stepwise transfer of leadership and decision-making responsibilities to local German managers. They are to be (co)responsible primarily for the implementation of decisions prompted by changing market conditions, for contacts with customers, and the management of German employees, either in the role of managing director, or of an executive with power of attorney, or her deputy.

Other strategies had to be pursued in the case of the acquisition of German companies, for here the new Chinese owners were confronted with established structures, and often they recognized that it was not a good idea to change them too quickly. The experience of harmonizing the strategic planning of the companies in the merger as quickly as possible, and of keeping the operational side of the business in the hands of trusted local employees, was a positive one. This path was also chosen by companies which grew out of representative offices with mainly Chinese employees and in the course of the expansion of their businesses adapted functions such marketing, human resources management or sales to local conditions. Such a localization of tasks and functions can be accelerated by adopting three specific measures: comprehensive communication on each level, a strictly open-door policy, that is, mutual and informal access without hierarchical or cultural exclusion, and the joint targeting of the new goals.

The creation of a corporate identity which emphasizes what the two partners have in common and what their strengths are, and expresses itself in the processes and structures of the company, is important both internally and externally. An example of this is supplied by the machine tool company Waldrich Coburg, which in its company newspaper communicates the idea that success is the result of joint work, thereby promoting a positive external image of the company. Regional social commitment underpins this effect and shows that the company is integrated in more ways than one, and not only in the economic sphere.

员工之间的互相宽容和理解，是找到独辟蹊径的问题解决方案的根本。文化背景不同的中国人和德国人在一起共事，形形色色的观点和系统每天都会发生碰撞，挑战在于如何对此进行适当的调控。在跨文化的环境氛围里，企业领导的目标正应当努力将主观的情绪化的观点变为客观的理性化的考量。起决定作用的不应当是个别员工和部门先入为主的意见，而应当是更完善的理由。为此首先就必须对解决问题的各种方案和想法进行讨论和交流，激励员工以各种方式积极参与。应当让对话的文化蔚然成风，使双方都感到对方的提议不但没有限制，而是加强了自己的决定自由权。所有的案例都表明，管理层对此起到了表率作用。

为了克服种种障碍，联想在进入德国市场后不久就引入了“双元”体系。与之相似，杜克普爱华对高级管理层采用的是一种长期的机制：在共同组成的管理层中，对待来自杜克普爱华和上工申贝集团的高级管理人员都一视同仁。而这对整个企业都起到了示范的作用。

即使是在成长顺利的分公司里，中国总经理与他们的德国管理层之间跨文化的合作仍然起着表率的作用。在这里首先出现的问题就是：当地德国经理和中国派来的经理各自有哪些职责和负责哪些任务，中国总部对分公司的日常经营施加多大的影响。所有案例共同表明：领导责任和决定权都是分解为很多步骤逐渐转移给当地德国经理的。这些德国经理主要负责执行更加接近市场需求的决定、与客户联络沟通和领导德国员工。其职务则分为总经理、公司代理人或副总经理。

与此相反，并购的德国企业必须实行其他的战略方针，因为在这里中国的新股东所面对的是固有的结构。他们常常能够认识

The Abilities and Skills of Executives and Employees

The selection of employees and executives and the way in which vacancies are filled is a task that is crucial to intercultural management. Companies tend to be especially successful if they select their employees not only on the basis of special qualifications, but also on account of international experience, and build up a workforce consisting of well educated younger employees and more mature employees with a great deal of experience.

In cases where market entry occurred through the acquisition of a German company, Chinese top executives are primarily responsible for developing a joint strategy with their German colleagues. It is their duty to combine the know-how of their German partner, which always forms part of the purchasing decision, since it is the core capital of the acquired company, with the goals of the parent company, and to translate them into the operational business. Here again trust and reticence have proved their worth, as is demonstrated in the case of Waldrich Coburg. Zhicheng Cui summed this up as follows: "I can only advise other companies in a similar situation to give the German managers all the freedom they need and to cultivate a reticent leadership style." Positive experiences of the kind which Beijing No. 1 had in the case of the Franconian machine tool company make it easy for a Chinese managing director to explain the strategies elaborated to his Chinese headquarters, even if from a distance the latter cannot always understand why there is a need to adapt to local conditions.

This interface function calls for balanced communication. Special communicative skills are needed in order to carry along all those involved and to motivate them to cooperate. With the successful completion of this task the intercultural competence of the Chinese managers increases, and thus it makes sense to teach such skills to younger managers in China, for example, by means of the kind of mentoring programme that Baosteel has introduced. In this way talented young executives can be supported in a systematic way and, on the basis of the experience of their older superiors, trained in the long term to be international executives.

In the subsidiaries in Germany that have grown organically the Chinese managers are also required to shape the interface between the German subsidiary and the Chinese parent company as described above. However, they also have the demanding task of actually managing employees from both cultural groups and do not merely have to cast their votes at executive meetings. Thus, in addition to

到，改变这种结构不可能一蹴而就。而他们获得的正面经验，就是在企业并购之后尽快制定和谐的战略规划，日常经营则继续让久经考验的当地管理人员负责。那些由主要以中国人负责的代表处发展起来的企业，也选择了这一途径，以求在市场营销、人员管理或者产品销售等方面，更进一步适应当地的条件。以下三条措施可以加快实现这种任务和职能的本土化：各个层面的全方位沟通、严格的开放式政策（即互相之间不拘形式的开放、消除级别与文化封闭）和共同确立新目标。

创立一个能充分体现伙伴双方共同点、强调各自的强项、表现企业程序和结构的企业形象，对于公司内部和对外展示都是十分重要的。机器设备制造商瓦德里希科堡提供了一个范例：它在公司内部刊物上把成功归结为共同努力的结果，同时也引起外部正面的反应。在地区和社会工作方面的积极参与，则有助于扩大影响力，表明企业不仅仅局限于融入经济领域而已。

领导层和员工的能力

选聘员工和管理人员是跨文化管理的中心任务。事实证明，那些在挑选员工时，不仅仅以专业知识为唯一标准，而且重视员工的国际经验的企业是非常成功的。这些企业的后备力量都受过良好的职业教育，它们的员工经验丰富。

通过并购德国公司进入市场的中国高管首要任务就是和德国同事一起制定战略。这样他们就必须把在决定并购时，始终作为核心资产的德国伙伴的专业知识与总公司的目标联系起来，而且在日常工作中有效利用。这也证实，满怀信任的克制是成功的。正如瓦德里希科堡所展示的那样，"我可以给和我们情况相同的企业一个建议，在管理方面

a knowledge of international business practices, a crucial ability is to be able to understand the cultural peculiarities of their employees.

In the companies included in this study the German managers have different functions. In the case of the acquisitions they are in charge of the operational side of the business, though they also have to coordinate their activities with the Chinese owners and are then confronted with challenges which resemble those facing the Chinese managing directors. It is their job to harmonize the local decisions with the strategies of the parent company.

The situation is different in the case of branches set up by the parent company. Here German executives are subordinated to a Chinese managing director. They are recruited and esteemed on account of their comprehensive knowledge of the local market, which is why, in the cases included in this study, the Chinese owners as a rule opted in favour of experienced and capable specialists. They possess the knowledge needed to adapt the Chinese company to the local conditions. Whenever their ideas do not coincide with those of the Chinese headquarters, it is the task of the Chinese managing director to mediate and to align the specific decision-making competence of the German executive and the strategy of the headquarters in China.

On the work level the challenges tend to be of a more functional and not of a strategic intercultural kind. For example, in some cases, when it comes to financial reporting, the Chinese do the cost accounting and internal reporting back to headquarters in China. On the other hand, the German employees deal with external accountancy and taxation issues. In the areas of technology and sales German engineers or marketing experts manage the design of the products and customer relationships. However, in some cases product requirements have to be sent to headquarters in China, where Chinese employees deal with this task. In such cases international cooperation within the company shows how resilient it is, since all this has to be based on mutual respect and trust.

As a result of the assignment of these functions such tasks cannot be successfully dealt with without close cooperation and a lively exchange of information. In the final analysis it is all about developing a joint sense of responsibility and exchanging ideas, and not about using specific assignments to demarcate responsibilities and to isolate certain work processes and employees. Intercultural awareness heightened by means of workshops or by travelling to headquarters in China, which in some companies stands at the beginning of systematic implementation, can accelerate this process.

给德国管理层充分的自由，要保持矜持的领导风格。”崔志成这样说。虽然因为距离遥远而不容易弄清楚如何才能适应当地的具体情况，北京第一机床厂和这家弗兰肯地区机器设备制造商合作的正面经验已经多到如此地步，致使它的中国总经理只需把他们制定的战略传给中国总部而已。

这样的接口功能首先需要的是流畅的沟通。要想把所有参与者调动起来共同合作，就必须具备特别强的沟通能力。能胜任这样的任务，中国总经理的跨文化工作能力就能得到极大的提高。而象宝钢那样，通过指导人传帮带的方式将这种能力传授给中国国内后备干部更是意义深远。这样一来，年轻的人才就可以得到系统的培养，长期接受老上级经验的熏陶，他们就会成长为能适应国际化的领军人物。

即使是在以有机增长方式获得的德国分支机构里，中国总经理也必须在德国子公司和中国母公司之间搭建这种接口。不过他们还有一项高要求的任务，那就是直接领导来自两种文化圈的员工，而不是仅仅在封闭的高层做决定。除了熟悉国际业务的常规以外，拥有对自己员工的文化特性方面的知识十分重要。

在调查的案例当中，德国经理有着不同的职能。在并购的公司里他们主持日常工作，但是还必须和中国所有者协商，除此之外他们所面对的挑战也和中国总经理相似：必须使当地的决定与母公司的战略协调一致。

建立分公司则不同。这里的德国管理人员是处于中国总经理之下的“二号人物”。由于他们拥有丰富的当地市场知识而被聘用和受重视，所以在调查的案例当中，中国所有者通常决定聘用有经验和执行能力强的专

The Cultural Integration of Mixed Workforces

Particular attention must be paid to the integration of Chinese employees in Germany: They are often expatriates who have to cope simultaneously with both job-related and private adaptation problems. A German person with a knowledge of Chinese who can help Chinese expatriates on account of his or her linguistic skills and local knowledge, even when it comes to dealing with private matters, can make a crucial contribution to the cultural integration of Chinese employees. In some cases a managerial assistant has performed this function, and also that of acting as a mediator between German employees and their Chinese superiors. Once cooperation has actually started, some German employees tend to fight shy of communicating unpleasant facts to a Chinese superior, partly on account of the language barrier and because they are unsure about how he will react. The appointment of a mediator has proved its worth with regard to both functions, and with the expansion of activities and competences he will no doubt be used even more.

Thus it becomes clear that in addition to formal procedures there need to be informal exchanges which make it possible for employees to get to know each other and to interact, so that the "social glue" of the company can emerge. If this is the case, successful cooperative management of the multinational corporate culture can also be pursued at the lower executive levels. In all of the companies examined in this study activities which transcended work itself were a successful introduction to an informal exchange of views. They included joint outings, meetings or mutual visits (for example, as in the case of the employees of Dürkopp Adler AG and ShangGong Holding).

Help with integration no doubt improved the chances of actually finding Chinese specialists with a knowledge of the German market, and of persuading them to move to Germany. Because career opportunities and the standard of living has risen quite clearly in China and going abroad has thus become far less attractive in view of the negative impact this tends to have on the private lives of the individuals concerned, far fewer qualified Chinese specialists can now be persuaded to come to work in Germany, and those who come are demanding greater compensation. This is another reason why the proportion of Chinese employees at German locations has tended to decline whilst that of local German employees has risen.

The growing recruitment of German employees shows that the companies are interested primarily in specialist training, knowledge of the market and cultural proximity to the customer. Chinese people who live in Germany possess these

业人才。他们为中国企业适应当地情况带来了必不可少的知识。当他们的建议与中国总部的决策相左时，中国总经理的中间人职能就凸显出来了，这时候他就得在德国管理层的特别决定权和中国总部的战略决策之间进行斡旋。

在工作层面，跨文化挑战更多地体现在职能方面而非战略方面。例如在财务上，有的公司是中方负责内部财务监控和对总公司的数据上报。德国同事则处理对外财务和有关税法方面的问题。在技术和销售部门是德国工程师和营销专家负责推出产品和联系客户。在一些企业里，产品要求必须报告给中国总公司，这一任务一般是由中国同事完成。公司内部的国际合作体现的是它的承载能力，而承载能力是要建立在互相尊重和信任的基础之上的。

正是因为这样的职能分配，决定了如果没有密切的合作和频繁的信息交流，任务根本无法完成。最终的目的是要确立共同的责任，交换各种意见，而不是因为分工而限制责任，甚至将工作流程和员工孤立起来。通过工作培训的形式或者象一些企业在系统执行的初期那样，安排员工去中国出差而增加跨文化的敏感性，可以加速这一趋势的发展。

不同国籍员工的文化融合

中国员工在德国的融合需要特别的照顾：他们大都是被派往海外的员工，要在职业和个人生活两个方面同时适应新环境。选出一个懂中文的德国同事当联系人来出主意想办法，用母语和国情方面的知识帮助中国同事处理一些私事，这对于中国同事的文化融合是具有实质意义的。在几个案例当中，总经理助理发挥了这个作用，并且在德国同事和中国领导之间充当中间人的角色。合作

qualities, and they also understand the cultural background of the parent company. Recruiting them means that a company is not only acquiring much-needed local skills and knowledge, for on account of their dual cultural identity they can also perform the function of an intercultural bridge. However, not all of the companies have started to make systematic use of this option.

In future Chinese companies in Germany will be shaped even more by their German employees. Thus their success will be determined to all intents and purposes by how successful they are in identifying and recruiting the right employees, and how effectively they can make use of their abilities. Strategic intercultural human resources management is the real key to success. Only cooperative organization of the various competences, and this begins with recruitment, can promote the requisite localization of the value chain in the German market, harmonization with the strategic goals of the Chinese owners, and the attainment of synergy effects. Only rational conflict management in which both sides are willing to learn from one another can minimize the damage caused by people rubbing each other up the wrong way. It presupposes an atmosphere of mutual trust. And this needs to increase and be expanded on an ongoing basis.

之初，一些德国员工往往不敢在中国领导的面前陈述令人不快的事实，可能是出于语言障碍，也可能他们还不知道领导如何反应。设立中间人发挥这两项作用已经证实是十分有效的，当然其工作范围和权限还可以进一步扩大和加强。

因此很明显，除了工作上的措施，还应当为员工提供非正式的途径，让他们有机会互相学习与交流，这样才会产生企业的“社会粘合剂”。多民族企业文化的协作管理才能够在领导层进一步发扬光大。所有受访企业都证实，工余的集体活动是进行非正式交流的成功开端：包括共同的活动、聚会或者互访（例如杜克普爱华和上工申贝集团员工之间的互访）。

融合上的支持不仅能提高中国专业技术人员熟悉德国市场的机会，而且可能鼓励他们在德国居留。由于在中国职业发展机会的增加和生活质量的明显提高，同时在国外居留使个人生活方式受到种种限制，而导致其吸引力下降。虽然薪金越来越高，找到愿意在德国工作的中国高级专门人才却越来越难。不仅如此，当地德国员工数的增加，也使得中国员工在德国分公司里所占的比例越来越小。

企业招聘德国员工愈来愈多，特别重视专业学历、市场知识和对客户的文化亲近感。在德国生活的中国人不但具备这些特长，而且还熟知母公司的文化背景。聘用他们获得的不仅仅是期望中的来自当地的知识与能力，他们更可以因为其双重文化背景，而成为跨文化交流的桥梁。不过，这一资源尚未得到所有企业系统性地开发利用。

在将来，落户德国的中国企业一定会更加多地受到德国员工的影响。它们的成败将取决于在多大程度上找到、招到和有效使用

The Way Ahead

Chinese companies do not come to Germany as “saviours,” either of companies or of the economy as a whole, nor do they come to “snap up bargains.” They enter the German market with due care and a great deal of hope, they have their ups and downs, and they would like to expand their businesses. This is not peculiar to Germany, and it is not a threat to German industry. The market entry of German corporations in China offered opportunities for the companies concerned and strengthened the economies of both countries. The same pattern may be expected in Germany. In the right configuration the process has potential for both sides, as the present case studies demonstrate. These companies are the harbingers of what is to come. Others will follow, will learn from their predecessors, and shape their market entry quickly and efficiently. Intercultural management skills will increase steadily, and at the same time the companies will pursue a policy of localization and become more and more domestic. Shaping intercultural cooperation is of crucial importance if this development is to succeed. The findings presented here are intended to provide all those who are involved in the internationalization of Chinese corporations with some ideas and suggestions, and these may enable them to seize some of the opportunities and meet the challenges with which they are confronted. ■

合适的员工。战略性跨文化人事管理是成功的钥匙。只有协调组织在招聘时就已经考虑到的专门能力，才能够一方面推进在德国本土市场上的获利，另一方面同时协调中国企业所有者的战略目标并取得协同效应。只有双方互相学习的、理性的冲突管理，才能达到磨擦损失最小化的效果。而这唯一的基础就是双方互信的关系。这种关系需要持续不断的加强。

展望

无论是在公司个体还是在经济层面而言，中国企业不是以“救星”的身份，也不是以“买手”的身份来到德国的。它们怀着很大的期望谨慎地进入德国市场，积累经验、扩展业务。这不是什么德国特例，更不是对德国经济的威胁。恰恰相反，正如德国企业进入中国市场一样：不仅企业获得机会，而且两国的经济得到加强。在德国我们期待着同样的结果。正如这里展示的例子，如果配置正确，这一过程能给双方都提供机遇。这里介绍的企业是先遣队，更有大批后来者向这些先驱学习，迅速高效进入市场。它们的跨文化管理能力将不断得到提高，同时企业将更进一步本土化。而这一发展趋势的成败，取决于如何进行跨文化的合作。

在“中国企业在德国——机会与挑战”这一项目实施的过程中，我们能够见识到德国和中国的企业领导层、员工和顾问以极大的热忱在迎接这一使命。我们感谢参加本研究的各界同仁，他们为此尽心尽力，传授经验，贡献良多。但愿这些经验能为所有中国企业国际化的参与者们，在抓住机遇应对挑战时，激发出思想的火花。■

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贝恩德・米夏埃尔・林克博士自1998年执教于耶拿弗里德里希-席勒大学，讲授跨文化经济交流，专业为东亚。在获得汉学博士学位后他在东亚工作16年，其中有6年供职于德意志学术交流中心驻韩国办事处。他组建了蒙古乌兰巴托大学外事学院德语专业，并为一家广告代理商工作，同时也是一家经济杂志的记者。林克博士的研究领域有东亚现代史、经济史、跨文化管理、文化人类学和比较宗教学。他出版了大量与东亚有关的著作，最新一部为《宗教里的仪式》（2004年于法兰克福出版）。

安德雷斯・科罗斯克博士自2008年11月起供职于凯捷咨询公司。此前他在弗莱贝格工业大学贝格科学院的企业经济学、企业领导和人力资源专业任教，负责讲授领导管理、组织、人力资源和战略方面的课程。他的研究重心在于国际管理，并专注于国际性合资企业和联盟组织在中国的发展。他的研究成果常见于国际学术杂志和会议论文。他还负责多家本地及跨国企业的咨询项目。

斯太芳妮・索姆从2006年起，负责贝塔斯曼基金会的"全球化进程中的企业文化"项目。她的工作重点为企业内部和企业间的国际合作，企业中面向未来的工作环境以及非物质形态价值的建构和引导。她先后在曼海姆大学、卡尔斯鲁厄大学和西班牙的科尔多巴大学攻读以国际管理为重点的企业管理经济学。之后，她曾任职于德国和美国的私人企业和非营利组织，并且在曼谷市的朱拉隆功大学担任客座讲师。■

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  Blazejewski, Susanne / Dorow, Wolfgang

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